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This dissertation focuses on applying operations research techniques to problems arising in
the energy sector. The work presented attempts to push the existing frontiers in energy
optimization by adding to an existing open-source framework in electricity infrastructure
optimization and applying bilevel programming to relatively unexplored applications in nat-
ural gas market modeling. This dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an
introduction encompassing a brief description and motivation for the dissertation’s work.
The future development of the U.S. electricity sector will be shaped by technological,
economic, and policy drivers whose trajectories are highly uncertain. Chapter 2 describes
an optimization model for the integrated generation and transmission system in the con-
tinental U.S., which is used to explore electricity infrastructure pathways from the present
through 2050. By comparing and contrasting results from numerous scenarios and sensitivity
settings, we ultimately affirm five key policy-relevant insights. (1) U.S. electricity can be
substantially decarbonized at a modest cost, but complete decarbonization is very costly.
(2)Significant expansion of solar PV and wind to combine for at least 40% of the generation
mix by 2050 is fairly certain. However, solar PV and battery storage are more affected by
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economic and policy assumptions than wind. (3) Investments in long-distance transmission
are minimal, while investments in battery storage are much more significant under a wide
range of assumptions. (4) Optimal solutions include large investments in natural gas capac-
ity, but gas capacity utilization rates decline steadily and significantly. (5) Cost structures
shift away from operating expenditures and toward capital expenditures, especially under
climate policy. We conclude our article by discussing the policy implications of these findings.
Chapter 3 presents a bilevel programming model to aid decision-making in natural gas
markets where multiple autonomous agents interact strategically, possibly with conflicting
interests. In the proposed model, a liquefied natural gas (LNG) operator is the leader, and
a natural gas (NG) producer is the follower. The LNG operator attempts to optimally lo-
cate LNG export terminals, purchase gas from the NG producer, and export it as LNG.
The NG producer aims to optimize production, pipeline investments, and sales to domestic
consumers and the LNG operator. To solve the bilevel problem, we first reformulate it as
a single-level problem by exploiting the lower-level problem’s convexity. Then, we use dis-
junctive reformulations of complementarity constraints and piecewise linear approximations
of objective function terms to convert the problem into a convex quadratic mixed-integer
program (QMIP). Computational experiments confirm that the QMIP is tractable and can
be solved efficiently. We apply our bilevel framework to a case study of the Gulf-Southwest
region of the United States and evaluate several decision-making scenarios. The scenario re-
sults emphasize the importance of using the bilevel methodology to anticipate the effects of
new LNG export facilities on NG prices across the domestic gas network. Adding these large
gas-consuming facilities at specific locations puts upward pressure on domestic gas prices,
although this is somewhat mitigated by the NG producer’s optimal production response to
the increased demand.
Chapter 4 presents a risk-based integer bilevel programming model that considers two
players in a leader-follower setting, where each tries to maximize their individual profits.
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The leader or manufacturer makes decisions pertaining to facility location and the amount
of raw material to buy from the supplier. The supplier or follower decides how much raw
material to produce. Both players face demand uncertainty in their respective markets while
making investment, production, and sales decisions. We develop models for optimal decision-
making under risk-neutral and risk-averse objectives and explore the effects of different risk
attitudes on the problem and its optimal solution. These problems are hard to solve as
the number of scenarios increase, and solving them generally involves developing customized
algorithms. To find feasible solutions to the resulting stochastic bilevel problem, an algorithm
is developed that iteratively solves a restricted version of the problem to obtain feasible
solutions to the original problem. Extensive computational experiments are performed to
evaluate algorithmic tractability and solution quality. The proposed algorithm is able to
find high-quality feasible solutions to the bilevel problem in very reasonable amount of time,
and the attained solutions are found to be close to the optimal solution. The methodology
is demonstrated with an example that addresses strategic issues in the natural gas market.
The model considers two players, the liquefied natural gas (LNG) operator or leader and
the natural gas (NG) producer or follower acting in a leader-follower setting. The LNG
operator makes decisions pertaining to the locations of LNG facilities and the amount of gas
to buy from the producer. The follower decides how much gas to produce. Both players
face demand uncertainty in their respective markets and make investments, production, and
sales decisions. The case study explores the Gulf-Southwest region of the United States
and demonstrates the impact of the risk-averse decision-making approach on investment and
operational decisions.
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation by summarizing the most important findings from
each study and outlining valuable directions for future research.
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Two of the most prominent features of the ongoing energy transition are the substitution
of coal by natural gas and the rise of cost-effective renewable technologies. The degree
to which the United States (U.S.) electricity system would transform to incorporate more
renewable-based generation and the pace at which it is expected to happen is often debated.
It is of deep interest to see how the U.S. electricity system would evolve in the years to come
and the extent to which renewables would penetrate the generation fleet. This question
is further explored in detail in this dissertation and how the future of the U.S. electricity
system would be shaped.
The abundance of supply and affordable prices for natural gas driven by the shale revolu-
tion, along with its lower carbon footprint compared to coal, has brought on much significance
to natural gas in the past decade. Moreover, the future transition to renewable generation
is often accompanied by the opinion of natural gas power plants as a complementary gener-
ation to renewable generation sources. The ability of natural gas power plant capacity to be
ramped up or down with relative ease compared to other conventional sources of generation
coupled with low fuel prices could make them a perfect transition fuel. The natural gas
market involves multiple players and many moving parts. Natural gas prices are impacted
by various factors, including events and trends happening globally and domestically. The
increase in global natural gas demand and the shale gas revolution in the U.S. has paved
the way for the emergence of the LNG export industry in the U.S. In this dissertation, we
attempt to study how the LNG export industry’s emergence would impact domestic gas
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markets in terms of prices and natural gas availability.
Optimization in energy can lower energy costs while improving operational performance
and has gained significant importance over the years. It can aid in making high-cost and
high-risk investments efficiently while mitigating risks and maximizing profits. In this dis-
sertation, we develop optimization models to aid decision-making in the energy sector. The
methodologies proposed in this dissertation have various applications. While it can be used
as a business strategy tool wherein a firm attempts to maximize profits or choose an op-
timal investment portfolio, these models also find applications in developing policies and
regulations for a given objective like achieving environmental objectives.
The electricity sector in the U.S. has undergone multiple changes in terms of technologies
and policies. The changes in the past decade have significantly shifted focus to the diversi-
fication of the electricity sector. The falling cost of renewable technologies, including solar
photovoltaic (PV) panels, wind turbines, and battery storage, have brought the discussion
of renewable energy sources and their integration into the generation mix in the U.S. to the
forefront. Conventional generation technologies like coal have been declining in usage over
the past decade, with natural gas surpassing coal as the primary fuel in electricity genera-
tion, and this trend is expected to continue. Hence, it becomes pertinent to study how the
electricity generation landscape in the U.S. would change in response to the penetration of
renewable technologies, clean energy initiatives, government regulations, and policies that
will impact the generation fleet in the years to come.
The U.S. is expected to transition from being an importer of natural gas to an exporter
in the near future, caused due to the low natural gas prices owing to the shale gas revolution.
Natural gas is a major energy source in the U.S. and has multiple applications, including but
not limited to electricity generation, residential and commercial heating, and transportation.
Natural gas production in the U.S. has been growing steadily in the past decade and is
projected to continue well into the next decade, with the U.S. expected to become a net
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exporter by 2022 (Conti et al., 2018). The increase in the global natural gas demand has
resulted in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade’s rapid growth. The LNG operators work
by procuring natural gas locally and using large liquefaction facilities to liquefy the natural
gas. The liquefied gas is then transported globally to regasification centers using specially
designed tankers. The regasification centers convert the LNG into natural gas, which is then
sold in the regional markets. The U.S. was the third-largest exporter of LNG in 2019, and
the export volume is expected to increase with multiple LNG facilities in the U.S. expected
to become operational in subsequent years. We can anticipate that an increasing fraction of
domestically produced gas in the U.S. will be sold to LNG operators for export to foreign
markets. The LNG operators significantly increase demand for gas supplies in the regions
where they operate, and the presence of these large demands will exert influence on the local
market players in the region. The high gas demand can influence the natural gas production
in the region and the local spot market dynamics, influencing the gas consumption and prices
in the spot market. Therefore it is imperative to study the strategic interactions between
the LNG operator and the natural gas producer under a non-cooperative setting and how
they make decisions in response to each other’s presence.
The dissertation comprises work that primarily focuses on developing decision-making
tools pertaining to infrastructure investment and operational decisions for the energy sector.
The case studies used to demonstrate the methodologies focus on the electricity sector and
natural gas markets in the United States. The work presented in this dissertation attempts
to push the existing frontiers in energy optimization by adding to an existing open-source
framework in electricity infrastructure optimization and using bilevel programming to study
natural gas markets, which has not been done before to the best of my knowledge. The
dissertation is broadly divided into the following components:
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1.1 U.S. electricity infrastructure of the future: Generation and
transmission pathways through 2050
The first part of the dissertation focuses on designing an electricity infrastructure plan-
ning model for the continental U.S. and exploring how the electricity infrastructure will
evolve over the next several decades. We develop a least-cost optimization model of the
integrated generation and transmission system in the continental U.S., which includes 13
regions, representative 24-hour profiles for every season, with investment and capacity de-
cisions made every five years. We apply this model to the U.S. electricity network for a
time frame of 35 years, from 2016-2050, to identify generation and transmission expansion
pathways under multiple scenarios. The future development of the U.S. electricity sector will
be shaped by technological, economic, and policy drivers whose trajectories are highly un-
certain. We consider four scenarios representing various parametric assumptions and policy
interventions in the model to analyze these effects. The results obtained from these scenarios
reveal several policy-relevant insights, which are summarized below.
1. U.S. electricity can be substantially decarbonized at modest cost, but complete decar-
bonization is very costly.
2. Significant expansion of solar PV and wind to combine for at least 40% of the generation
mix by 2050 is fairly certain, although solar PV and battery storage are more affected
by economic and policy assumptions than wind.
3. Investments in long-distance transmission are very limited, while investments in battery
storage are much greater, under a wide range of assumptions.
4. Optimal solutions include large investments in natural gas capacity, but gas capacity
utilization rates decline steadily and significantly.
4
5. Cost structures shift away from operating expenditures and toward capital expendi-
tures, especially under climate policy.
The scenario-specific results and their policy implications are further discussed in detail in
this chapter.
1.2 Strategic interactions between liquefied natural gas and do-
mestic gas markets: A bilevel model
In the second part of the dissertation, we develop a bilevel model to aid decision-making
in natural gas markets where multiple autonomous agents interact strategically, possibly
with conflicting interests. The proposed model consists of two players, a liquefied natural
gas (LNG) operator and natural gas (NG) producer operating under a leader-follower setting.
The LNG operator purchases gas from the NG producer, liquefies it at the LNG terminals,
and ships it to the overseas LNG market. The LNG operator makes high fixed cost and
lumpy decisions and hence is considered the leader. The LNG operator’s decisions include
optimally locating the LNG terminals, the amount of gas to purchase from the NG producer,
and the sales quantities and prices in LNG markets. The NG producer is the follower and
attempts to optimize the production, pipeline investments, and sales to domestic consumers
and the LNG operator.
The bilevel problem is solved by reformulating it into a single-level problem by exploit-
ing the lower-level problem’s convexity. The resulting mathematical program with comple-
mentarity constraints is then reformulated into a set of linear constraints using disjunctive
formulations and binary variables. We further linearize the non-convex quadratic terms in
the objective function using piecewise linear approximations to convert the problem into a
convex quadratic mixed-integer program (QMIP). The computational experiments run on
multiple random instances of the problem confirm that the QMIP is tractable and can ef-
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ficiently solve problems of reasonable size. Then, we apply our bilevel framework to a case
study of the Gulf-Southwest region of the United States. We evaluate the model results un-
der several decision-making scenarios to study the impact of both players’ non-cooperative
interactions on each other’s decisions. The scenario results further emphasize the importance
of using the bilevel methodology to anticipate the effects of new LNG export facilities on
NG prices across the domestic gas network. We also analyze the effects of adding these large
gas-consuming facilities at specific locations on domestic gas prices and the NG producer’s
production.
1.3 Risk-averse stochastic bilevel programming: An application
to natural gas markets
The third part of the dissertation focuses on extending the bilevel model developed in
the previous section to incorporate demand uncertainty and risk aversion. The players’ deci-
sions can be significantly impacted when the markets they operate in have uncertain future
demands. We analyze this setting using a multi-stage stochastic modeling framework that
captures the strategic interactions between two players, a leader or manufacturer and a fol-
lower or supplier, under demand uncertainty. Both players make investment, operational,
sales, and pricing decisions. The leader makes large-scaled, high fixed cost investment deci-
sions and hence we analyse how his decisions change when he follows risk-neutral and risk-
averse approaches for decision-making. The production, sales, and prices for both players
are directly impacted by the market conditions, which are uncertain. Hence, we capture the
stochastic behavior in these models by introducing uncertainty in demand for each player’s
respective markets. We capture the demand uncertainty using scenarios that correspond to
various demand conditions in the market.
We propose an algorithm to efficiently find high quality feasible solutions to the stochas-
tic bilevel problem. We first reformulate the bilevel problem into a single-level problem using
6
the KKT conditions of the lower-level problem and strong duality. The non-linear comple-
mentarity constraints in the resulting single-level problem are linearized using disjunctive
formulations with binary variables and big M . The non-convex terms in the objective func-
tion are further approximated using piecewise linear functions resulting in a QMIP. The
QMIP is intractable for larger numbers of scenarios, and we propose an iterative algorithm
that finds a feasible solution to the QMIP relatively fast. The computational studies con-
ducted on random instances show that even larger instances of the the stochastic bilevel
problem can be solved within a very reasonable amount of time. The analysis also addresses
the ”quality” of the solution attained using the algorithm, where the feasible solutions are
found to be consistently very close to the optimal solution.
We apply the stochastic bilevel modeling framework to study the strategic issues arising
in the natural gas market. The model considers two players, an LNG operator or leader and
a NG producer or follower acting in a leader-follower setting. The LNG operator makes in-
vestment, gas procurement, LNG export, and pricing decisions. The NG producer produces
gas and sells it in the spot market and to the LNG operator. The natural gas spot market
and LNG market behavior can be far from deterministic and can be significantly impacted
by events worldwide. Hence, it becomes crucial to analyze how the LNG operator’s and
NG producer’s decisions change when the markets they operate in have uncertain future
demands. The LNG operator’s large investment decisions would impact his risk, and his op-
timal strategy could be quite different depending on whether he is risk-averse or risk-neutral.
The case study explores the Gulf-Southwest region of the United States and demonstrates
the impact of the the LNG player’s risk behavior on investment and operational decisions.
1.4 Organization of the dissertation
In this chapter, we have provided a brief introduction to the problems considered in this
dissertation. More detailed problem descriptions and reviews of related literature are given
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in the respective chapters. The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter
2, we develop an optimization model for the integrated generation and transmission system
in the continental U.S. and use it to explore electricity infrastructure pathways from the
present through 2050. In Chapter 3, we develop a bilevel model to aid decision-making in
natural gas markets for an LNG operator and an NG producer who act as autonomous agents
interacting strategically with conflicting interests. In Chapter 4, we develop a stochastic risk-
based bilevel model to study an LNG operator’s behavior and an NG producer who faces
demand uncertainty in the respective markets they operate in. We also attempt to study the
LNG player’s behavior and how his decisions change under various risk behaviors. Chapter
5 presents the concluding remarks on the work presented in this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
U.S. electricity infrastructure of the future:
Generation and transmission pathways through 2050
2.1 Introduction
The electricity sector in the United States (U.S.) is in the midst of a dynamic period
in its long-run evolution, driven by profound technological, economic, and policy changes.
The shale gas revolution has resulted in lower natural gas prices that caused natural gas
to surpass coal as the leading fuel used to generate electricity, and continue to drive sub-
stitution of gas for coal (Feijoo et al., 2018). Costs of intermittent renewable technologies
such as wind turbines and solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, as well as battery electricity
storage, have decreased sharply in recent years and continue to decline (Sivaram et al.,
2018). Electricity market restructuring has instituted competitive markets in many regions
of the U.S., a shift which is causing generation utilities to be cautious about investing in
large, capital-intensive generation facilities, and instead favor smaller, more flexible projects
(Rhodes, 2018). Growing awareness of the dangers associated with climate change has led
to a complex and constantly evolving patchwork of regulations governing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions at local, state, and federal levels. These include renewable portfolio stan-
dards in a majority of the 50 states (Barbose et al., 2016), the Clean Power Plan setting
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions reduction targets for individual states, subsidies and tax
This chapter has been published in the Applied Energy journal. Jayadev, Gopika, Benjamin D. Leibowicz,
and Erhan Kutanoglu. ”US electricity infrastructure of the future: Generation and transmission pathways
through 2050.” Applied energy 260 (2020): 114267. Gopika Jayadev is the lead author and Dr. Leibowicz
and Dr. Kutanoglu supervised the work.
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incentives for clean technologies like solar PV (Hagerman et al., 2016), and cap-and-trade
programs in California and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative states on the East Coast
(Chan and Morrow, 2019).
Considerable uncertainty about the trajectories of technological, economic, and policy
drivers has led to a wide range of projections for how the U.S. electricity sector will – or
ought to – evolve over the coming decades. For instance, there is a general consensus that
the power sector will have to play a crucial role in climate change mitigation, as most analy-
ses suggest that a highly decarbonized electricity system is required for climate stabilization
(de Sisternes et al., 2016). Nevertheless, researchers disagree about the costs of reducing
CO2 emissions from electricity, the ideal extent of decarbonization, and the optimal mix of
technologies to deploy. Some argue that the U.S. electricity system can achieve complete
decarbonization (zero CO2 emissions) at no additional cost, based on a combination of wind,
water, and solar energy together with various storage technologies (Jacobson et al., 2015).
Other scholars propose relying on a broader portfolio of technology options to transition to a
low-carbon electricity future (Clack et al., 2017). For example, MacDonald et al. MacDon-
ald et al. (2016) contend that U.S. electricity CO2 emissions can be reduced substantially at
no additional cost by deploying renewables in concert with nuclear and natural gas genera-
tion, and investing in long-distance transmission lines to balance variability in intermittent
renewable power supplies. On the other hand, based on the very long and gradual energy
transitions typically observed in the historical record, some researchers claim that any large-
scale transition from fossil fuel electricity to intermittent renewables will necessarily take
many decades (Smil, 2016).
In this dissertation, we investigate the future development of U.S. electricity infrastruc-
ture through 2050 by developing a least-cost optimization model of the integrated generation
and transmission system in the continental U.S. Our model is a customized and expanded
version of the core Open Source Energy Modeling System (OSeMOSYS) framework. We
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represent 13 regions distinguished by their electricity demand profiles, wind and solar PV
capacity factors, hydro and geothermal resources, and existing generation capacities. Com-
pared to existing tools, our model incorporates greater temporal resolution using a multi-level
representation of time. Generation and transmission capacity investment decisions are made
every five years, inter-seasonal variability in loads and resources is captured, and 24-hour
dispatch solutions in each season allow us to faithfully project the operation of future elec-
tricity systems featuring significant intermittent renewables and battery storage. We apply
this model to compare and contrast results from four main scenarios (No Policy, No New
Transmission, Pessimistic Costs, Carbon Tax) and additional sensitivity analyses in order to
obtain policy-relevant insights into future pathways for the U.S. electricity sector. Based on
our results, we affirm five key takeaways regarding the optimal development of the electricity
system, and discuss their policy implications in Section 2.6.
1. The U.S. electricity sector can be substantially decarbonized at modest cost, but com-
plete decarbonization is very costly.
2. Significant expansion of solar PV and wind to combine for at least 40% of the generation
mix by 2050 is fairly certain, although solar PV and battery storage are more affected
by economic and policy assumptions than wind.
3. Investments in long-distance transmission are very limited, while investments in battery
storage are much greater, under a wide range of assumptions.
4. Natural gas capacity growth is strong and robust, but utilization of gas capacity de-
clines steadily and significantly.
5. Electricity system costs shift away from operating expenditures and toward capital
expenditures over time, especially in the presence of climate policy.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we review the
literature on energy system modeling and its application to the U.S. electricity sector. We
describe our model in Section 2.3 and document our data sources. Scenario results are
presented and compared in Section 2.4. We discuss the five key takeaways in Section 2.5,
then conclude in Section 2.6 with a brief summary of our most important contributions.
2.2 Literature review
Researchers have developed a multitude of energy system models to explore how energy
system pathways are shaped by technological, economic, and policy drivers. In this section,
we review the literature on two modeling paradigms that are commonly applied to electricity
generation and transmission expansion: optimization and market equilibrium. We devote
most of this section to the former class of models because the framework we develop for this
study adopts an optimization structure. Afterward, we briefly summarize what equilibrium
models tend to reveal about the future of the electricity sector.
2.2.1 Energy system optimization models
Energy system optimization models aim to identify the ideal transformations of energy
systems over time, including decisions on capacity investments and operations (Pfenninger
et al., 2014). The objective is typically to minimize the total present discounted cost while
satisfying all demands and respecting a host of technological, economic, and policy con-
straints. Energy system optimization is often considered a bottom-up modeling approach
since it represents energy technologies and competition among them in great detail, but
handles macroeconomic drivers of energy demand via broad, exogenous assumptions. This
modeling paradigm inherently assumes that a single, rational decision maker controls all
investment and operational decisions throughout the system, effectively acting as a benevo-
lent system planner. The energy system pathways that optimization models produce should
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therefore be viewed as normative results describing how a system should evolve (conditional
on the sets of structural and parametric assumptions encoded in the model) rather than as
predictions for how the system will in fact evolve.
A few examples of energy system optimization frameworks appearing in the literature are
the Open Source Energy Modeling System (OSeMOSYS) (Howells et al., 2011), Regional En-
ergy Deployment System (ReEDS) (Short et al., 2011), Market Allocation (MARKAL)/The
Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System (TIMES) (Loulou et al., 2004; Loulou and Labriet,
2007), Solar and Wind Energy Integrated with Transmission and Conventional Sources
(SWITCH) (Nelson et al., 2012), National Electricity with Weather System (NEWS) (Mac-
Donald et al., 2016), SimWIND (Phillips and Middleton, 2012), and SimCCS (Middleton and
Bielicki, 2009). Some of these tools are designed to examine a specific energy system (e.g.,
NEWS for the U.S. power sector) while others are essentially model generators that can be
used to define a wide range of models tailored to particular applications (e.g., OSeMOSYS).
The models differ in many respects such as geographical scope, regional disaggregation,
temporal resolution, sets of technologies, and whether they represent spatial infrastructure
networks (e.g., transmission). Which features are represented in detail, and which are treated
in a simple manner or omitted entirely, depend on the modeler’s perspective and the goals
of the analysis (Wilkerson et al., 2015).
2.2.1.1 Open Source Energy Modeling System (OSeMOSYS)
The model we develop in this study to explore the future development of the U.S. electric-
ity system is a customized and expanded version of OSeMOSYS. We describe the standard
version of OSeMOSYS here, then delineate our modified implementation in Section 2.3. OS-
eMOSYS is a highly flexible and modular energy system optimization framework structured
as a linear program that minimizes cost by determining optimal technology capacity invest-
ments and dispatch schedules (Howells et al., 2011). Unlike many other energy modeling
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platforms, the standard version of OSeMOSYS is available open source to encourage dis-
semination and improve research transparency (DeCarolis et al., 2012). An OSeMOSYS
implementation consists of different “blocks” of functionality that represent various com-
ponents of the overall system being modeled. These blocks can be selectively enabled or
disabled depending on the scope of the analysis, and integrated together to form a coherent
model architecture that captures the interactions among them. For a comprehensive descrip-
tion of the standard OSeMOSYS framework, see the original documentation (Howells et al.,
2011).
The literature based on OSeMOSYS showcases a diverse range of applications. (Welsch
et al., 2014) uses OSeMOSYS to analyze scenarios with high renewable electricity penetra-
tion in Ireland. Cervigni et al. (2015) employs OSeMOSYS as one tool to study strategies
for enhancing the climate resilience of African infrastructure. (Groissböck and Pickl, 2016)
applies the model to the Saudi Arabian power sector to study the tradeoff between cost and
environmental objectives. Brozynski and Leibowicz (2018) builds a version of OSeMOSYS
with integrated electricity generation and transportation sectors to evaluate urban-scale de-
carbonization strategies in Austin, Texas. de Moura et al. (2018) incorporates endogenous
transmission investments into OSeMOSYS to study cross-border electricity trade in South
America. By reformulating OSeMOSYS as a stochastic (rather than deterministic) opti-
mization program, Leibowicz (2018) investigates optimal hedging strategies for expanding
electricity generation under climate policy uncertainty. The review article (Gardumi et al.,
2018) describes the evolution of the OSeMOSYS developer and user communities since their
inception, as well as a number of customized extensions that researchers have created.
The standard OSeMOSYS model and more information about it can be found at the website
www.osemosys.org.
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2.2.1.2 Other energy system optimization models
Among other energy system optimization platforms, ReEDS (Short et al., 2011) is per-
haps the model most similar to the one we develop in this chapter. ReEDS also depicts
the regionally disaggregated U.S. electricity sector, integrates generation and transmission,
and simultaneously solves for capacity investments and dispatch. ReEDS uses geographic
information system (GIS) databases to achieve impressive spatial resolution, but this focus
on spatial detail comes at the expense of temporal resolution. Specifically, ReEDS includes
134 load balancing areas and 356 regions for establishing renewable capacity factor profiles,
but only 17 representative timeslices to capture the annual electricity demand and dispatch
solution (Eurek et al., 2016). These timeslices correspond to four six-hour blocks on four
representative seasonal days, plus one additional timeslice to reflect peak load conditions.
Relative to ReEDS, our model developed in Section 2.3 features less spatial disaggregation,
but more granularity in the time dimension to capture temporal variations in demands and
renewable capacity factors, and to more faithfully analyze generation dispatch and electricity
storage operations.
Cole and Frazier (2018) employs the ReEDS model to study 38 scenarios for the evolution
of the U.S. electricity system. It finds that wind and solar PV capacities grow significantly
in almost all scenarios, and that their expansions raise the demand for flexibility within
the rest of the generation fleet. The number of low-cost electricity hours increases over
time, and substantial solar PV deployment shifts the most costly hours from the afternoon
to the evening. Zhou et al. (2018) uses ReEDS to evaluate the impacts of misestimating
renewable capacity credits on the U.S. power sector. It finds that the system is robust
to small underestimates of renewable capacity credits, but large underestimates (> 50%)
can adversely affect the relative costs and values of variable renewable energy technologies
enough to reduce their deployment. Using ReEDS, Reimers et al. (2019) demonstrates that
the optimal capacity expansion pathway is sensitive to the way that regional planning reserve
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margins are formulated. Energy modelers often assume the reserve margins recommended by
the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), but regional reserve margins have
historically exceeded these in many cases. Therefore, using NERC reserve margins typically
leads to lower near-term capacity investments.
Mignone et al. (2017) uses the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) developed
by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) to study how carbon prices after
2030 affect investment in natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) plants prior to 2030. They
assess various scenarios from 2010–2050 and find that investment in NGCC prior to 2030
is robust to a wide range of carbon price trajectories. Cole et al. (2016) uses the ReEDS
model in tandem with the Rice World Gas Trade Model (RWGTM) to investigate how the
electricity and natural gas sectors co-evolve from 2010–2050, and how the results respond to
different input price assumptions for natural gas. They find that the generation mix in the
future predominantly consists of natural gas, wind, and solar PV generation. Due to their
assumption of no re-licensing of nuclear power plants, nuclear generation declines steadily
and nearly reaches zero in 2050.
Nelson et al. (2012) uses the SWITCH mixed-integer linear programming model to an-
alyze least-cost generation and transmission expansion in the western U.S. and Canada.
The authors find that stronger carbon policy can achieve a 54% reduction in power sec-
tor emissions below the 1990 level by 2030, using a mix of existing generation technologies.
Intermittent renewables contribute 17–29% of total generation in 2030, depending on cost as-
sumptions. Furthermore, while the carbon prices needed to achieve this emissions reduction
can be high, the increase in overall electricity system cost does not exceed 20%. MacDonald
et al. (2016) obtains even more optimistic results using the NEWS model, which co-optimizes
generation investments, transmission expansion, and dispatch across the U.S. The model in-
corporates very detailed weather data and captures cost savings stemming from geographic
diversity, load smoothing, reserve pooling, and reduced energy density requirements. Its
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results claim that emissions can be reduced 80% below the 1990 level using existing tech-
nologies and their current cost projections, and without electricity storage, at no increase in
levelized electricity cost.
Additional energy system optimization models focus on one particular energy technology
and its associated spatial infrastructure networks. SimCCS (Middleton and Bielicki, 2009)
optimizes the spatial configuration of an infrastructure network for capturing, transporting,
and storing CO2. The model represents candidate facilities where CO2 can be captured and
candidate sites where CO2 can be injected into geological storage as nodes in a network
whose arcs serve as candidate CO2 pipeline segments. SimCCS minimizes the cost of storing
a target quantity of CO2 by constructing and operating capture facilities, pipelines, and
storage facilities. The closely related SimWIND tool (Phillips and Middleton, 2012) applies
this same general modeling principle to identify optimal wind farm locations and transmission
capacity investments, considering the existing transmission network. It represents the electric
grid in great detail, including transmission losses and investment costs based on topography,
population density, land availability, and other factors. Krishnan et al. (2016) discusses the
general benefits of co-optimizing resources, transmission, and fuel supply on an underlying
network structure, in contrast to traditional planning methods. The authors present several
existing and emerging co-optimization approaches, along with challenges encountered in their
implementation. One principal challenge is that the broader scopes of these models entail
higher computational and data requirements that can necessitate cruder representations of
time.
2.2.2 Energy system equilibrium models
While the model we develop in this dissertation follows the optimization paradigm, it
is helpful to briefly introduce a few equilibrium-based energy-economy models to gain more
insights into future electricity sector pathways, and to clarify the relative strengths and limi-
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tations of the two modeling approaches. Equilibrium models endogenously determine prices
that balance supply and demand in a set of represented markets. Models that endogenously
solve for equilibria only in selected energy markets (e.g., electricity, natural gas) are known as
partial equilibrium models, whereas general equilibrium models balance supply and demand
across all markets that comprise an economy. This top-down approach is valuable for study-
ing the macroeconomic forces that drive energy demand, as well as demand-side mitigation
levers such as energy efficiency investments and price-induced demand reductions. It is also
useful for analyzing interactions among multiple decision makers (e.g., firms, consumers,
different countries), unlike optimization models which adopt the point of view of a single
agent. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models capture the ripple effects of energy
and climate policies throughout the economy, beyond just the energy sectors. Relative to
optimization-based platforms, equilibrium models typically feature much less technological,
temporal, and spatial detail. However, researchers have experimented with hybrid modeling
approaches that couple a bottom-up optimization model with a top-down equilibrium model,
and solve them iteratively (Messner and Schrattenholzer, 2000; Young et al., 2017).
The U.S. Regional Economy, Greenhouse Gas, and Energy (US-REGEN) model is one
such hybrid framework that couples a capacity expansion and dispatch model of the power
sector with a CGE model of the U.S. economy (Young et al., 2017). Blanford et al. (2014)
employs US-REGEN to analyze the effects of a clean energy standard under scenarios with
varying technology assumptions. Results show that the future capacity and generation mixes
are very sensitive to constraints on technology deployment; for example, constraints on inter-
regional transmission expansion limit the growth of wind and allow nuclear to take on a larger
role. It also finds that the clean energy standard can induce extreme electricity system
transformations at the regional level even when the national transformation is relatively
moderate. Bistline (2017) uses US-REGEN to quantify the decline in the marginal value
of wind and solar PV capacity as deployment levels increase. The analysis reveals that the
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correlations in capacity factors across space are critical determinants of this relationship,
and that electricity storage helps mitigate the drop in value. Greater availability of inter-
regional transmission and electricity trade also bolster the value of intermittent renewables
by connecting locations with complementary resource profiles.
The Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 32 study assesses GHG emissions reduction strate-
gies in the U.S. power sector using a collection of 15 different models (Creason et al., 2018;
Murray et al., 2018), 11 of which are based on a partial or general equilibrium structure.
These include US-REGEN and ReEDS-USREP, which links the ReEDS model described in
the previous subsection to a CGE formulation. For the most part, all models agree that the
largest emissions reductions are achieved under scenarios with low natural gas prices, low
renewable technology costs, and low energy efficiency costs. Gas prices and renewable costs
exert the most significant effects on projected capacity investments, generation mixes, and
emissions. Mai et al. (2018) evaluates the effects of model structure and input assumptions
on renewable energy penetration. It finds that inter-model differences in the structural rep-
resentations of storage, transmission, and intermittency of renewables can cause significant




The model we develop for this analysis is a customized and expanded version of OSe-
MOSYS implemented in Python as a linear program, and solved using CPLEX. We described
the standard OSeMOSYS framework (Howells et al., 2011) in Section 2.2.1.1, and in this sec-
tion we document our structural extensions and original input database. For more detailed
information, please note that the complete model formulation can be found in the appendix.
Our model determines the least-cost transformation of the integrated electricity gener-
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ation and transmission system in the continental U.S., including capacity investments and
operational dispatch. The timeframe of the analysis is 2016–2050, with each model period
corresponding to a five-year decision making time step for capacity investments. Within each
model period, a total of 96 timeslices representing 24-hour profiles for four average seasonal
days allow for a simplified computation of dispatch. Our inclusion of a full day of hourly
dispatch in each season is crucial for capturing temporally varying solar and wind capacity
factors, loads, and the endogenous dynamics of battery storage operations. Since the analysis
spans several decades, we apply a 5% discount rate to convert all costs to present values.
We divide the continental U.S. into the 13 regions outlined in Table 2.1, which are
defined according to state boundaries. The regional definitions are based on the regions that
the EIA uses to report electricity system operating data, which are themselves based on the
territories of load balancing authorities and independent system operators (ISOs). However,
we make several modifications to the regions to ensure that states grouped together have
roughly similar energy resources and demand profiles. Regions are linked in the model by
the inter-regional transmission network, which we add on top of the standard OSeMOSYS
structure. We do not represent the transmission and distribution grids within each region,
so the network in our model should be interpreted as capturing long-distance transmission
that serves to balance electricity supply and demand on a broad spatial scale by leveraging
each region’s unique generation resources.
Each region in the model has its own electricity demand growth projection, load profile,
Most long-term energy modeling studies use real discount rates in the 3–7% range (Brozynski and
Leibowicz, 2018; Blanford et al., 2014; Eurek et al., 2016; Jacobson et al., 2015; Nelson et al., 2012), so our
5% discount rate reflects the middle of the typical range. The sensitivity analysis results for the discount
rate presented in Table A.1 show that it does not strongly affect optimal capacity additions.
For example, we divide the Northwest region used by the EIA into a Northwest region consisting of
Washington and Oregon, and a separate Mountain North region including states in the interior West. We
consider this important because Washington and Oregon feature significant hydroelectric resources and less
extreme seasonal load variations than the Mountain North states.
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Table 2.1. Model region definitions.
Model region Abbreviation States included
Northwest NW WA, OR
California CA CA
Mountain North MN MT, ID, WY, NV, UT, CO
Southwest SW AZ, NM
Central CE ND, SD, NE, KS, OK
Texas TX TX
Midwest MW MN, WI, IA, IL, IN, MI, MO
Arkansas-Louisiana AL AR, LA
Mid-Atlantic MA OH, PA, WV, KY, VA, NJ, DE, MD
Southeast SE TN, NC, SC, MS, AL, GA
Florida FL FL
New York NY NY
New England NE VT, NH, ME, MA, CT, RI
hydroelectric and geothermal resources, and solar and wind capacity factor profiles. A model
run begins in the 2016 base year with the existing regional generator fleets and transmission
network, and can endogenously invest in additional generation and transmission capacity
over the model timeframe. The annual retirement schedule for existing generation assets
included in the EIA-860 data (EIA, 2017d) is exogenously incorporated into the model.
The set of included generation technologies is delineated in Table 2.2. In addition to these
generation technologies, the model can invest in transmission and battery electricity storage.
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Table 2.2. Electricity generation technologies.
Electricity generation technology Abbreviation
Coal integrated gasification combined cycle COALPP
Natural gas fired combined cycle NGCC






NGCC with carbon capture and storage NGCCCCS
IGCC with carbon capture and storage COALCCS
Geothermal GEOPP
2.3.2 Structural extensions
In this subsection, we describe structural extensions that we add to the equations of the
standard OSeMOSYS framework (Howells et al., 2011) to incorporate new capabilities into
our model. For the full model formulation, please refer to the SI available online.
2.3.2.1 Flow balance constraints
Incorporating an inter-regional transmission network into the model requires us to impose
the flow balance constraints
22
Production(r, l, y) +
∑
s∈R




Import(r, s, l, y) ∀ r ∈ R, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y.
(2.1)
These constraints mandate that for every region r, dispatch timeslice l, and year y, the sum
of local electricity production plus electricity imports from all adjacent regions must satisfy
the sum of local electricity demand, endogenous local use (e.g., for battery storage charging),
and exports to all adjacent regions. The Import decision variables are added to standard
OSeMOSYS to depict the operation of the transmission segments.
2.3.2.2 Capacity growth constraints
Ample historical evidence suggests that energy transitions are long affairs that unfold
gradually over time, due to system inertia and lags in deploying large-scale, capital-intensive,
infrastructure-dependent technologies (Fouquet, 2010; Grubler, 2012). Therefore, we intro-
duce capacity growth constraints that limit the annual scale-up rates of technologies to avoid
unrealistic “bang-bang” solutions where the optimization scheme could respond to a small
change in the relative costs of technologies by rapidly altering the capacity mix. The formu-
lation we use, adapted from (Leibowicz et al., 2016) and (Brozynski and Leibowicz, 2018),
is
Eq. (2.1) will hold with equality in most ordinary circumstances, but it does allow for excess generation
relative to demand. In our model, this would only occur in an electricity system where zero-variable-cost
renewable generation exceeds load in certain timeslices. We treat this as feasible to avoid ruling out such a
system, which may well be optimal depending on the parameter setting. In reality, excess supply would have
to be handled through interventions such as voltage regulation, turning off wind turbines, reorienting solar
PV units, introducing artificial loads to dissipate excess energy as heat, and so on. These are important
grid management challenges that our multi-decadal capacity expansion model is not well suited to explicitly
represent.
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NewCapacity(r, t, y) ≤ TotalCapacityAnnual(r, t, y − τ) ·MaxCapacityGrowthRate(r, t)
+StartUpV alue(t) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ Y.
(2.2)
In these constraints, the parameter MaxCapacityGrowthRate is the maximum annual per-
centage growth in the total installed capacity of technology t and τ represents the time
step used in the model (i.e., τ = 5). The value of MaxCapacityGrowthRate varies by
technology to reflect the fact that granular technologies like solar PV, wind turbines, and
battery storage typically diffuse faster than large-scale, capital-intensive options like ther-
mal power plants (Grubler et al., 1999). The model thus allows large, centralized technology
capacities to grow up to 10% annually, solar PV and wind capacities to grow up to 15%,
and geothermal and battery capacities (which start at very low levels) to grow up to 25%.
The StartUpV alue parameter is added to allow for some small initial deployment of new
technologies with essentially no existing capacity (and is set to 100 MW).
2.3.2.3 Reserve margin constraints and capacity adequacy
Since our 96 dispatch timeslices represent average 24-hour profiles for the four seasons,
they do not include the true peak load in each region. We account for this difference between
the true peak load and the highest load featured in the 96 timeslices by adding to the reserve
margin that drives total generation capacity. We assume that the reserve margin requires
adequate capacity to satisfy demand 15% higher than the true peak load to accommodate
unforeseen circumstances. Then, this reserve margin is raised to reflect the difference between
the true peak load in the full 8760-hour profile and the maximum load included in the
representative seasonal days. The reserve margin constraints are
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≥ TotalCapacityInReserveMargin(r, t, y) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y.
(2.3)
In this formulation, the coefficient ξ ∈ [0, 1] determines the fractional contribution of import
transmission capacity toward the regional reserve margin. Following de Moura et al. (2018),
we credit import transmission links at 50% of their capacities (i.e., ξ = 0.5) for satisfying
the regional reserve margin.
2.3.3 Input database
The input database includes values of numerous parameters such as existing generation
and transmission capacities, capital costs, fixed and variable operation and maintenance
(O&M) costs, fuel costs, conversion efficiencies, load profiles, demand growth projections,
hydroelectric and geothermal resources, and solar and wind capacity factors. Table 2.3
documents our data sources. All input data used for the model come from publicly available
sources. For wind and solar capacity factors, since empirical data in some parts of the
country are lacking, we estimate regional capacity factor profiles by simulating generation
time series at myriad locations using the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)
System Advisor Model (SAM) software.
We provide a file with all model input data, which can be found at Jayadev (2019).
By making the input data available, we aim to enhance the transparency of our modeling
assumptions and provide other researchers with a set of U.S. electricity input data from pub-
licly available sources that have been compiled according to standardized region definitions.
The sensitivity analysis results for ξ presented in Table A.2 show that results are not particularly sensitive
to its assumed value.
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Table 2.3. Documentation of data sources.
Parameter Source
Annual demand forecast ERCOT (2017a), NERC (2017), MISO (2017a)
NYISO (2017a), PJM (2017a), ISO-NE (2017)
Hourly demand profile ERCOT (2017b), MISO (2017b), NYISO (2017b),
PJM (2017b), ISO-NE (2017)
Average hourly wind NREL (2017b)
capacity factor
Average hourly solar PV NREL (2017b)
capacity factor
Existing power plant capacity EIA (2017d)
Existing transmission capacity FERC (2017), EIA (2017c)
Power plant conversion efficiency EIA (2017b)
Input activity ratio EIA (2017a)
Capital cost NREL (2017a)
Variable cost NREL (2017a)
Fixed cost NREL (2017a)
CO2 emission factors IPCC (2017)
The plots in Fig. 2.1 illustrate selected, key input parameters in the database. Fig.
2.1a shows how the annual electricity demand in each region is projected to evolve from the
present through 2050. The projected trends vary considerably across regions, from strong
growth in Texas (TX) to declining electricity demand in New York (NY). Projected capital
costs for a sample of technologies are depicted in Fig. 2.1b. According to the NREL Annual
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Technology Baseline data source, capital costs of most technologies will decline slightly over
time, while solar PV and batteries will experience larger cost reductions. Meanwhile, the
average cost for natural gas increases from $2.21/MMBtu in 2016 to $3.62/MMBtu in 2050,
but it is worth noting that we capture regional variation in fuel costs. Fig. 2.1c visualizes
the representative seasonal load profiles for two regions, TX and Northwest (NW). The TX
load peaks sharply in summer due to strong space cooling demand, while the NW load varies
less from season to season and actually peaks in the winter. The diurnal profiles within each
season are also apparent, as loads tend to be highest in the late afternoon or early evening,
and lowest in the early morning. Fig. 2.1d plots the 24-hour load profile for the entire U.S. in
each season, demonstrating the same trends. The winter profile has two distinct peaks, one
in the morning and one in the evening, reflecting when people are at home and the outdoor
temperature is lower than it is in the afternoon. Altogether, the input data plotted in Fig.
2.1 confirm the importance of spatial and temporal disaggregation for capturing system
operating conditions that vary across space and time (daily, seasonally, and annually).
We specify limits on the total regional installed capacities of the hydroelectric and
geothermal technologies because they can only be sited in specific locations where these
resources are available. Regional upper bounds on hydroelectric and geothermal deployment
are based on US DOE (2014) and EERE (2014), respectively.
2.3.4 Scenario analysis
The optimal future development of the U.S. electricity system is dependent on a vari-
ety of technological, economic, and policy drivers. In this scenario analysis, we compare
and contrast results from four scenarios to obtain insights into how the ideal evolution of
generation and transmission varies with important parameters and uncertainties. The four
scenarios we investigate are (1) No Policy, (2) No New Transmission, (3) Pessimistic Costs,
and (4) Carbon Tax. They are summarized in Table 2.4 and described in the paragraphs
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(a) Annual demand projection by region.


























(b) Capital cost projection by technology.

























(c) Hourly demand profiles for TX and NW.
















(d) Aggregate U.S. demand profile by season.






























Fig. 2.1. Visualizations of selected parameters in the input database.
below.
The No Policy scenario is interpreted as a baseline development of the electricity system
used to assess the effects of the particular factors that distinguish the other scenarios from
it. It assumes that no policy constraints, incentives, or penalties are imposed to guide the
electricity sector toward or away from particular technologies or environmental outcomes.
The No New Transmission scenario constrains the transmission capacity investment de-
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cision variables to be zero, thus prohibiting expansion of the transmission network. By
comparing the minimum cost objective value achieved under this scenario to that realized
in the No Policy case, we are able to quantify the value of new transmission in the continen-
tal U.S. over the next several decades. This result helps put into perspective the potential
economic losses stemming from regulatory constraints on new transmission lines, such as
inadequate permitting processes and inability to obtain the right of way.
The declining costs of renewables and battery storage are assumed to have a strong in-
fluence on the future of electricity. However, there is considerable uncertainty about future
costs, and the assumptions in the NREL Annual Technology Baseline could be viewed as
optimistic. To test the sensitivity of optimal capacity investments and generation mixes to
these costs, we consider the Pessimistic Costs scenario in which the capital costs of solar
PV, batteries, and wind turbines decline over time at only 20% of the rate assumed in the
other scenarios. Therefore, the increase in objective value from the No Policy scenario to
the Pessimistic Costs scenario quantifies the value of realizing the full capital cost reduc-
tions assumed in the NREL Annual Technology Baseline as opposed to just 20% of those
reductions.
The Carbon Tax scenario is used to explore how a tax on CO2 would affect future
investments and dispatch in the integrated electricity generation and transmission system.
This scenario reflects the persistent uncertainty about the future of climate policy in the U.S.
The sample tax trajectory we consider is introduced at the moderate level of $20 per tonne of
CO2 (tCO2) in the base period, then rises linearly over time to reach $200/tCO2 by the 2050
time horizon. The Carbon Tax scenario should shift investment toward less carbon-intensive
generation technologies, reduce CO2 emissions from the U.S. electricity sector, and increase
total cost compared to the No Policy case.
In addition to thoroughly exploring these four scenarios, we also conduct wider sensitivity
analyses over more parameter settings to establish how the capital cost of new transmission
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Table 2.4. Summary of the four main scenarios we investigate.
Scenario name Description
No Policy • A scenario with no policy constraints, incentives, or penalties
in effect.
• Interpreted as a baseline development of the U.S. electricity
system, against which the other scenarios are compared.
No New Transmission • Prohibits new investments in the inter-regional transmission
network.
• Used to quantify the value of new, long-distance transmission
investments in the U.S. electricity sector.
Pessimistic Costs • Assumes that only 20% of the reductions in solar PV, battery,
and wind turbine capital costs projected by the NREL Annual
Technology Baseline will actually materialize.
• Used to test the sensitivity of capacity investments, generation
mixes, and total cost to uncertain future cost assumptions.
Carbon Tax • Imposes a carbon tax initialized at $20/tCO2 in the base year
that rises linearly over time to $200/tCO2 in 2050.
• Used to assess how climate policy would affect capacity in-
vestments, generation mixes, CO2 emissions, and total cost.
influences total transmission investments, and how the percentage reduction in total CO2
emissions causes the total system cost to increase above the No Policy objective value.
2.4 Results
The base year model calibration is demonstrated in Section 2.4.1. Sections 2.4.2–2.4.5
present and discuss the results of each scenario individually and in detail. We begin with the
No Policy case, which is interpreted as a baseline development of the U.S. electricity system
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against which the other scenarios are compared. Then, in Section 2.4.6, we present and
analyze summary figures that compare the developments of key electricity sector outcomes
and metrics across the four scenarios, and emphasize policy-relevant insights.
2.4.1 Model calibration
Before we evaluate our forward-looking scenarios, we ensure that the model is properly
calibrated to produce a base year (2016) dispatch solution that roughly matches the actual
generation mixes from that year. The model results should not be expected to exactly match
reality due to temporal, spatial, and technological aggregation in the model, as well as the
fact that the real U.S. electricity sector is not operated by a single optimizing agent to achieve
cost minimization. However, it is comforting to confirm that the model-based dispatch and
the true generation mixes are quite similar. Fig. 2.2 shows the empirical, regional generation
mixes from 2016, and then the regional generation mixes produced by our model using the
existing generation capacities.
2.4.2 No Policy scenario
Fig. 2.3a illustrates the evolution of the national cumulative new capacity (top) and
generation (bottom) mixes through 2050 in the No Policy scenario. Even without a policy
stimulus, the generation mix shifts significantly toward renewable technologies like wind and
solar PV. Combined, these two technologies contribute 57% of total generation in 2050. Coal
and natural gas generation both decline, by 18% and 25%, respectively, from 2016 to 2050.
Most of the reductions in coal and gas generation occur during the later years of the No Policy
case, as the rates of wind and solar PV expansion increase due to falling costs, including
the cost of battery storage, and retirements of conventional generation facilities. Natural
gas generation is more affected than coal generation because gas complements intermittent
renewables by serving as the marginal production technology, ramping up production when
31
(a) Actual generation mixes
(b) Model output generation mixes
Fig. 2.2. Model calibration for the base year 2016. (a) illustrates the empirical, regional generation
mixes from that year, and (b) plots the optimal dispatch solution computed by the optimization
model.
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renewable output drops or load is high. The story for capacity additions shown in the top
plot of Fig. 2.3a is quite different, as far more gas power plant capacity is added through
2050 than coal capacity. Therefore, considerable investments in natural gas capacity are
warranted in the No Policy case, but the utilization rate of gas capacity falls over time. This
is an important theme that consistently emerges from our scenario results, with notable
policy implications discussed in Section 2.5.
(a) No Policy (b) Pessimistic Costs (c) Carbon Tax
Fig. 2.3. Annual cumulative new installed capacity (top row) and generation mix (bottom row)
for the whole continental U.S., by scenario.
Figs. 2.4a and 2.5a are map-based snapshots of the regional generation and cumulative
installed capacity (new capacity only) mixes, respectively, in 2050 in the No Policy scenario.
Wind still plays a larger role in generation than solar PV, despite solar PV having a lower
capital cost than wind, an advantage that widens over the next few decades. Wind is valued
for its higher average capacity factors and less extreme diurnal variability, which mean that
less dispatchable generation or storage capacity is required to balance intermittency. Nuclear
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capacity is added mainly in the southeastern regions of the U.S., where existing generation
and transmission capacities must be supplemented, and alternatives like gas face higher
fuel prices. Nuclear investment takes place during the early years of the No Policy scenario.
Once installed, nuclear plants run essentially all the time for the full duration of the analysis,
driven by low variable cost and a maximum capacity factor of 98%.
As shown by the arrows in Fig. 2.4a representing electricity imports, the model makes
extensive use of the existing inter-regional transmission network. The optimal solution in-
cludes 6162 GW-miles of new long-distance transmission capacity added to the system by
2050. To put the scale of this investment in perspective, though, the existing network in the
2016 base year comprises a total of 190,395 GW-miles. Therefore, expanding the transmis-
sion network does not constitute a major component of the electricity system transformation
in the No Policy scenario. The transmission that is added serves more to address existing
imbalances between regional generation resources and demands in the base year than to take
advantage of renewable resources in regions with superior availability and capacity factors.
Expansion of intermittent, renewable electricity induces complementary growth of bat-
tery storage capacity, illustrated by the black, vertical bars in Fig. 2.5a. Storage investment
helps improve the utilization of wind and solar resources. As a result of significant growth
in renewable generation and storage, CO2 emissions decline substantially in the No Policy
scenario. By 2050, annual CO2 emissions from the U.S. electricity sector fall to 53% below
their level in the 2016 base year. This reinforces the suggestion made by MacDonald et al.
(2016) and others that emissions associated with electricity in the U.S. can be significantly
reduced using existing technologies, assuming that costs decline as projected. This is true
even without a clear policy stimulus, which reflects the impacts of recent and continuing
reductions in the costs of renewable generation options and electricity storage. However, it
should be noted that a 53% decline in power sector CO2 emissions by 2050, while substantial,
is almost surely insufficient to be in alignment with climate policy goals such as constraining
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global warming to 2◦C (Audoly et al., 2018).
2.4.3 No New Transmission scenario
Given the fairly limited role that transmission capacity additions play in the No Pol-
icy scenario, prohibiting the model from investing in the transmission network in the No
New Transmission scenario has only minor effects on the electricity system. Power plant
capacity investments and generation mixes are not noticeably affected by the inability to
build new long-distance transmission, so we omit this scenario from a number of the figures
in this section. Certain regions are forced to be slightly more self-sufficient in the No New
Transmission case, so they add dispatchable capacity mainly in the form of coal to provide
electricity when intermittent renewable output is low or demand peaks. The decline of CO2
emissions by 2050 is 0.5% lower in this case than in the No Policy scenario, due to minor
transmission constraints on the utilization of renewable electricity and greater investment in
fossil-based generation capacity.
2.4.4 Pessimistic Costs scenario
The continued reductions in capital cost that the NREL Annual Technology Baseline
projects for wind, solar PV, and battery technologies clearly underlie the significant expan-
sions of these technologies in the No Policy results. While these decreases in cost might
materialize, they are far from certain, so it is helpful to understand how sensitive the de-
velopment of the U.S. electricity sector is to these cost projections. Therefore, we consider
the Pessimistic Costs scenario in which the costs of wind, solar PV, and battery storage fall
only 20% as much as the NREL data project them to decline.
Fig. 2.3b shows how the generation mix and cumulative capacity additions evolve in
the Pessimistic Costs scenario. As expected, the conservative cost assumptions dampen the










Fig. 2.5. Regional cumulative new installed capacity mixes in 2050, by scenario.
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on the latter. Solar PV is more strongly affected because the baseline assumptions project
its capital cost to fall more than that of wind, and also because solar PV is more reliant
on cost-effective battery storage due to its more extreme diurnal variability. Interestingly,
nuclear power benefits from the less favorable economics of wind, solar PV, and battery
storage in the Pessimistic Costs setting. In this case, installed nuclear capacity doubles by
2050, when it provides 33% of the total generation. As seen in Fig. 2.4b, nuclear generation
takes on a sizable share of the mix in more regions than in the No Policy scenario, including
regions like MA and CA where it was a negligible contributor under the baseline technology
cost assumptions. The substitution of nuclear electricity for intermittent renewables in the
Pessimistic Costs scenario helps limit the increase in CO2 emissions relative to the No Policy
scenario.
On the other hand, while the Pessimistic Costs setting does not induce greater investment
in fossil-based generation capacity, it does increase the utilization rates of coal and natural
gas power plants. With lower deployment of wind and solar PV, the net load profiles are
higher and more stable, allowing dispatchable fossil capacity to satisfy more demand during
more hours. As a result, coal generation in Fig. 2.4b expands in regions like TX and CE.
Since the capacity additions in the Pessimistic Costs scenario (e.g., nuclear) tend to have
higher capacity factors than those in the No Policy scenario (e.g., wind, solar PV), cumulative
capacity additions of all technologies combined are lower under Pessimistic Costs.
The smaller capacities of wind and solar PV added in the Pessimistic Costs case mean
that investments in battery storage and transmission are lower than in the No Policy setting.
The existing transmission network is still used extensively, but the new transmission added
drops to 3266 GW-miles, relative to 6162 GW-miles under No Policy. The black, vertical bars
representing battery storage capacity are lower in Fig. 2.4b than in Fig. 2.4a, and disappear
completely from some regions where No Policy storage investment was substantial (e.g., MA).
Battery storage capital cost has a long way still to decline in the Annual Technology Baseline
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assumptions, and its deployment is also predicated on significant expansion of wind or solar
PV. In consequence, its growth is very sensitive to cost assumptions for these technologies.
Total CO2 emissions in the Pessimistic Costs case decline to 51% below their 2016 base
year level by 2050. This is a slightly smaller reduction than in the No Policy scenario (53%),
but overall, the results suggest that U.S. electricity sector emissions will fall substantially
even if wind, solar PV, and battery costs do not decline nearly as much as the Annual
Technology Baseline projects. Of course, this is also based on its assumptions about future
nuclear costs, which are also highly uncertain. If nuclear were assumed to be more expensive,
or were constrained by non-economic factors, then higher costs for intermittent renewables
and storage would lead to more fossil-based generation and higher CO2 emissions.
2.4.5 Carbon Tax scenario
Fig. 2.3c charts the growth of new capacity and the evolving generation mix in the
Carbon Tax scenario. In the early years of this scenario, the penalty on CO2 emissions
causes the system to phase out coal generation faster than in the other scenarios, with
natural gas use increasing to compensate for diminished coal output. Wind, solar PV, and
other low- or zero-carbon technology options are still relatively expensive during these early
years, and their up-scaling is limited by the capacity growth rate constraints. Furthermore,
existing gas capacity can be dispatched at higher utilization rates to offset the drop in coal
generation while reducing emissions. The near-term substitution of gas for coal is a familiar,
ongoing trend in the U.S. electricity sector, partially due to relative fuel prices, and partially
driven by policy goals. As seen in Fig. 2.4c, regional generation mixes increasingly consist
of wind, solar PV, and nuclear electricity by 2050, with natural gas shares still sizeable but
nevertheless decreasing. With a high carbon price in place at the end of the timeframe,
gas-fired power plants with CCS account for small shares of generation in many regions,
while geothermal capacity is added in the western NW, CA, and SW regions.
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The Carbon Tax scenario is a boon for nuclear capacity investment, which is 2.3 times
higher in this setting than in the No Policy case. Wind capacity additions are 7% higher
in the Carbon Tax scenario, but solar PV capacity additions are interestingly 9% lower.
The latter outcome reflects the ability of increased nuclear capacity to provide substantial
carbon-free baseload generation, as continuing to expand solar PV would require significantly
higher investments in battery electricity storage. On the whole, the optimal solution in
the Carbon Tax case includes more investment in battery storage and in the transmission
network compared to that in the No Policy case. Total storage additions are 4% higher
under the Carbon Tax, and these investments are logically concentrated in regions where
wind and solar PV contribute more than 55% of electricity in 2050 (see Figs. 2.4c and
2.5c). Cumulative transmission investments sum to 8231 GW-miles, which represents a one-
third increase over the No Policy result. Additional transmission capacity helps maximize
the utilization of carbon-free, intermittent, renewable electricity output by allowing it to
satisfy demands in multiple regions. Fig. 2.5c reveals that the transmission links which are
augmented in the Carbon Tax scenario are largely in the western U.S., used to import more
renewable electricity into the high-demand regions CA and TX.
The implemented carbon price successfully reduces CO2 emissions far below the level
reached in the No Policy case. Under the Carbon Tax, total annual CO2 emissions are
91% lower in 2050 than in the 2016 base year, a much larger decline than we observed
in the No Policy scenario (53% reduction). Looking at the full timeframe from the base
year through 2050, the Carbon Tax scenario leads to 48% lower cumulative CO2 emissions
than the No Policy case. The deeper GHG reductions achieved under the Carbon Tax do
come at a cost, but the cost appears to be fairly moderate given the magnitude of the





Fig. 2.6a compares the cumulative capacity additions installed by the model over the
full analysis timeframe across the four scenarios. Wind and solar PV capacities are expanded
in all cases, though solar PV investment is more sensitive to the particular scenario than
wind investment. Continued deployment of solar PV will rely more heavily on further cost
reductions, so its growth is noticeably dampened in the Pessimistic Costs scenario. Some
nuclear capacity is added in every scenario, but nuclear growth is much stronger if either
wind, solar PV, and battery costs decline less over time (Pessimistic Costs), or a carbon
price penalizes fossil generation (Carbon Tax). New coal investments are relatively small
in all cases, and nearly extinguished under the Carbon Tax. At least in terms of new
capacity added, natural gas growth is significant and evidently robust to the particular
scenario parameterization assumed. Gas capacity has a relatively low capital cost, and
can serve versatile roles ranging from providing affordable bulk generation with lower CO2
emissions than coal, to backing up intermittent renewables when required to satisfy net
load. Generation facilities incorporating CCS are only deployed in the Carbon Tax case,
as expected. The scale of total CCS investment, however, is not large. Total cumulative
capacity additions are lower in the Pessimistic Costs scenario than in the other settings,
because it features less solar PV capacity (lower capacity factors) and more nuclear capacity
(higher capacity factor).
2.4.6.2 Costs
The total discounted present costs in each scenario are broken down into capital costs,
O&M costs, and fuel costs in Fig. 2.6b. Capital costs are further decomposed into genera-
tion, storage, and transmission assets. As previously described, long-distance transmission
expansion plays a minor role in all scenarios, and the associated capital costs are barely no-
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(a) Cumulative capacity investment
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Capital Cost - Transmission
Fig. 2.6. Comparison of cumulative capacity investments (a) and cost breakdowns (b) across the
scenarios.
ticeable in the bar chart. The existing transmission network continues to be heavily utilized,
but only limited transmission capacity additions can be economically justified, a finding
similar to what (Phillips and Middleton, 2012) observed. Battery storage investments are
larger, signaling an interesting trend in the electricity sector as less investment is allocated to
transmission and more resources are invested in storage. However, capital costs for storage
are still small compared to the total investment in the generation system. Capital costs for
new generation capacity are greater in the Pessimistic Costs scenario, where intermittent
renewable and battery costs decline less, and in the Carbon Tax scenario, which induces a
swifter and more extensive electricity system transformation toward low- and zero-carbon
technologies. In general, the results in Fig. 2.6b reveal that electricity sector expenditures
over the next three decades will slant heavily toward capital costs, with fuels accounting for
a smaller fraction of overall costs than in the past. This is particularly pronounced under the
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(a) Annual average gas capacity utilization
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Fig. 2.7. Annual average utilization rates of natural gas capacity (a) and cumulative additions of
gas capacity (b) in the whole continental U.S., by scenario.
Carbon Tax, which leads to more deployment of capital-intensive technologies like nuclear,
wind, gas plants equipped with CCS, geothermal, and battery storage.
2.4.6.3 Gas capacity utilization
Fig. 2.7b shows that natural gas capacity growth is significant and robust across the four
scenarios, with 700-800 GW added from 2016–2050 in all cases. For much of the model time-
frame, the Carbon Tax scenario actually induces the strongest expansion of gas capacity, due
to its ability to substitute for coal in the short run and to complement intermittent renew-
ables in the long run. Additional gas capacity helps a system with significant intermittent
renewables cope with fluctuations in their output to satisfy net load plus the reserve margin
in all hours of the year. However, as the 2050 time horizon is approached, the Carbon Tax
case ceases to feature the most cumulative gas investment because the carbon price reaches
very high levels and the costs of renewables and storage become increasingly competitive.
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While gas capacity continues to be added, the average utilization rate of this capacity
declines steadily through 2050, another outcome which holds across all four scenarios. This
is clearly visible in Fig. 2.7a. The average utilization rate falls from roughly 40–45% in
2016 down into the 5–10% range by 2050. The decline in utilization rate is much steeper
for NGCC plants than for NGCT plants, as the former are utilized 70–80% of the time in
the base year but are relegated to more of a peaking role as intermittent renewables expand
over time. Early on, gas capacity utilization is highest in the Carbon Tax scenario, reflecting
coal-to-gas switching due to the effect of the carbon price on economic dispatch. Pretty
soon, however, the Carbon Tax case exhibits the lowest gas utilization rate as gas plants
assume more of a backup generation role due to the growth of nuclear, wind, and solar
PV generation, as well as battery storage that offers an alternative strategy for balancing
intermittency. The availability of gas capacity is still imperative for satisfying peak net
loads plus reserve margins, but increasing variable renewable power output with essentially
zero marginal cost will continue to erode gas capacity utilization. The fact that gas-fired
generation capacity still has considerable system value, but produces electricity during fewer
hours of the year, has important policy implications that we discuss in Section 2.5.
2.4.6.4 Growth of transmission and battery storage
Fig. 2.8a illustrates the relative timing of transmission and storage investments in the
four scenarios. In all parameter settings, the model expands the transmission network early
on, and finishes investing in transmission capacity by 2035. Battery storage capacity, on
the other hand, grows steeply later in the analysis timeframe once the costs of intermittent
renewables and batteries have been reduced from their base year values. The Carbon Tax
case induces the largest capacity additions in both transmission and storage, both of which
help maximize the utilization of intermittent, carbon-free renewables. Interestingly, storage
investments are nearly as high in the No New Transmission scenario. The inability to add
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(a) Cumulative additions of battery and trans-
mission capacities, by year
















































(b) Cumulative additions of battery and trans-
mission capacities, with respect to renewables













































Fig. 2.8. Cumulative additions of battery storage and transmission capacities in the whole conti-
nental U.S. with respect to time (a) and cumulative growth in intermittent renewable generation
capacity (b).
transmission capacity makes storage more valuable as a way of addressing the intermittency
issue locally within a region, and also because storage allows for more complete utilization
of transmission capacity by spreading electricity imports over time.
Fig. 2.8b also plots cumulative transmission and storage capacity additions, but does
so relative to the endogenous growth of wind and solar PV capacity on the x-axis. The re-
sults show that all scenarios produce similar transmission and storage expansion trajectories
with respect to their growth in intermittent renewables. As renewable capacity increases,
the transmission network initially grows quite fast, but this relationship does not continue
indefinitely and the growth of transmission capacity saturates. Battery storage, by contrast,
continues to grow roughly linearly with the increase in intermittent renewable capacity even
as the latter reaches progressively higher levels of penetration. In general, our scenario anal-
ysis suggests that the contributions of long-distance transmission expansion to balancing
intermittent renewable electricity output are limited and confined to the short-run, whereas
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Fig. 2.9. Annual capital investments for battery storage and transmission in the whole continental
U.S.
battery storage is the preferred strategy in the long-run.
In terms of annual capital investments in transmission and storage, Fig. 2.9 confirms
that the electricity sector will devote more resources to expanding long-distance transmission
in the short-run, but eventually shift to allocating investment to storage in the long-run. The
scale of the total storage investment through 2050 is also much larger than the scale of the
total transmission investment. Of course, significant costs might be incurred in reality to
expand transmission and distribution within each region, a level of spatial granularity that
our model cannot be used to investigate.
2.4.6.5 Sensitivity analysis: Transmission capital cost and capacity additions
A notable outcome under all our scenarios is that new investments in the long-distance
transmission network are insignificant relative to the broader electricity system transforma-
tion. Since the capital cost of building new transmission in the future is uncertain, we test
how sensitive our finding is to this assumption by reducing the capital cost of transmission
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(a) Sensitivity of total transmission capacity addi-
tions to transmission capital cost





























(b) Sensitivity of total cost to targeted % reduc-
tion in 2050 CO2 emissions
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Fig. 2.10. Sensitivity analysis results showing how total transmission capacity additions respond
to the capital cost of transmission (a), and how the increase in total cost (objective value) responds
to the targeted percentage reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050 (b).
below its $1000/GW-mile reference value and re-running the No Policy scenario. Fig. 2.10a
shows how much total transmission capacity the model adds over the full analysis timeframe
as a function of its assumed capital cost. The x-axis is logarithmic. These sensitivity results
suggest that transmission would have to be many times cheaper, available at a cost unlikely
to be plausible, in order for significantly more transmission capacity to be constructed. We
thus conclude that the minor role of long-distance transmission expansion in the scenario
results is robust to its capital cost.
2.4.6.6 Sensitivity analysis: CO2 emissions reduction and total cost
Even in the No Policy scenario, annual U.S. electricity sector CO2 emissions are 53%
lower in 2050 than in the 2016 base year. In this sensitivity analysis, we specify increasingly
stringent CO2 reduction targets that must be reached by the 2050 time horizon, and explore
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how the corresponding total cost objective values rise as emissions are reduced toward zero.
The allowed total CO2 emissions are assumed to linearly decline over time from the initial
2016 level down to the specified 2050 target. Fig. 2.10b illustrates the percentage increase
in total cost relative to the No Policy scenario as CO2 emissions are reduced more and more.
The relationship between emissions reduction and cost is approximately linear until about
a 90% reduction (similar to the reduction achieved under our Carbon Tax scenario), but
begins to rise much more steeply after that. Eliminating the last remaining emissions from
the electricity sector is very expensive because it rules out the use of relatively low-carbon
technologies like fossil generation equipped with CCS, biomass, and natural gas peaking
plants, and essentially demands either enough battery storage to balance all intermittent
renewables or a generation mix dominated by nuclear power. As (Clack et al., 2017) suggests,
it is extremely difficult to achieve complete decarbonization (zero CO2 emissions) of the
electricity system using currently available technologies, even if substantial decarbonization
can be achieved at fairly moderate cost. For more results from this sensitivity analysis, see
Table A.3.
2.5 Discussion
As with any mathematical model, our framework has its limitations. The sheer scope
of the analysis requires considerable temporal and spatial aggregation that limits its appli-
cability to issues that are highly resolved in either space or time. For example, our model
cannot shed light on the value of transmission and distribution investments at scales smaller
than each of our 13 regions, or complications associated with ramp rates on time scales less
than one hour. The optimization paradigm assumes perfect foresight of future parameter
values and seamless coordination across regions governed in reality by many different deci-
sion makers. Therefore, the pathways produced by the model should be viewed as idealized
transformations of the U.S. electricity system rather than predictions of how it will evolve in
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practice. Parameter assumptions become more uncertain as the analysis progresses toward
its 2050 time horizon. While we have performed scenario and sensitivity analyses to explore
how model outcomes vary with certain important assumptions, there are many other param-
eters in the model whose assumed values may end up being poor representations of what ends
up transpiring in reality. Similarly, we employ a five-year time step for investment decisions
to reduce the computational complexity associated with solving a model of this size. While
using a shorter investment time step would allow us to capture varying construction lead
times for different technologies, this additional granularity would be unlikely to affect the re-
sults significantly given the long analysis timeframe and assumption of perfect foresight. The
values of some model parameters – such as the maximum capacity growth rates for power
plant types and the fractional contribution of import transmission capacity to satisfying the
reserve margin – are fairly subjective values that are either adopted from previous studies or
established to approximate reality. As is the case in essentially any energy modeling study
that develops long-term scenarios, we cannot predict the emergence of fundamentally new
technologies that could be introduced before 2050. Despite these limitations, we have com-
pared results across a number of different parameterizations to obtain major, policy-relevant
insights about the future of U.S. electricity infrastructure. The following subsections clearly
assert what we view as the five key takeaways from our analysis, and discuss their policy
implications.
2.5.1 The U.S. electricity sector can be substantially decarbonized at modest
cost, but complete decarbonization is very costly
In our scenario results, U.S. electricity sector CO2 emissions in 2050 are 53% below
their 2016 level even without a policy stimulus. This reflects the rapidly declining costs
of renewable and storage technologies. Additional emissions reductions can be achieved at
fairly moderate cost. For instance, annual CO2 emissions can be reduced by 80% from
2016 to 2050 with only a 9% increase in total present discounted costs (see Fig. 2.10b).
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However, beyond a 90% reduction, marginal abatement costs rise very steeply. We find
that complete decarbonization of the U.S. electricity sector by 2050 would raise total costs
by 69% relative to the No Policy case. It is not surprising that costs escalate significantly
as the last remaining CO2 emissions must be eliminated. Complete decarbonization rules
out low-carbon technologies like fossil generation with CCS, and requires massive capacity
additions of electricity storage to ensure that reliability standards are met.
To put the high cost of reducing the last few percent of CO2 emissions in perspective,
it is instructive to compare this cost to mainstream estimates of the social cost of carbon,
which quantifies the benefits of reducing emissions in monetary terms. In terms of the
cumulative CO2 emissions from 2016–2050, raising the 2050 emissions reduction target from
97.5% to 100% entails an average abatement cost of $2108/tCO2 for eliminating the last
2.5% of emissions. This figure is an order of magnitude greater than even the high end of
currently accepted social cost of carbon estimates (Nordhaus, 2017).
Overall, our findings indicate that the U.S. electricity sector will undergo significant de-
carbonization, and that policies to reduce annual emissions by 80–90% by 2050 are achievable
at moderate cost but pursuing a zero-emissions electricity sector under current technology
cost projections would risk major increases in electricity costs.
2.5.2 Significant expansion of solar PV and wind to combine for at least 40%
of the generation mix by 2050 is fairly certain, although solar PV and
battery storage are more affected by economic and policy assumptions
than wind
Renewable technologies expand considerably through 2050 regardless of the scenario,
but solar PV and battery storage growth are more sensitive to assumptions than wind de-
ployment. Furthermore, future technology cost trajectories appear to be stronger drivers
of renewables expansion than the climate policy. Compared to the No Policy setting, the
Carbon Tax scenario does not increase renewable capacity and generation as much as the
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Pessimistic Costs scenario decreases them. While wind and solar PV still grow in the latter
case, their cumulative capacity investments are 40% lower in the Pessimistic Costs scenario
than in the No Policy setting. Most of this difference is attributed to lower solar PV de-
ployment, with wind less affected. Wind is a more mature technology than solar PV and
its future growth is less dependent on further cost reductions. In addition, with its more
extreme diurnal capacity factor variations, solar PV expansion relies more heavily on falling
costs of battery storage, which also decrease less in the Pessimistic Costs scenario.
The increase in CO2 emissions in the Pessimistic Costs case is limited because nuclear
power offsets most of the decline in wind and solar generation. This outcome suggests that
nuclear generation can be a reasonably cost-effective, carbon-free substitute for intermittent
renewables and storage if costs develop as projected by the NREL Annual Technology Base-
line. This is of course far from guaranteed, but the results do demonstrate that the extensive
decarbonization of U.S. electricity is robust to the costs of any one technology, as long as
other economically competitive mitigation options exist.
2.5.3 Investments in long-distance transmission are very limited, while invest-
ments in battery storage are significant, under a wide range of assump-
tions
In contrast to some other studies (MacDonald et al., 2016), we find that expansion
of the long-distance transmission network does not play a major role in future electricity
infrastructure pathways. The scenario results show that, due to rapidly falling wind, solar
PV, and battery storage costs, investing in renewable generation closer to the loads it serves
is generally more economical than installing renewables further away to take advantage of
higher capacity factors, but needing to install new transmission capacity. Our model results
thus support Lovins (Lovins, 2017), who essentially advanced this same argument. The
diminishing importance of long-distance transmission should come as a relief to policymakers,
since siting and approval of inter-state transmission projects has been politically challenging
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due to public opposition and having to navigate multiple complex regulatory environments
(Vajjhala and Fischbeck, 2007; Zichella and Hladik, 2013).
On the other hand, investments in battery storage are much greater and accelerate over
the next several decades. Given the considerable value that storage offers to the electric-
ity system, policymakers and system operators should ensure that market mechanisms fully
compensate storage providers for the many valuable services it can provide. As Sioshansi
(2017) describes, storage owners must often decide whether to earn revenue through compet-
itively priced services (e.g., energy arbitrage) or services subject to rate-based cost recovery
(e.g., transmission deferral) since they are not allowed to be compensated for both sets of
activities. As a result, the range of valuable services that storage can provide is constrained,
which discourages storage investments. Market design solutions to this artificial separation
of competitive and regulated services have been proposed, such as auctioning storage capac-
ity rights to third parties (Sioshansi, 2017), and their effective implementation will become
more important as the need for storage intensifies.
2.5.4 Natural gas capacity growth is strong and robust, but utilization of gas
capacity declines steadily and significantly
Our results consistently show that large investments in natural gas capacity continue to
be part of the optimal system transformation, but that average utilization rates of this gas
capacity decline steadily and significantly through 2050. Utilization drops as intermittent
renewables expand and continue to be dispatched first due to near-zero variable costs. Cost-
effective storage improves utilization of wind and solar generation, which further erodes the
utilization of gas-fired power plants. However, gas capacity is still required to maintain sys-
tem reliability during hours of high demand and low variable renewable power output. This
constitutes another market design challenge for policymakers, who must have mechanisms
in place to properly remunerate natural gas generation facilities for the reliability services
52
they provide. There is some doubt as to whether the high wholesale electricity prices avail-
able during a few peak net load hours when power is scarce will allow gas plants to recover
their costs in energy-only markets such as the Electric Reliability Council of Texas and the
Southwest Power Pool (Ela et al., 2015). Capacity markets and creative approaches for re-
warding flexible, dispatchable capacity (such as the flexible ramping product introduced by
the California Independent System Operator) can help overcome the missing money problem
and ensure resource adequacy (Brown, 2018; Hobbs and Oren, 2019; Newbery, 2016). Poli-
cymakers should actively learn from successes and failures in other jurisdictions and adopt
market design approaches that incentivize sufficient capacity investments.
2.5.5 Electricity system costs shift away from operating expenditures and to-
ward capital expenditures over time, especially in the presence of climate
policy
As fossil fuel generation is replaced by renewables, storage, and nuclear power in the
future, costs will shift away from operating expenditures and toward capital expenditures.
This trend makes access to financing critical and threatens to extend payback periods, which
could be at odds with one another in an increasingly competitive electricity landscape where
market-based prices present considerable risk. Investment is increasingly directed toward
renewable and natural gas generation projects that are smaller than traditionally large coal
and nuclear units (Rhodes, 2018), a shift that helps manage project risk. This investment
trend is currently well aligned with emissions reduction goals. In the future, however, if
less granular technologies like fossil plants with CCS or nuclear power are expected to form
part of the decarbonization portfolio, then policymakers might need to help insulate these
capital-intensive projects from risk in competitive market areas. This would become more
important if wind, solar PV, and battery storage costs do not decline as much as anticipated.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we developed a customized and expanded version of the core OSeMOSYS
framework (Howells et al., 2011), which is a least-cost optimization model of the integrated
U.S. electricity generation and transmission system, and used it to study the evolution of
U.S. electricity infrastructure through 2050. We represented 13 regions distinguished by
their electricity demand profiles, wind and solar PV capacity factors, hydro and geothermal
resources, and existing generation capacities. Our model incorporates the long-distance
transmission network that links these regions and balances supply and demand across them.
A major advantage of our framework compared to existing tools is its temporal resolution
that represents time on multiple levels, from five-year capacity investment decision periods,
to inter-seasonal variability in loads and capacity factors, to 24-hour dispatch in each season.
We applied this model to run and compare results from four main scenarios (No Policy, No
New Transmission, Pessimistic Costs, Carbon Tax) as well as additional sensitivity analyses.
Based on the model results, we affirmed five key takeaways and discussed their policy
implications in the previous section. Here, they serve to summarize our most important
findings.
1. The U.S. electricity sector can be substantially decarbonized at modest cost, but com-
plete decarbonization is very costly.
2. Significant expansion of solar PV and wind to combine for at least 40% of the generation
mix by 2050 is fairly certain, although solar PV and battery storage are more affected
by economic and policy assumptions than wind.
3. Investments in long-distance transmission are very limited, while investments in battery
storage are much greater, under a wide range of assumptions.
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4. Natural gas capacity growth is strong and robust, but utilization of gas capacity de-
clines steadily and significantly.
5. Electricity system costs shift away from operating expenditures and toward capital
expenditures over time, especially in the presence of climate policy.
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Chapter 3
Strategic interactions between liquefied natural gas
and domestic gas markets: A bilevel model
3.1 Introduction
Natural gas is a major energy resource and is extensively used for diverse applications
including residential and commercial heating, industrial processes, electricity generation, and
transportation. Natural gas production in the United States (U.S.) has increased steadily
over the past decade and is expected to grow another 32% from 2019 to 2050 (EIA, 2018b).
This includes a 36% increase in natural gas use for U.S. electricity generation as gas continues
to substitute for coal and provides dispatchable power to balance intermittent renewable
generation from wind and solar (EIA, 2018b). Meanwhile, global natural gas consumption is
expected to increase by more than 40% between 2018 and 2050 (IEA, 2019). In addition to
its expanding role in electricity generation, natural gas use is expected to grow significantly
in the industrial sector. As natural gas producers seek out new markets and natural gas
importers seek out new sources of gas, liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade is growing rapidly
and beginning to integrate regional gas markets into a global market. In the U.S., substantial
LNG export infrastructure is slated to come online, and an increasing fraction of domestically
produced gas will be sold to LNG operators for export to foreign markets.
Global LNG consumption has risen steadily over the past six years to reach 354.7 million
tonnes (MT) in 2019 (IGU, 2020). The largest LNG exporters in 2019 were Qatar (77.8 MT)
This chapter is under revision at the Computers & Operations Research journal.
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and Australia (75.4 MT), followed by the U.S. (13.1 MT) (IGU, 2020). On the other side,
Japan (76.9 MT) and China (61.7 MT) were the largest importers of LNG (IGU, 2020). The
global LNG market is expected to grow by 3.6% annually until 2035 (McKinsey & Company,
2019) and U.S. LNG exports are expected to increase by approximately 250% over that period
(EIA, 2018b). While the U.S. only began exporting LNG in 2016 with the opening of the
Sabine Pass terminal in Louisiana, five facilities are currently under construction and more
are in various phases of planning and approval. Once these facilities become operational,
they will cater to sharply rising LNG demand from Asia (EIA, 2018b). As LNG exports
grow, they will exert increasing influence on domestic gas markets including production,
infrastructure investments, and prices. It is therefore important to understand how the
additions of LNG export facilities, which significantly raise demand for gas at individual
locations in the network, affect the decisions of market actors further upstream, and in turn
what this means for LNG operators choosing whether and where to construct terminals.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a modeling framework that effectively captures
the strategic interactions between an LNG operator and a natural gas (NG) producer. The
LNG operator procures natural gas from the NG producer in the domestic network, liquefies
the gas, and exports the LNG to overseas markets. LNG facilities are lumpy investments
with very high upfront costs, making decisions about whether and where to construct them
highly consequential. To make these decisions, LNG operators should not only consider
historical prices available at potential facility locations, but should also anticipate the effects
of a new export terminal’s gas demand on those prices, including the reaction of domestic
supply. The NG producer sells gas to the LNG operator in addition to the consumers in the
domestic market, with production and demand locations connected via a pipeline network.
The strategic interactions between the LNG operator and NG producer are certainly non-
cooperative, as gas sales from the producer to the LNG operator appear as revenues in
the former’s profit maximization problem and as costs in the latter’s problem. In this
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environment with conflicting strategic interests, it is crucial for market agents to anticipate
the responses of others when making their own decisions.
In this chapter, we model the non-cooperative relationship between the LNG operator
and NG producer as a sequential game using a bilevel programming framework. Since LNG
terminals are large-scale, long-lived, lumpy investments that will interact with the domestic
gas market for several decades, we represent the LNG operator as the leader who faces the
upper-level problem. The LNG operator’s decisions involve locating LNG facilities, procuring
gas for liquefaction, and selling LNG to foreign markets. The NG producer is the follower.
In the lower-level problem, the NG producer makes decisions about production quantities,
pipeline infrastructure, and gas sales to domestic consumers and the LNG operator. Since
we are more interested in seeing how the LNG player integrates into the setting where the
NG producer caters only to the local spot markets, the decisions that have more value in
analyzing correspond to those of the LNG operator. The bilevel structure aids the LNG
operator in making profitable decisions while anticipating the NG producer’s response to
those decisions. Our main contributions to the literature are summarized below.
1. We develop a bilevel model to study the strategic interactions between an LNG operator
and an NG producer.
2. Using a preliminary model with one production node and one demand node, we derive
analytical insights on optimal gas pricing for the NG producer.
3. We provide a general bilevel model for a network with multiple possible locations for
LNG facilities, multiple production locations, multiple LNG markets, and multiple
spot markets.
4. We reformulate the bilevel program into a tractable, convex QMIP and demonstrate
that it can be solved efficiently for relatively large networks.
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5. We apply our framework to a case study of the Gulf-Southwest region of the U.S.
and evaluate several decision making scenarios to quantify the benefits of the bilevel
methodology.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on
natural gas infrastructure optimization, natural gas market models, and bilevel programming
applications in energy. In Section 3.3, we derive analytical insights on optimal gas pricing
using a simple, preliminary model. Our generalized network model formulated as a bilevel
program is presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 describes the solution strategy we employ to
solve the bilevel model by reformulating it into a convex QMIP. Section 3.6 presents a case
study that applies the bilevel model to the Gulf-Southwest region under several different
decision making scenarios. The scenario results are analyzed and compared in Section 3.7.
Finally, Section 3.8 concludes by summarizing our key findings.
3.2 Literature review
3.2.1 Natural gas infrastructure optimization
Significant work has been done to optimize the design and operation of natural gas trans-
mission networks including models which aid in developing a natural gas network from scratch
or optimally expanding an existing network to cater to increasing demand (da Silva Alves
et al., 2016; Kabirian and Hemmati, 2007; Rømo et al., 2009; Üster and Dilaveroğlu, 2014).
Most of these problems are hard to solve due to the nonlinearities and non-convexities asso-
ciated with pipeline design elements and the dynamics of gas flows. Üster and Dilaveroğlu
(2014) propose a large-scale mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) framework for
transmission network expansion with an objective to minimize investment, operational, and
gas procurement costs. The model instance is then solved using an online MINLP solver
(Bonmin) and sensitivity analysis is conducted on various parameters.
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Although a nonlinear, non-convex framework is justified to model the complexities as-
sociated with pipeline design and operation, the main drawback of these models is that
there is no guaranteed way to ascertain the global optimality of the solution obtained. A
common strategy is therefore to derive convex and tractable relaxations of these non-convex
problems which can then be solved to optimality. Rømo et al. (2009) present a real-world
example of such an approach for the decision support tool GassOpt, which is a single-period,
steady-state, mixed-integer linear program (MILP) used to optimize Norwegian natural gas
production and transport. It is also used as a decision making tool by StatoilHydro, a ship-
per of natural gas, and Gassco, a pipeline operator, to optimally route gas through their
network (Rømo et al., 2009). A similar problem pertaining to the design of a natural gas
transmission network is considered by da Silva Alves et al. (2016) using a multi-objective
model. The first objective is to minimize the cost of transportation and the second is to
maximize the volume of gas transported through the network. The demand points consid-
ered in their study represent growing markets, with demand curves that help capture the
endogenous dynamic whereby higher demand causes additional infrastructure investment,
which in turn leads to lower revenue in transportation. The multi-objective problem is then
solved by generating a Pareto frontier using an ε-constraint method (da Silva Alves et al.,
2016).
Gupta and Grossmann (2012) propose a model for offshore oilfield infrastructure de-
velopment that is a multi-period, non-convex MINLP with an objective to maximize net
present profit. They employ a linearization technique to reduce the problem to an MILP
which can be solved efficiently using off-the-shelf solvers. Rothfarb et al. (1970) present
a similar framework and implement solution techniques based on trees with heuristics that
iteratively eliminate suboptimal solutions until the optimal solution is reached. Ulstein et al.
(2007) describe a planning model which is used as a decision tool for petroleum production in
Norway. The model considers multi-component flows and nonlinear functions to model the
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complexities involved in processing, which are further linearized to achieve an MILP solved
using Xpress. Cafaro and Grossmann (2014) address the problem of long-term infrastruc-
ture and operational planning for shale gas. They develop an MINLP model for optimizing
infrastructure decisions for the shale gas supply chain starting from drilling of wells to the
pipeline network that delivers the gas. A decomposition method based on piecewise linear
approximation of the objective function is proposed as a solution strategy for the result-
ing large-scale, non-convex MINLP. A similar model of infrastructure planning for shale
gas production is provided by Arredondo-Ramı́rez et al. (2016). Its objective is to develop
a least-cost schedule for planning and development of infrastructure including production
wells and a gas distribution network, considering price trajectories generated using Monte
Carlo simulation.
A mixed-integer nonlinear version of the facility location problem is proposed by Cam-
ponogara et al. (2012) for optimal scheduling of compressors in oilfields. The authors use
linear reformulations of constraints and piecewise linear approximations of cost functions to
achieve an MILP. As we have described, most natural gas infrastructure planning models
adopt the perspective of a single decision maker. Although these models attempt to capture
the complexities and nonlinearities of infrastructure design and operation in detail, they fail
to consider interactions between the decision maker and other market actors. Therefore,
these existing frameworks could lead to suboptimal decision making by failing to account for
the reactions of other agents to the decision maker’s chosen strategy. In this dissertation,
we attempt to overcome this limitation by proposing and analyzing a bilevel model where
the LNG operator anticipates the response of the domestic gas market before choosing to
construct LNG terminals.
Han et al. (2019) present a model for dynamic planning of natural gas transmission.
Their non-convex, nonlinear model of the pipeline network is relaxed using a three-stage
convex relaxation along with piecewise linear approximations to yield a tractable model that
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can be solved in real-time for decision support. The strategy of reformulating non-convex
problems to obtain tractable convex relaxations is practically useful and has been employed
often in the literature. The solution strategy we develop in Section 3.5 to solve our bilevel
model is based on the same general approach.
Recent applications of optimization to LNG focus on supply chain problems such as
transportation and routing of LNG cargoes (Goel, Slusky, van Hoeve, Furman, and Shao,
2015; Grønhaug, Christiansen, Desaulniers, and Desrosiers, 2010; Halvorsen-Weare and Fager-
holt, 2013; Mutlu, Msakni, Yildiz, Sönmez, and Pokharel, 2016). Goel et al. (2015) introduce
a constraint programming approach for optimal LNG scheduling and routing. The solution
method they propose for their mixed-integer program is based on an iterative search heuristic
and is claimed to be computationally efficient compared to conventional methods. The LNG
inventory routing problem, which deals with the optimal routing of LNG tanker fleets, has
been studied by Grønhaug et al. (2010). They develop a mixed-integer program to decide
on routes, production quantities, and sales quantities to maximize profit given the capacity
restrictions of the LNG tanker fleet. Similarly, Halvorsen-Weare and Fagerholt (2013) also
solve the LNG inventory routing problem as a mixed-integer program, but they use penalty
costs to ensure that deliveries are completed within pre-specified time periods.
Lai et al. (2011) assess the value of downstream LNG storage using a Markov decision
process model that incorporates the LNG inventory routing problem, natural gas prices, and
sales quantities to the market. While optimization methods have been applied to natural
gas infrastructure and LNG supply chains, these planning problems have typically been
considered in isolation even though they are tightly intertwined in reality. To the best of
our knowledge, our work is the first to use a bilevel programming structure to model the
strategic interactions between an LNG operator and NG producer who both seek to maximize
their own profits. Sönmez et al. (2013) consider the benefits of experimenting with new
technologies and integrating them into the LNG supply chain. Their work demonstrates the
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importance of evaluating alternative operational models as technological advances expand
the possibilities in the industry.
3.2.2 Natural gas market models
Researchers have modeled natural gas markets using a variety of approaches including
linear programming, nonlinear programming, mixed complementary problem (MCP) equi-
librium modeling, and agent-based economic modeling (Busch, 2014). Linear and nonlinear
programming models are unable to capture the interactions among the many decision makers
who constitute gas markets since they inherently assume the perspective of a single decision
maker who controls all aspects of the system (Busch, 2014). On the other hand, LP models
can be quite detailed in terms of their representations of time and the gas infrastructure
network. NLP models are more difficult to solve and often provide unstable results. Agent-
based models depict each market player as a separate entity. They can also be parameterized
with substantial detail, but agent-based models are typically solved by simulating agents’
actions and behaviors, or by applying heuristics or iterative algorithms. They do not attempt
to provide solutions which are system-wide optima or equilibria based on individual players’
optimization problems (Busch, 2014).
A popular approach in the natural gas market modeling literature is to represent the
market as an equilibrium problem formulated as an MCP. All players in the market face their
own optimization problems, and the MCP consists of their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions as well as market-clearing conditions that determine prices and link the players’
problems (Gabriel et al., 2005). Egging et al. (2008) develop an MCP model of the European
natural gas market and use it to study the effects of a disruption in gas supplies from Russia
via Ukraine. Egging et al. (2010) build the World Gas Model, which is similarly structured
and includes LNG trade, long-term contracts, and explicit consideration of market power
in the upstream segment. In recent years, MCP methodology has advanced to incorporate
63
features like endogenous capacity investments (Huppmann, 2013) and stochastic optimization
under uncertainty (Egging, 2013; Gabriel et al., 2009).
Much like MCPs, our model in this chapter explicitly considers multiple players who face
separate (but linked) optimization problems. But unlike an MCP, which is a simultaneous
game, our bilevel model assumes that the LNG operator and NG producer act sequentially,
with the former as the leader and the latter as the follower. The bilevel methodology allows
the leader to make decisions while anticipating how those decisions would influence the
actions of the follower. We believe that this is an important alternate perspective given the
differences in the scales and longevities of infrastructure investments in different segments
of the natural gas supply chain.
3.2.3 Bilevel models in the energy domain
While bilevel programming has not previously been applied to LNG and domestic gas
market interactions, it has been used to study problems across the energy domain, especially
in electricity. Jin and Ryan (2013) develop a trilevel model for electricity generation and
transmission expansion. In their formulation, centralized transmission expansion decisions
are made in the first level, decentralized generation expansion decisions are made in the
second level, and operational decisions are made in the third level. To solve the problem,
they consider the bilevel subproblems of the lower two levels of the original trilevel model,
and reformulate them as equivalent single-level problems. Finally, the resulting problem is
solved iteratively using a diagonalization method.
Maurovich-Horvat et al. (2014) explore the impacts of policy measures on investment and
operational decisions of wind producers and transmission operators using a leader-follower
model. The transmission operator acts as the leader, making investment decisions and
setting congestion charges, while the wind producer acts as the follower, making capacity
investment and operational decisions including transmission flows. The authors solve the
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bilevel model using the complementarity approach by replacing the lower-level problem with
its equivalent KKT conditions, converting it into a mathematical program with equilibrium
constraints (MPEC), and further reducing it to an MILP. In a similar setting, Baringo and
Conejo (2012) model a wind power plus transmission investment problem as an MPEC.
The decision maker in this case aims to identify optimal investment projects in wind power
and the transmission network in order to maximize social welfare. They propose an MILP
reformulation by reformulating the nonlinear complementarity constraints using a disjunctive
formulation approach, along the lines of what we implement in Section 3.5.3.
Pozo et al. (2017) provide an overview of bilevel models, their theoretical foundations,
solution techniques, and applications to power systems. They describe many variations of the
bilevel framework including single-leader-single-follower, single-leader-multiple-follower, and
multiple-leader-single-follower problem structures. The solution strategies discussed in the
paper are dominated by the approach of reformulating the bilevel problem into a single-level
problem by employing KKT conditions or strong duality by using the primal constraints,
dual constraints, and strong duality theorem with the lower-level problem. The authors also
briefly review stochastic bilevel problems.
Beyond electricity, Bard et al. (2000) present a bilevel program for allocating tax credits
to enhance biofuel production. The government serves as the leader and aims to increase
biofuel production by providing subsidies in the form of annual tax credits. The agricultural
sector serves as the follower and maximizes profit by making crop mix and land use decisions
in response to the tax credits offered by the government. Two algorithms are proposed to
solve the bilevel model: a grid search over the leader’s variables and an approximate NLP
formulation of the bilevel program.
In natural gas, researchers have used bilevel models to study the natural gas cash-out
problem. This problem arises when a shipper, who has contracted with a pipeline company
to deliver specified amounts of gas to different points throughout the network, actually
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delivers more or less than the committed quantities, causing an imbalance (Dempe et al.,
2005). The pipeline company penalizes the shipper for any imbalance by imposing a cash-
out penalty policy. Dempe et al. (2005) investigate the natural gas cash-out problem from a
leader-follower perspective where the supplier is the leader who aims to maximize revenue,
and the pipeline company is the follower who aims to minimize penalties imposed due to
imbalances. Their model is a mixed-discrete bilevel program which is solved by reducing
it into two linear bilevel programs. The authors propose using a branch-and-bound-based
algorithm to solve the resulting linear bilevel problems by enumerating over the faces of the
underlying convex polyhedron. Dempe et al. (2011) extend this work by providing a linear
reformulation of the problem that yields theoretical insights and is computationally easier.
Kalashnikov et al. (2010a) consider a stochastic version of the natural gas cash-out problem.
In the stochastic upper-level problem, the gas supplier considers different scenarios of future
demand and decides on the amount of gas to extract and sell, earning revenue but leading
to possible penalties for imbalances. The authors reformulate the upper- and lower-level
problems so that they become LPs, then solve them iteratively.
Zhang and Zhu (1996) construct a bilevel program for pipeline network optimization
where the available pipeline diameters are discrete. The initial discrete problem is then re-
laxed by replacing the discrete variables with continuous ones, yielding an NLP. The lower-
level problems are then reformulated and solved using conjugate duality theory by taking
advantage of the convexity of the lower-level problem. The upper-level problem is refor-
mulated using a piecewise linear convex function and the resulting problem is then solved
iteratively.
3.2.4 Solution strategies for bilevel models
Bilevel problems are fundamentally hard to solve due to their non-convex and non-
differentiable nature (Colson et al., 2007), and most of the solution methodologies proposed
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in the literature focus on simpler cases with convex objectives and constraint sets. Even
the simplest case of a linear bilevel program, with linear upper- and lower-level problems,
is NP-hard (Colson et al., 2007). As described in the previous subsection which focused on
bilevel programming applications in energy, the most common solution approach is to refor-
mulate the bilevel model into an equivalent single-level problem. Other strategies for solving
bilevel programs that appear in the literature include extreme-point approaches (Tuy et al.,
1993), branch-and-bound (Edmunds and Bard, 1991), complementarity pivoting (Bialas and
Karwan, 1984), and various descent methods.
The prominent strategy of reformulating a bilevel problem into a single-level one essen-
tially replaces the lower-level problem with its KKT conditions or Fritz-John conditions,
resulting in a single-level mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC)
(Allende and Still, 2013; Dempe, 2002). This approach depends on the lower-level problem
being convex. The solution strategy we implement in this chapter leverages this idea, as
we begin by using the KKT conditions of the lower-level problem to obtain a single-level
MPCC reformulation. Another approach is to use the necessary optimality conditions with-
out Lagrange multipliers, resulting in an optimization problem with variational inequalities
or an MPEC (Dempe, 2002). Colson et al. (2007) show that if the lower-level problem is
convex and differentiable, then MPECs encompass bilevel problems and MPECs can also
be formulated as bilevel problems. Therefore, techniques for solving MPECs can be used to
solve bilevel programs under certain conditions.
3.3 Preliminary model and analysis
In this section, we analyze the simplest version of the bilevel model where an LNG
operator and NG producer interact with each other in a sequential manner. The LNG
operator is represented as the leader (due to the lumpy, large, and long-lived nature of LNG
terminal investments) who anticipates the response of the NG producer when making his own
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decisions. The NG producer is the follower who responds optimally to the LNG operator’s
upper-level choices. In this simple, preliminary model, we assume that the LNG operator
has an operational export facility and the NG producer has unlimited production capacity.
The NG producer can sell natural gas to two markets: the domestic spot market (consisting
of power plants, homes with gas heating, etc.) and the LNG operator, each of which is
assigned its own demand curve. The LNG operator can liquefy the gas it procures from
the NG producer and sell LNG to a single overseas market, represented by a demand curve.
The LNG operator’s decisions are the amount of gas to procure from the NG producer, the
quantity of LNG to export, and the LNG market price. The NG producer’s decisions are the




Cprod(·) NG production cost function
Cpipe(·) NG pipeline installation cost function
Cship(·) NG shipment cost function
C liq(·) LNG liquefaction cost function
CLNGship(·) LNG shipment cost function
Dspot(pspot) Domestic spot market demand curve
DLNG(pLNG) LNG market demand curve
Dν(pν) LNG facility gas procurement demand curve
Leader’s Decision Variables
ν Natural gas procured from producer (by LNG operator)
l LNG exported to overseas market
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pLNGj Market price of LNG
Follower’s Decision Variables
f Natural gas shipped to spot market
x NG pipeline capacity installed
q Quantity of NG produced
pspot Spot market price of natural gas





pLNGl − pνν − C liq(ν)− CLNGship(l) (3.1a)
subject to
l ≤ ν (3.1b)
l = DLNG(pLNG) (3.1c)




pspotf + pνν − Cprod(q)− Cpipe(x)− Cship(f) (3.1d)
subject to
f + ν ≤ q (α) (3.1e)
f ≤ x (β) (3.1f)
f = Dspot(pspot) (γ) (3.1g)




The upper-level problem (3.1a) – (3.1c) is the optimization problem faced by the LNG
operator, who maximizes the revenue earned from LNG sales minus the costs of procuring
natural gas from the NG producer, liquefying it, and shipping LNG to the overseas market.
The lower-level problem (3.1d) – (3.1h) belongs to the NG producer, who maximizes revenue
earned from sales of natural gas to the spot market and LNG operator, minus the costs of
production, pipeline investment, and shipment via the pipeline. The variables α ∈ R+,
β ∈ R+, γ ∈ R, and τ ∈ R are the dual variables associated with constraints (3.1e) – (3.1h),
respectively. Spatially, this simple formulation assumes that gas production and the LNG
terminal are located in the same place, whereas the domestic spot market demand is located
elsewhere. The NG producer thus needs to build and use a pipeline to deliver gas to the
spot market. Note that the spatial configuration could be changed easily by making minor
modifications to the model structure. Our model naturally fits within the bilevel framework
because the upper-level gas procurement quantity appears in the lower-level problem, while
the lower-level price for gas sales to the LNG operator appears in the upper-level problem.
3.3.3 Analytical insights
The preliminary model allows us to derive analytical insights on optimal gas pricing in
a bilevel setting. The lower-level problem is an LP, so we can replace it with its equivalent
KKT conditions.
Proposition 1. At optimality, the constraints f+ν ≤ q and f ≤ x of the lower-level problem
hold with equality.
Proof. When the optimal production quantity q∗ = 0 and the optimal pipeline capacity
x∗ = 0, given the non-negativity of pipeline flow f and gas procurement by the LNG operator
ν, we have f ∗ = x∗ and f ∗ + ν∗ = q∗.
Next, if the optimal production quantity q∗ > 0, then the complementarity conditions
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yield α∗ = dC
prod(q)
dq
and α∗ (f ∗ + ν∗ − q∗) = 0. Assuming dC
prod(q)
dq
> 0, we have f ∗ + ν∗ =
q∗ at optimality. Similarly, if the optimal pipeline capacity x∗ > 0, then the respective
complementarity conditions yield β∗ = dC
pipe(x)
dx
and β∗ (f ∗ − x∗) = 0. Assuming a non-
negative unit pipeline investment cost, we get f ∗ = x∗ at optimality since the objective has
a negative term in x with the associated constraint x ≥ f , so the lowest value x can take on
is f ∗.
We see from Proposition 1 that the NG producer will only produce as much gas as he
sells to the spot market and LNG operator, and will only invest in as much pipeline capacity
as he will actually use to ship gas from the production location to the spot market.
Proposition 2. Under optimal pricing, the change in the NG producer’s revenue from selling
the marginal unit of gas to the spot market is equal to the total marginal cost of producing
and shipping the gas.
Proof. When the optimal flow f ∗ > 0, the complementarity condition yields an expression




































the change in LNG facility gas procurement price when an additional unit of gas is sold to the
LNG operator. Thus, we can interpret γ∗ and τ ∗ as the losses in revenue from existing sales
when an additional unit of gas is sold to the spot market and LNG operator, respectively
(because selling more gas depresses the price). We can see that Eq. (3.2) represents the
condition equating marginal revenue to marginal cost, where marginal revenue (pspot
∗ − γ∗)
is the price of the marginal unit sold in the spot market minus the effect of that one unit
increase in spot sales on the revenue earned from all previous units of gas sold.
3.4 Generalized network model
In this section, we formulate a far more expansive version of the bilevel model. We
generalize the preliminary model to a network wherein the nodes represent geographical
regions and arcs represent the pipeline network that transmits gas across regions. Here are
some simplifying assumptions our model entails. We ignore the nonlinearities associated with
modeling the physical characteristics of pipelines and gas compressibility for mathematical
tractability. The model considers a single LNG operator and a single NG producer in the
upper and lower level, respectively, leading to both the leader and the follower acting as
monopolists. We consider quadratic production costs for the NG production and linear costs
for the remaining parameters, including NG and LNG shipments, liquefaction, and capacity
investments. We consider linear demand curves for all markets. The LNG operator decides
whether to open an export terminal in each region where one is allowed, and if a terminal is





N Set of production nodes; N = {1, 2, . . . , N}
M Set of LNG market nodes; M = {1, 2, . . . ,M}
Parameters
Kj Maximum production capacity at node j ∈ N
KLNGj Maximum capacity of LNG facility that can be built at node j ∈ N
Aij Adjacency matrix, N ×N
Cunitj Unit cost of installing production capacity at node j ∈ N
Cprodj (·) Production cost at node j ∈ N (C
prod







Cpipeij Unit cost of installing pipeline on link (i, j) ∈ N ×N
Cshipij Variable cost of shipping gas through pipeline link (i, j) ∈ N ×N
C liqj Cost of liquefaction at node j ∈ N
CLNGfixedj Fixed cost of investment in LNG facility at node j ∈ N
CLNGunitj Unit cost of installing capacity in LNG facility at node j ∈ N
CLNGshipij Variable cost of LNG shipment between node j ∈ N and market i ∈M
ηj Loss during liquefaction process at node j ∈ N
aspotj Intercept of spot market demand curve at node j ∈ N
bspotj Slope of spot market demand curve at node j ∈ N
aLNGj Intercept of LNG market demand curve at node j ∈M
bLNGj Slope of LNG market demand curve at node j ∈M
aνj Intercept of LNG facility gas procurement demand curve at node j ∈ N
bνj Slope of LNG facility gas procurement demand curve at node j ∈ N
Leader’s Decision Variables
νj Natural gas procured at node j ∈ N (by LNG operator)
lij LNG shipped from node i ∈ N to market j ∈M
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zj Binary variable taking value 1 if LNG facility is opened at node j ∈ N ,
0 otherwise
µj Capacity installed in LNG facility at node j ∈ N
dLNGj Demand for LNG in market j ∈M
pLNGj Price of LNG in market j ∈M
Follower’s Decision Variables
fij Flow in pipeline (i, j) ∈ N ×N (from node i to j)
xij Pipeline capacity installed in link (i, j) ∈ N ×N
Qj Production capacity installed at node j ∈ N
qj Production at node j ∈ N
dspotj Demand for natural gas in spot market j ∈ N
pspotj Spot price of natural gas at node j ∈ N





























lji ≤ (1− ηj) νj ∀ j ∈ N (3.3b)
νj ≤ µj ∀ j ∈ N (3.3c)






j ∀ j ∈M (3.3e)
dLNGj = a
LNG
j − bLNGj pLNGj ∀ j ∈M (3.3f)
zj ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j ∈ N (3.3g)
pLNGj , νj, µj, d
LNG
j ∈ R+ ∀ j ∈ N (3.3h)
lij ∈ R+ ∀ i ∈ N , j ∈M (3.3i)
Eq. (3.3a) represents the total profit earned by the LNG operator (leader), where the
term pLNGj d
LNG
j is the revenue earned from LNG exports to overseas market j and the term
pνj νj is the cost of procuring gas from the NG producer (follower) at node j, where the variable
pνj is set by the NG producer in response to the LNG operator’s decisions. C
LNGfixed
j zj denotes
the fixed cost of opening an LNG facility at node j and CLNGunitj µj is the cost of adding
capacity to the LNG facility opened there. The term C liqj νj captures the cost of liquefying
the gas procured at node j and the term CLNGshipij lij represents the cost of shipping LNG
from the export facility at node i to the LNG market at node j.
Constraint (3.3b) stipulates that the total LNG shipments from any node j to the LNG
markets are bounded by the total gas procured at that node, accounting for losses during the
liquefaction process. Constraints (3.3c) – (3.3d) ensure that the gas procured by the LNG
facility at node j does not exceed the capacity available at the facility. Constraints (3.3e) –
(3.3f) compute the total sales in each LNG market and specify the LNG demand curves faced
by the LNG operator. Constraint (3.3g) declares the binary variable zj, whose value denotes
whether the LNG operator opens an export terminal at node j or not. We incorporate these
binary variables into the model to reflect the lumpy nature of LNG terminal investments,













































j + νj ∀ j ∈ N (λj) (3.4b)
qj ≤ Qj ∀ j ∈ N (θj) (3.4c)
Qj ≤ Kj ∀ j ∈ N (αj) (3.4d)







j ∀ j ∈ N (κj) (3.4f)
νj = a
ν







j ∈ R+ ∀ j ∈ N (3.4h)
xij, fij ∈ R+ ∀ i, j ∈ N (3.4i)
Eq. (3.4a) represents the total profit earned by the NG producer (follower), where the
term pspotj d
spot
j is the revenue from spot market sales at node j and p
ν
j νj is the revenue earned
from sales to the LNG operator. Cunitj Qj denotes the cost of adding production capacity at
node j and the term Cprodj qj represents the production cost at node j. The terms C
pipe
ij xij
and Cshipij fij are the costs of adding pipeline capacity and shipping gas, respectively, from
node i to node j.
Constraint (3.4b) ensures flow balance among production, shipments, and sales at any
node j. Constraints (3.4c) – (3.4d) ensure that the total production at node j does not exceed
the production capacity available there. Constraints (3.4f) – (3.4g) specify the demand curves
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for the spot market and LNG facility gas procurement at node j. The variables λj ∈ R,
θj ∈ R+, αj ∈ R+, βij ∈ R+, κj ∈ R, and τj ∈ R are the dual variables associated with
constraints (3.4b) – (3.4g), respectively.
3.5 Solution strategy
This section describes in detail how we reformulate our bilevel program from the previous
section into a tractable, convex QMIP through a combination of (i) replacing the convex
lower-level problem with its KKT conditions to yield an MPCC, (ii) using piecewise linear
approximations to eliminate the non-convex terms from the objective, and (iii) using a
disjunctive reformulation to eliminate the complementarity constraints from the original
lower-level problem.
3.5.1 Mathematical program with complementarity constraints
Finding the optimal solution to the bilevel program presented in Section 3.4.2 requires
jointly solving the upper-level problem (3.3) and lower-level problem (3.4). The lower-
level problem in which the NG producer maximizes profit has a convex quadratic objective
function and a linear constraint set, and is therefore convex. To solve the bilevel program,
we transform it into a single-level problem by replacing the lower-level problem with its KKT
conditions, which yields an MPCC.
Proposition 3. The lower–level problem (3.3) of the NG producer is convex.
Proof. The objective function of the lower-level problem can be written as
F
( [




pspot − pspot>Diag (bspot) pspot + aν>pν
− pν>Diag (bν) pν − Cunit>Q− q>Diag (Cproda ) q
− Cprodb
>
q − Cpipe>x− Cship>f,
(3.5)
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where Diag(·) is the diagonal matrix. The Hessian of the function F has non-zero rows only
corresponding to the variables pspot ∈ RN+ , pν ∈ RN+ , and q ∈ RN+ . The non-zero rows of the
Hessian of the objective function F are given by
HessF =
 −2 Diag(bspot) 0 00 −2 Diag(bν) 0
0 0 −2 Diag(Cproda )
 .
The parameters bspot and bν represent the slopes of the demand curves for the spot market and
LNG facility gas procurement, respectively, and both parameters are non-negative (slopes
are negative). Similarly, Cproda is the coefficient for the quadratic term of the production cost
function and each term in Cproda is non-negative as well. Therefore, the matrix HessF is
negative semidefinite (NSD) since it is a diagonal matrix with all eigenvalues negative. Also,
the constraints associated with the lower–level problem are all linear. Hence, the problem of
maximizing the objective function F subject to linear constraints is convex.
3.5.2 Piecewise linear convex relaxation
In this subsection, we develop a relaxation scheme to solve the non-convex, nonlinear,
single-level MPCC described in Section 3.5.1, which arises after the lower-level problem is
replaced with its KKT conditions. We start by analyzing this MPCC, with a quadratic
objective function (3.6).
Proposition 4. The MPCC that maximizes the objective function (3.6) is non-convex.
Proof. The objective function of the MPCC can be written as
G
( [




pLNG − pLNG>Diag (bLNG) pLNG − aν>pν
+ pν>Diag (bν) pν − CLNGfixed>z − CLNGunit>µ
− C liq>ν − CLNGship>l.
(3.6)
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The Hessian of the function G has non-zero rows only corresponding to the variables pLNG ∈








The parameters bLNG and bν represent the slopes of the demand curves for the LNG market,
DLNG(pLNG) = aLNG − bLNGpLNG, and LNG facility gas procurement, Dν(pν) = aν − bνpν ,
and both parameters are non-negative (slopes are negative). Therefore, the matrix HessG
is not NSD since HessG is a diagonal matrix with both negative and positive eigenvalues.
Hence, the objective function G to be maximized is not concave and thus the problem of
maximizing it is non-convex.
To make the problem tractable, we replace the non-convex terms in the objective function
(3.6) with piecewise linear convex approximations. Let S be the index set of segments.





j for all s ∈ S, as shown in Fig. 3.1, where the superscript “pw” is an abbrebiation
for “piecewise.” The slopes bpwsj and intercepts a
pw
sj of the pieces, along with the breakpoints,
are estimated by solving an MILP with the objective of minimizing the absolute error:
min
∑
i∈N |yi − ŷi|. Using this method, we now achieve a convex objective function by
replacing each of the non-convex terms bνj (p
ν
j )
2 with uj, such that Eq. (3.7) holds true:




j ∀ s ∈ S, j ∈ N ,




j −M(1− ξsj) ∀ s ∈ S, j ∈ N ,∑
s∈S
ξsj = 1 ∀ j ∈ N ,


















Fig. 3.1. An example piecewise linear approximation of bνj p
ν
j
2 with |S| = 5
.
3.5.3 Quadratic mixed-integer program
In this subsection, we carry out our final reformulation of the problem into a convex
QMIP, which is computationally tractable. First, we prove that the objective function of
the MPCC is convex when the piecewise linear relaxation scheme from Eq. (3.7) is used.
Then, we employ a disjunctive reformulation of the complementarity constraints to obtain
the convex QMIP.
Proposition 5. In the single-level MPCC reformulation of the bilevel program, incorporating
the piecewise linear relaxation scheme from Eq. (3.7) makes the objective function convex.









pLNG − pLNG>Diag (bLNG)pLNG − aν>pν + u>
− CLNGfixed>z − CLNGunit>µ− C liq>ν − CLNGship>l.
(3.8)
The Hessian of the function H has non-zero rows only corresponding to the variables pLNG ∈
RN+ . The non-zero rows of the Hessian are given by HessH = −2 Diag(bLNG), which is an
NSD matrix since the Hessian is a diagonal matrix with all eigenvalues negative. Hence,
the objective function H is concave and thus the problem of maximizing it has a convex
objective function.








































j ∀ s ∈ S, j ∈ N (3.9b)




j −M(1− ξsj) ∀ s ∈ S, j ∈ N (3.9c)∑
s∈S
ξsj = 1 ∀ j ∈ N (3.9d)∑
i∈M
lji ≤ (1− ηj) νj ∀ j ∈ N (3.9e)
νj ≤ µj ∀ j ∈ N (3.9f)




j − bLNGj pLNGj ∀ j ∈ N (3.9h)




j κj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (3.9i)
0 ≤ pνj ⊥ −νj − bνj τj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (3.9j)
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0 ≤ dspotj ⊥ −p
spot
j + λj + κj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (3.9k)
0 ≤ Qj ⊥ Cunitj − θj + αj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (3.9l)
0 ≤ qj ⊥ 2 Caprodj qj + Cb
prod
j + θj − λj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (3.9m)
0 ≤ xij ⊥ Cpipeij − Aijβij ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (3.9n)
0 ≤ fij ⊥ Cshipij + λi − λj + βij ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (3.9o)
0 ≤ θj ⊥ Qj − qj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (3.9p)
0 ≤ αj ⊥ Kj −Qj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (3.9q)
0 ≤ βij ⊥ Aijxij − fij ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (3.9r)∑
i∈N












j ∀ j ∈ N (3.9t)
νj = a
ν
j − bνjpνj ∀ j ∈ N (3.9u)
zj ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j ∈ N (3.9v)
ξsj ∈ {0, 1} ∀ s ∈ S, j ∈ N (3.9w)







j , qj, Qj, d
spot
j , θj, αj ∈ R+ ∀ j ∈ N (3.9y)
λj, τj, κj, uj ∈ R ∀ j ∈ N (3.9z)
Lastly, the MPCC model (3.9) is reformulated into an MILP by implementing a disjunc-
tive reformulation of the nonlinear complementarity constraints from the original lower-level
problem. The reformulation scheme shown in Eq. (3.10) is applied to all of the complemen-
tarity constraints, (3.9i) – (3.9r), of the MPCC model (3.9):
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x ≤M δ,
x ⊥ b− Ax, x ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ b− Ax ≤M (1− δ),
b− Ax ≥ 0, x ≥ 0, δ ∈ {0, 1}.
(3.10)
Therefore, the combination of applying piecewise linear approximations to the objective
function and a disjunctive reformulation to the complementarity constraints yields an MILP
with a convex quadratic objective function and linear constraints. This “convex QMIP” is
computationally tractable using off-the-shelf commercial solvers.
3.5.4 Computational experiments
We perform computational experiments on randomly generated instances of the convex
QMIP to investigate how the problem size and solution time scale with the numbers of nodes
in the network and LNG markets. Each instance is randomly generated in the following
sequence: (1) an N × N network is generated such that each node i ∈ N has a local
spot market with a demand curve, (2) potential locations for LNG facilities are randomly
selected within the network, (3) generate investment costs, capacity costs, production costs,
and production capacity limits for the LNG operator and NG producer for each node in the
network, (4) generate a node-node incidence matrix for the network along with pipeline and
shipping costs, and (5) define LNG markets with demand curves where open LNG facilities
can sell LNG. The computational experiments are executed using a single 2.6 GHz Intel
Core i7 processor with 16 GB memory, with Gurobi 8.1.1 as the QMIP solver. We generate
10 random instances each for different problem sizes, and the average runtime in seconds is
reported in Table 3.1. It is worth noting that the solution time increases significantly with
the number of nodes but does not vary considerably with the addition of LNG markets. The
greater sensitivity to the number of domestic nodes arises because the lower-level problem
grows exponentially with this number. Our model is intended as a decision support tool
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# of int. vars
(upper)







1 5 17 75 0.026
2 5 24 75 0.031
3 5 31 75 0.023
10
1 10 32 250 0.558
2 10 44 250 0.695
3 10 56 250 0.604
15
1 15 47 525 7.364
2 15 64 525 7.976
3 15 81 525 7.565
25
1 25 77 1375 85.05
2 25 104 1375 87.26
3 25 131 1375 87.92
50
1 50 152 5250 1848.92
2 50 204 5250 2108.79
3 50 256 5250 1979.56
100
1 100 302 20500 8496.24
2 100 404 20500 8725.63
3 100 506 20500 8805.04
for long-run strategic infrastructure planning rather than real-time operations. Therefore,
even the solution times for the largest instances in Table 3.1, which are on the order of 2–3
hours, are acceptable given the application. Although the case study presented in the next
section features only nine nodes and two LNG markets, we emphasize that the results of
our computational experiments confirm that the model could include significantly more of
them without becoming too computationally burdensome. The limited numbers of nodes
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and LNG markets in the case study have far more to do with the difficulty of obtaining
high-quality, publicly available input data.
3.6 Case study
In this section, we apply our bilevel framework to model the interactions between an
LNG operator and NG producer in a real-world setting. As a case study, we focus on the
Gulf-Southwest region of the U.S., which is a major producer and exporter of natural gas.
This area of interest is divided into nine regions, where each region is represented as a
node in the network. The regions are defined according to state boundaries, namely, New
Mexico (NM), Oklahoma (OK), Arkansas (AR), Louisiana (LA), and Texas. Since Texas
covers a large area with multiple production clusters and suitable LNG export locations, it is
further subdivided into North Texas (NT), East Texas (ET), West Texas (WT), and South
Texas (ST) based on the oil and gas division district boundaries established by the Railroad
Commission of Texas (2020). For the case study, LNG facilities can only be constructed in
the three regions with coastlines, which are LA, ET, and ST. All regions feature spot markets
with associated demand curves. We consider two distinct LNG markets representing exports
to Atlantic (e.g., Europe) and Pacific (e.g., Asia) destinations.
Table 3.2 documents all of the data sources that we use to parameterize the case study
input database. All of these sources are publicly available.
3.6.1 Scenario analysis
In this scenario analysis for the Gulf-Southwest case study, we compare and contrast
results from five scenarios that differ according to their decision making structures and
assumptions about existing infrastructure. In particular, these scenarios are designed to
shed light on the differences between cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes, the benefits
of using the bilevel model instead of single-agent optimization to make costly and lumpy
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Table 3.2. Documentation of data sources for the case study input database.
Parameter Source
Production capacity EIA (2018a)
Unit cost of production capacity EIA (2018a)
Production costs IEA (2017)
Pipeline installation & shipment cost Jaremko (2019)
Liquefaction costs IEA (2017)
LNG facility costs (fixed & unit) Songhurst (2018)
LNG shipment costs Moryadee and Gabriel (2017)
Demand curve parameters Government of Canada (2018), Baker (2018), EIA
(2018), Statistics Canada (2018), Canadian Gas As-
sociation (2018)
investment decisions, and the general effects of LNG additions on the domestic gas market.
The five scenarios we assess are outlined in Table 3.3.
The Bilevel scenario captures the strategic conflict between the LNG operator and NG
producer which is present in the real-world market, so we consider it the baseline scenario
against which all other scenarios are compared. This is the generalized network model we
presented in Section 3.4, in which the LNG operator and NG producer compete in a non-
cooperative, leader-follower game.
The Cooperative scenario assumes that a single optimizing agent is given control of all
decisions that belong to both the LNG operator and NG producer in the Bilevel scenario.
This agent optimizes the entire system to maximize total profits from gas and LNG sales.
In reality, this scenario would describe situations where the LNG operator and NG producer
are two divisions of the same company, so that they jointly coordinate their decisions with
the goal of maximizing their combined profit. The strategic conflict over the price at which
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Table 3.3. Summary of the five main scenarios we investigate.
Scenario name Description
Bilevel Scenario • A scenario with two players, the LNG operator (leader) and
NG producer (follower), who aim to maximize their own profits.
• Interpreted as the baseline scenario against which the other
scenarios are compared.
Cooperative Scenario • A scenario with a single optimization agent who jointly makes
all NG and LNG decisions to maximize total profit.
• Serves as a counterfactual to the Bilevel scenario to elucidate
the effects of conflicting strategic interests in the latter.
No LNG Scenario • A single-agent optimization problem in which the NG pro-
ducer maximizes profit by selling to the spot markets only.
• Used to study spot market outcomes in the absence of an LNG
export industry and provide prices for the Näıve LNG scenario.
Näıve LNG Scenario • A scenario where the LNG operator makes decisions assuming
that gas procurement prices will be the same as the spot prices
in the solution to the No LNG scenario.
• Compared to the Bilevel scenario to quantify the losses in-
curred by the LNG operator for failing to anticipate the effects
of his demand on prices across the network.
Existing Pipeline Network
Scenario
• This is the same as the Bilevel scenario, except it assumes that
a pipeline network already exists to transmit gas across regions.
• Used to study the impact of having an existing pipeline net-
work instead of having to build this infrastructure from scratch.
the NG producer sells gas to the LNG operator is absent in this Cooperative scenario.
As very large purchasers of natural gas at specific locations in the network, LNG ter-
minals can have profound effects on the local spot markets in the region. These effects are
captured in the Bilevel scenario, but in order to compare its results to a case without the
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LNG industry present, we run the No LNG scenario. This scenario omits the LNG operator
and adopts the single-agent perspective of the NG producer, who can only sell gas to the
domestic spot markets. In other words, the No LNG scenario is just the lower-level problem
from the bilevel formulation, but without sales to the LNG operator. The spot prices fea-
tured in the solution to this scenario can be interpreted as the gas prices that prevail before
any LNG facilities are added to the region.
The primary advantage of using the bilevel formulation to make decisions about LNG
investments is that it allows the LNG operator to anticipate the effects of LNG facility
demands on the prices at which they would be able to procure gas. This is important
because their large demands would put upward pressure on prices, although the effect could
be somewhat mitigated if the NG producer responds by increasing production. To quantify
the benefits of using the bilevel framework to aid LNG investment decisions, we compare
the Bilevel scenario results against those of a Näıve LNG scenario. In this case, the LNG
operator makes LNG terminal investment decisions based on the spot prices from the solution
to the No LNG scenario, näıvely assuming that he will be able to procure gas at these prices.
Once the LNG operator and NG producer engage in leader-follower competition with LNG
facility capacities fixed at their suboptimal values, the LNG operator will not be able to earn
as much profit as in the Bilevel scenario.
A common assumption in the four scenarios described above is that both players be-
gin without any infrastructure and must invest in production, pipeline, and LNG capacities
from scratch. However, the model proposed in this chapter can flexibly represent either
cases of new gas development or cases with existing gas infrastructure. For example, the
Gulf-Southwest region which is the focus of our case study already has an extensive pipeline
network which has been built up over the years to transmit gas across locations. Therefore,
in the Existing Pipeline Network scenario, we assume that the NG producer inherits the
initial pipeline network instead of having to construct all pipelines from scratch. This sce-
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nario allows us to examine how the initial infrastructure configuration influences the spatial
distributions of production and prices.
3.7 Case study scenario results
This section presents and compares results from the five scenarios to obtain relevant
strategy insights. Natural gas production levels are described in Section 3.7.1 while Section
3.7.2 examines infrastructure investments. Natural gas and LNG consumption levels and
prices are reported in Section 3.7.3. Section 3.7.4 compares the profits earned by the players
in each scenario.
3.7.1 Natural gas production
Natural gas and LNG production levels are higher in the Cooperative scenario shown
in Fig. 3.2b than in the Bilevel scenario shown in Fig. 3.2a. This is expected, since the
Cooperative scenario removes the strategic conflict over the price at which the NG producer
sells gas to the LNG operator in the Bilevel scenario. As a result, the single optimizing agent
in the Cooperative case can seamlessly increase gas production to supply more feedstock to
the LNG facilities. By contrast, in the Bilevel scenario, as the LNG operator seeks to procure
more gas, the NG producer has an interest in limiting his gas production response to keep the
price of their exchange higher. Fig. 3.2 also indicates that the LNG operator only chooses
to add terminals in two of the three coastal regions (ST and LA) in the Bilevel scenario,
whereas terminals are constructed in all three of them in the Cooperative scenario. The
strategic conflict over LNG facility gas procurement prices in the Bilevel case thus reduces
LNG infrastructure investment relative to the Cooperative counterfactual.
Fig. 3.2c reports production volumes for the No LNG scenario, where the NG producer
is the lone player and sells gas only to the domestic spot markets. Compared to the Bilevel
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Fig. 3.2. Natural gas and LNG production levels across the scenarios.
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regions where LNG terminals are allowed to be built in the Bilevel setting. The presence
of the LNG operator in the Bilevel scenario increases gas production in the regions with a
potential LNG facility, but in the interior regions with only spot markets, production volumes
are not affected by the addition of an LNG export industry. The response of gas production
to the presence of the LNG operator in the Bilevel scenario is limited to the potential LNG
exporting regions because the NG producer chooses to satisfy increased demand for gas there
by ramping up local production within these regions rather than by investing in a pipeline
network to produce gas elsewhere and transmit it to the LNG facilities.
Fig. 3.2d shows natural gas and LNG production levels in the Näıve LNG scenario.
Interestingly, the locations of the constructed LNG terminals are not the same in this case
as in the Bilevel scenario depicted in Fig. 3.2a. Specifically, the Näıve LNG solution features
LNG terminals in ST and ET instead of ST and LA, as in the Bilevel solution. By failing
to anticipate the effects of his LNG terminals on gas procurement prices, the LNG operator
in the Näıve LNG scenario locates facilities suboptimally. As a result, once those capacity
investments are fixed and the sequential game for the Näıve LNG scenario takes place, the
LNG operator faces higher procurement prices than anticipated. Consequently, the LNG
operator procures much less gas and exports less LNG than in the Bilevel case. Therefore,
natural gas production is lower as well in the Näıve LNG case.
A noteworthy feature of the solutions to the first four scenarios is that the model does
not find it economical to invest in a pipeline network to transmit gas across regions. Instead,
the model prefers to produce enough gas in each region to satisfy that region’s demands,
essentially making all regions self-sufficient. The decision to not invest in pipelines is nat-
urally influenced by many factors in the model including (but not limited to) the cost of
adding pipeline capacity, the maximum production capacity in each region, relative produc-
tion costs in each region, and the fact that our model does not capture pipeline exports from
the Gulf-Southwest to other areas of the U.S. and Mexico, which are substantial in real life.
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Therefore, to understand how results change if we incorporate the existing pipeline capacities
in these regions rather than require the model to build them from scratch, we consider the
Existing Pipeline Network scenario. Its production volumes are shown in Fig. 3.2e. The
LNG operator’s optimal decisions in this scenario are the same as in the Bilevel scenario;
regardless of where the NG producer extracts gas, the LNG operator is only concerned about
the prices at which its facilities in selected locations can procure gas. Furthermore, the LNG
operator makes the same discrete investments in terminals in ST and LA in the Bilevel and
Existing Pipeline Network scenarios, and these terminals are at their maximum capacity
limits, so there is limited flexibility to adjust operational decisions to whatever differences in
gas procurement prices arise between these two cases. Meanwhile, for the NG producer, it is
clear that inheriting the underlying pipeline network increases overall natural gas production
and shifts it toward the interior regions with lower production costs (e.g. WT). So, while it
is apparently not profitable to invest in pipelines from scratch under our reference parameter
assumptions, having these pipelines in place is valuable because it links high-demand nodes
to low-cost production areas.
3.7.2 Infrastructure investments
Fig. 3.3a reports total investments in gas production and LNG production capacities in
each scenario. Compared to the No LNG scenario, the presence of the LNG export industry
in all other scenarios leads to far greater investment in natural gas production. This effect
is strong because the demand for gas from LNG facilities is sizable relative to the size of
the overall domestic spot market, and especially relative to the spot markets within the
LNG exporting regions. In the Bilevel scenario, the LNG operator accounts for 29% of
total natural gas consumption, and approximately 50% of gas consumption in the regions
where LNG terminals are located. Therefore, LNG exports serve as a major stimulus for
upstream investment in natural gas production capacity, especially in the regions where
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Fig. 3.3. Comparison of annual production capacity and annual LNG capacity installed (a) and
annual gas consumption (b) across the scenarios.
export terminals are sited.
Total LNG capacity investment is greatest in the Cooperative scenario. As previously
described, this scenario removes the strategic conflict over LNG facility gas procurement
prices that shapes the non-cooperative scenarios. As a result, the LNG operator can in-
vest more extensively without worrying about increasing the prices for feedstock gas. The
Existing Pipeline Network solution features the most investment in natural gas production
capacity. Since the capital costs of shipping gas across regions are sunk in this scenario,
the NG producer is able to produce gas in low-cost regions and transmit it to high-demand
regions, leading to greater overall production capacity investment as the optimal market
equilibria shift to higher quantities sold.
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Fig. 3.4. Spot prices (bars) and LNG procurement prices (markers) by region across the scenarios.
3.7.3 Consumption and prices
3.7.3.1 Spot markets and LNG facility gas procurement
Fig. 3.4 plots natural gas spot prices (bars) in each region by scenario, and where
applicable, also plots the LNG facility procurement prices (markers). Please note that the
gas procurement prices for LNG facilities only exist for the regions and scenarios which result
in an LNG facility being opened. It can be seen that the addition of LNG terminals to a
region drives up the local spot market prices. For instance, in Fig. 3.4, the spot prices in
the ST and LA regions are higher in the Bilevel scenario than in the No LNG scenario. This
effect is intuitive, since the LNG facilities are large users of natural gas that compete with
local consumers for gas supplies. A more general observation is that the prices in Fig. 3.4 are
higher than the actual current market prices in these regions. There are several reasons for
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these price differences between the model and reality, the most important of which is likely
that our model features a single NG producer who acts as a monopolist, which is far more
market power than exists in the real upstream segment. Since our aim in this case study
is to understand the impact of LNG industry growth on domestic natural gas markets, and
assess the importance of using a bilevel model to plan LNG infrastructure investments, we
emphasize relative changes in prices from one scenario to another rather than the absolute
price levels.
Fig. 3.4 further elucidates the pitfalls of failing to anticipate production and price re-
sponses to new LNG terminals when deciding whether and where to construct these facilities.
In the Näıve LNG scenario, the LNG operator suboptimally locates an LNG terminal in ET
instead of LA (see Fig. 3.2d), assuming that the spot market prices from the No LNG solu-
tion will remain available for gas procurement. However, as seen in Fig. 3.4, once the LNG
operator puts a terminal in ET, the NG producer charges almost double the original spot
price for sales to this LNG terminal. Therefore, we infer that the näıve approach of failing
to anticipate the price effects of constructing new LNG terminals can lead to suboptimal
performance by underestimating the prices that these facilities would need to pay to procure
gas. The availability of existing pipelines in the Existing Pipeline Network scenario leads to
much lower spot prices in the LNG exporting regions ST and LA. The pipelines allow gas
to be transmitted in large quantities from low-cost production regions to these regions with
high demands, thus reducing spot prices. However, LNG procurement prices do not change
in the Existing Pipeline Network scenario, as the NG producer can price separately for sales
to the spot market and the LNG operator.
Fig. 3.3b shows overall gas consumption in each scenario. The Existing Pipeline Network
scenario features the highest total consumption, mainly due to the spot market as access to
low-cost production regions enabled by the pipeline network results in spot market equilibria
with higher quantities. Out of the four scenarios that lack an initial pipeline infrastructure,
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the Cooperative scenario has the most total gas consumption. While it features slightly less
spot market consumption than the No LNG scenario, the Cooperative case has the highest
consumption by the LNG operator. With the strategic conflict over gas sales to the LNG
operator eliminated, the single optimizing agent in the Cooperative scenario can effectively
supply gas to the LNG terminals at cost, leading to more procurement and liquefaction. Gas
procurement by LNG facilities is much lower in the Näıve LNG scenario than in the Bilevel
scenario because export infrastructure in the former is suboptimally located in regions where
the NG producer charges high procurement prices.
3.7.3.2 LNG markets
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Fig. 3.5. Comparison of LNG market price (a) and total LNG market sales (b) by export market
across the scenarios.
Figs. 3.5a and 3.5b show the LNG prices and total LNG sales, respectively, for the two
LNG export markets in each scenario. The lowest LNG prices and highest export volumes
occur in the Cooperative scenario in which LNG infrastructure investments are greatest and
there is no conflict over procurement prices. On the other hand, the highest LNG prices and
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Fig. 3.6. Profits earned by the LNG operator and NG producer in each scenario.
lowest export volumes arise in the Näıve LNG scenario where LNG infrastructure investments
are lower and gas procurement prices are higher, discouraging liquefaction.
3.7.4 Profits
The profits earned by the LNG operator and NG producer in each scenario are shown in
Fig. 3.6. The highest combined profit is earned in the Cooperative scenario where a single
agent jointly optimizes all decisions on behalf of the two players, resulting in greater natural
gas production, more LNG exports, and higher profit. The profits in the Bilevel scenario are
split between the LNG operator and NG producer, and their combined profit is lower than
in the Cooperative case due to their strategic conflict over the LNG facility gas procurement
price. Profits are the lowest by far in the No LNG scenario, since the NG producer cannot
sell to overseas LNG markets without the LNG operator, and the total demand for the NG
producer’s gas is significantly lower. The reduction in the LNG operator’s profit from the
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Bilevel scenario to the Näıve LNG scenario captures (in annualized terms) the loss that the
LNG operator would incur by failing to anticipate the effect of his LNG terminal investments
on the prices at which they would be able to procure gas. The Existing Pipeline Network
scenario does not affect outcomes for the LNG operator, and its effect on the NG producer
is insignificant. While overall production and spot market consumption increase compared
to the Bilevel scenario, these greater quantities are largely offset by lower spot prices, and
the NG producer’s profit barely changes. Consumer surplus, however, expands because
the pipeline network provides access to low-cost gas, which increases domestic spot market
consumption.
3.8 Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter, we have developed a bilevel model to study the strategic interactions
between an LNG operator and an NG producer in a leader-follower setting. The model
helps both players determine optimal strategies when they operate in a non-cooperative
environment wherein their objectives conflict with one another. To solve the bilevel pro-
gram, we proposed and demonstrated a solution strategy based on (i) replacing the convex
lower-level problem with its KKT conditions to yield an MPCC, (ii) using piecewise lin-
ear approximations to eliminate the non-convex terms from the objective, and (iii) using
a disjunctive reformulation to eliminate the complementarity constraints from the original
lower-level problem. These steps ultimately generate a tractable, convex QMIP reformula-
tion. By carrying out computational experiments on randomly generated problem instances,
we showed that our method can obtain optimal solutions to instances with a hundred nodes
and several LNG markets within reasonable runtimes.
We then applied our bilevel framework to a real-world case study of the Gulf-Southwest
region of the U.S. Focusing on this case study, we evaluated five scenarios distinguished
by their decision making structures and assumptions about existing infrastructure. Scenario
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results show that the addition of LNG export terminals to the region can significantly increase
demand for domestic gas and raise prices, although this effect is somewhat mitigated by the
NG producer’s endogenous production response to higher demand. If the LNG operator does
not properly account for the effect of his infrastructure additions on gas prices when deciding
whether and where to construct new LNG terminals, then LNG operator profits can suffer
due to suboptimal capacity investments that face higher-than-expected prices to procure gas
from the NG producer. This finding underscores the usefulness of our bilevel framework for
informing discrete decisions about very costly LNG infrastructure, as it captures domestic
market responses to LNG investment alternatives. While the NG producer does not find
it economical to invest in a pipeline network when he would need to build it from scratch,
inheriting existing pipelines expands access to low-cost gas production regions and benefits
domestic consumers while leaving the LNG operator unaffected.
In terms of energy market insights, our goals in this dissertation have been to understand
the strategic interactions between an LNG operator and NG producer, develop a tractable
model capable of informing their optimal infrastructure investments, and analyze how the
growth of an LNG export industry affects domestic gas markets under a variety of scenarios.
Restricting the model structure to just two players helped us accomplish these goals with
a computationally tractable bilevel program, but entailed a number of limitations. Most
notably, our model assumes that there is just one LNG operator and one NG producer,
effectively acting as monopolists in their respective segments of the supply chain. In reality,
natural gas markets are often quite competitive, with many producers and multiple LNG
exporters operating in a given country or region. Furthermore, our bilevel framework gives
the NG producer control over the pipeline network, which is often constructed and operated
by a separate midstream company in real-world market environments. An extension of the
work described in this chapter could expand the number of market actors represented in the
model by incorporating multiple decision makers into the upper- and/or lower-level problems.
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For instance, Pozo et al. (2017) provide examples of bilevel models in power systems with
multiple-leader-single-follower and single-leader-multiple-follower structures. Applying these
ideas to extend the model presented in this chapter could lead to a richer formulation with
more comprehensive market interactions.
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Chapter 4
Risk-averse stochastic bilevel programming: An
application to natural gas markets
4.1 Introduction
The natural gas market comprises a variety of players and a plethora of moving parts.
The natural gas sector in the U.S. has seen extensive changes and shifts in trends in the
past decade (Finley, 2013). The global natural gas demand has been growing over the past
decade and is expected to continue to rise over the years to come. The shale gas revolution
has changed the role of the U.S. from a major importer of natural gas to a major exporter
(Conti et al., 2018). The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) anticipates the
natural gas production in the U.S. to continue to grow through 2050. With this growth
trajectory, the EIA contemplate the U.S. to become a net energy exporter by 2022 (Conti
et al., 2018). A similar growth trend is expected in the global liquefied natural gas (LNG)
market, with the demand expected to grow by over 3.6% annually (McKinsey & Company,
2019). The growth in the growing global natural gas demand will essentially pave the way to
an increase in LNG exports from the U.S., making it a major exporter of LNG. In 2019, the
U.S. became the third-largest LNG exporter after Qatar and Australia (EIA, 2020). Multiple
LNG projects in the U.S. have become operational in 2019 and 2020, with more expected
to come online in the subsequent years. With these additions, the U.S. LNG exports are
expected to increase by approximately 250% over the next 15 years (EIA, 2018a).
Although the overall demand forecasts and market growth trends are valuable tools in
future infrastructure planning, investment and operational decisions are often vastly affected
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by various uncertainties associated with these forecasts. In practice, it is often hard to
accurately forecast the demand in different markets. We often approximate future demands
by extrapolating the historical data along with other economic signals. However, in reality,
the demand often has inherent randomness associated with it that can significantly impact
the decisions and the repercussions associated with those decisions. A very recent example
is the COVID-19 pandemic and how it affected the global natural gas market in 2020. The
natural gas production in the U.S. had been growing steadily in the past decade. The natural
gas production in 2019 grew by almost 10 % compared to 2018 (EIA, 2021), but the trend
did not continue in 2020. The natural gas consumption by LNG operators in the U.S. has
fallen from 9.8 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) in late March 2020 to 4.0 Bcf/d in June
due to the decline in the global natural gas demand (EIA, 2020). The extremely low natural
gas prices globally in 2020 have also affected the economic viability of U.S. LNG exports
(EIA, 2020). Hence, it is of paramount importance for both the LNG operator and the NG
producer to consider these demand uncertainties when making investment and operational
decisions.
LNG plants require considerable capital investments and generally involve multiple stake-
holders. Setting up an LNG facility generally takes about 6-10 years (U.S. Department of
Energy, 2018) and are usually planned and structured with an approximate estimated 20-40
years of usage. The average construction cost of an LNG facility is about $US1.5B per 1
MM tonnes per annum (mtpa). Other costs associated with building an LNG facility include
the receiving terminal costs and LNG vessels costs for transportation (Naghash, 2017). The
average size of LNG facilities is about 5 mtpa, resulting in an average total cost of approxi-
mately $US10B - $US15B (U.S. Department of Energy, 2018). Due to the long time frames
and extremely high costs associated with these projects, the structuring of these projects
would need to anticipate and account for the various risks associated with the project’s dif-
ferent aspects. Thus, the consideration of risk is of extreme importance while considering
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the decisions of the LNG operator.
In this chapter, we propose a multi-stage stochastic modeling framework that captures
the strategic interactions between an LNG operator and NG producer under demand uncer-
tainty while accounting for the players’ risk behavior. The LNG operator makes large-scaled,
high fixed cost investment decisions and hence is considered the leader. The LNG operator
makes investments, gas procurement, LNG export, and pricing decisions. The NG producer
produces gas and sells it in the spot market and to the LNG operator. The production,
sales, and prices for both players are directly impacted by the market conditions, which are
by no means deterministic. Hence, we capture the stochastic behavior in these models by
introducing uncertainty in demand for each player’s respective markets. We capture the
demand uncertainty using scenarios that correspond to various demand conditions in the
market. Our main contributions to the literature are summarized below.
1. We develop a stochastic bilevel model to study the strategic interactions between an
LNG operator and an NG producer under uncertain demand.
2. We explore the optimal strategies under risk-neutral and risk-averse decision-making
approaches.
3. We provide a stochastic bilevel model for an N ×N network with multiple potential
LNG locations, production locations, spot markets, and LNG markets for multiple
demand scenarios. We further reformulate the problem into a convex QMIP.
4. We propose an algorithm that finds “good” feasible solutions to the stochastic bilevel
problem within a reasonable amount of time.
5. We apply our framework to a case study of the Gulf-Southwest region of the U.S. and
study the effect of the decision maker’s risk behavior on the investment and operational
decisions.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the literature
review on general stochastic optimization, stochastic bilevel programming, and its appli-
cations in energy. Section 4.4 presents the model formulations under the risk-neutral and
risk-averse strategies. The solution strategy and algorithm to solve the stochastic bilevel
problem are described in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 reports the computational experiments run
to study the solution algorithm’s efficiency. Section 4.7 presents a case study that applies
the stochastic risk-based bilevel model to the Gulf-Southwest region, and the results for the
risk-neutral and risk-averse strategies are summarized in Section 4.7.2. Finally, Section 4.8
concludes by summarizing our key findings.
4.2 Literature review
Stochastic programming deals with solving optimization problems in the presence of
uncertainty. There has been a plethora of literature available on applying stochastic op-
timization framework to real-world problems. In this section, we provide a brief review
of the different methodologies and techniques that are related to the risk-based stochas-
tic bilevel optimization framework we are attempting to develop. The topic of risk-based
stochastic bilevel optimization on falls at the intersection of three different methodologies in
the literature. The literature review presented in this section is divided into three sections,
summarizing some of the prominent work in each of these methodology, as shown in Fig.
4.1.
4.2.1 Risk-based stochastic optimization
Stochastic optimization has been very frequently used to model many problems arising
in the energy sector. Powell and Meisel (2016a) provides a summary of some of the sig-
nificant problems in the power sector that employ the stochastic optimization framework.
Some examples include but are not limited to the unit commitment problem, bidding en-
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Fig. 4.1. Venn diagram representation of literature review
ergy resources, infrastructure investment planning, and pricing electricity contracts. Powell
and Meisel (2016a) provide a standard canonical framework using the Markov decision pro-
cess theory that could be generalized to a variety of stochastic optimization problems. The
methodology is then applied to an energy storage problem (Powell and Meisel, 2016b) and
tested on five variants of the problem to demonstrate a particular policy class’s suitability
for specific problems.
Pozo and Contreras (2012) solve a unit commitment problem with chance constraints
with n −K reliability constraints for the day-ahead market with wind and demand uncer-
tainties. An alpha confidence level chance-constrained optimization problem is developed to
solve the problem, which the authors reformulate into a mixed-integer linear programming
(MILP) problem. They employ different case studies to demonstrate the methodology to
highlight the model’s performance under increasing wind penetration. Huang et al. (2014)
study a two-stage unit commitment problem with the conditional value at risk (CVaR) con-
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straints. They incorporate demand response (DR) and energy storage (ES) in the model and
employ risk constraints to account for the intermittency of solar and wind resources. The
mathematical properties of the CVaR are crucial in attaining a linear convex reformulation of
the CVaR constraints, which does not require integer variables, unlike the VaR constraints.
The effects of DR and ES on generator schedules are studied using the model to quantify
the total expected costs with risk consideration.
Roustai et al. (2018) present a scenario-based optimization framework for real-time elec-
tricity and natural gas prices along with electricity demand where the smart energy hub aims
to minimize the cost of energy and the net penalty for emissions. The authors consider the
CVaR technique to account for the operational risk of the smart energy hub. The authors
further test the methodology on a simulation of an office building.
A risk-based stochastic scheduling problem of an energy hub is explored by (Tian et al.,
2019), where the energy hub comprises a wind turbine, electricity market, electrical and
heat storage systems, along with the electrical and heat demand response programs. The
risk-in-cost and the energy hub’s operational costs are incorporated using the downside risk
constraints, and these constraints are employed to minimize the risk associated with the
uncertainties. The methodology is tested on simulated data to study the impact of the
downside risk constraints on the problem. Jabr (2005) proposes a model for the robust self-
scheduling problem under price uncertainty using the CVaR technique. The objective of the
problem is to identify bidding strategies and robust self-schedules under price uncertainties
that have lower risk associated with them. Hence, optimal schedules would need to provide
a trade-off between maximizing the net profit while minimizing the risk. The problem
is reformulated into a second-order cone program (SOCP) and solved using interior-point
methods.
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4.2.2 Stochastic bilevel optimization
Stochastic bilevel frameworks have been extensively used in the literature to study a
variety of problems arising in the energy sector and other fields like structural engineering,
supply chain, etc. There have been multi-period stochastic bilevel models developed for the
electricity sector for infrastructure planning and operation. Still, the application of these
models to natural gas markets has not been that prevalent.
Valinejad and Barforoushi (2015) present a multi-period stochastic bilevel framework for
generation expansion planning of restructured power systems. The upper-level problem is
a profit maximization problem for investment decisions, and the lower-level problem maxi-
mizes the system’s social welfare. The solution approach converts the bilevel problem into
a stochastic MPEC whose objective and constraints are further linearized, resulting in a
MILP. A similar problem is explored by Wogrin et al. (2011) where the upper level repre-
sents a generation company that makes investment decisions to maximize profits. The lower
level represents an oligopolistic market with other companies making generation decisions
and competing in the market. The resulting problem is solved by reformulating it into a
stochastic MPEC by replacing the lower-level problem with its equivalent KKT conditions.
The stochastic MPEC is then solved by further reformulating it into a MILP.
Carrión et al. (2009) propose a stochastic bilevel framework to solve the medium-term
decision-making problem faced by a power retailer. The model considers uncertainties in
demand, future prices, and rival-retailer prices and explicitly attempts to model the client
response to the retail price offered and the competition among rival retailers. The retailer
operates intending to maximize the expected profit at a specified risk level while making
decisions pertaining to the level of future involvement in markets and the prices offered to
its potential clients. The resulting bilevel programming formulation is solved by transforming
it into an equivalent single-level non-linear problem by replacing the lower-level problem with
its KKT optimality conditions. The single-level non-linear problem is further reformulated
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into a MILP using binary variables.
Zhan and Zheng (2018) propose a bilevel model for the long-term investment planning
problem in power generation under uncertainty. The upper-level problem is a multi-stage
stochastic expansion planning problem, and the lower-level problems include a collection
of economic dispatch problems. This model seeks the optimal sizing and siting for both
thermal and wind power units to be built to maximize the expected profit for a profit-
oriented power generation investor. A decision-dependent stochastic programming approach
is employed to address the uncertainties in the system. The scenario tree’s non-stationary
transition probabilities are calculated based on discrete choice theory and the economies of
scale theory in electricity systems. The problem is solved by reformulating it into a single-
level optimization problem and employing decomposition algorithms.
Other than the energy sector, stochastic bilevel models are also seen in other applications,
including agriculture, structural engineering, and supply chain. Christiansen et al. (2001)
attempt to mathematically model robust and cost-optimizing structural design problems.
The problem is modeled using a stochastic bilevel optimization framework that optimally
picks structural designs in response to a given probability distribution. The authors propose a
heuristic-based solution algorithm that uses the problem’s structure and its differentiability
properties. The proposed algorithm is efficient and is parallelizable across the scenarios.
Numerical experiments illustrate the benefits of considering a stochastic system compared to
a deterministic one that considers the average-case. The results show that using a stochastic
model to pick structural design optimally leads to increased robustness in the designs.
In the natural gas space, Kalashnikov et al. (2010b) present a multi-stage stochastic
bilevel framework for the natural gas cash-out problem. The upper-level problem is asso-
ciated with the natural gas shipping company making decisions about gas purchase and
injection decisions into the pipeline. The lower-level problem then optimizes the operational
decisions of the pipeline operator. Any change in the requested extraction and injection
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decisions to the actual amount required in real-time causes imbalances in the system, which
is then penalized. The non-linear natural gas problem is solved by reducing it to a linear
bilevel problem and solved by employing a scenario tree with stochastic demand and prices.
The model then compares the decisions made in the face of uncertainty to those made under
a deterministic system.
Yeh et al. (2015) study the supply allocation problem for a timber-lands supply chain
with harvesters and manufacturers under a leader-follower setting. The harvesters act as
the leader and make decisions pertaining to the amount to be harvested. The manufacturers
act as the followers and decide on the quantities they need to buy from the harvester. Each
player has conflicting objectives, and they attempt to maximize their respective individual
profits. The problem is set up as a multi-stage stochastic problem with the bio-refinery
investment decisions, including logistical decisions like location and capacity are considered
in the first-stage problem and the second-stage problem involves a bilevel timberlands model
with parameter uncertainty. The resulting problem is solved by replacing the lower-level
problem in the second-stage bilevel problem with its equivalent KKT conditions and refor-
mulating the resulting mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC)
into a MILP using binary variables.
Nishi and Yoshida (2016) explore a multi-period stochastic bilevel model for a multi-
echelon supply chain. The supplier is the leader, and the upper-level problem is associated
with maximizing the profit for the supplier who makes decisions, including the production
quantities and inventory levels for various products. The retailer is the lower-level player
who makes decisions of order quantities and logistics under uncertain demand. They suggest
an iterative solution algorithm to solve the proposed model, which solves the lower-level
non-linear problem and uses that solution to solve the upper-level mixed-integer program
using a branch and bound scheme. The algorithm proposed in Section 4.5.2 of this chapter
is similar to some extent to the algorithm proposed in (Nishi and Yoshida, 2016). Instead
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of solving the lower-level problem and upper-level problem separately, we attempt to solve
them simultaneously by creating a restricted problem by fixing some lower-level problem
variables and solving the resulting MILP while ensuring the feasibility of the solutions.
4.2.3 Risk-based stochastic bilevel optimization
Kardakos et al. (2015) provide a three-stage stochastic bilevel optimization model with
uncertainty in the day-ahead production and load consumption in distributed energy re-
sources and real-time balancing prices. The upper-level problem is associated with profit
maximization of the virtual power plant problem, and the lower level represents the inde-
pendent system operator’s day-ahead market-clearing problem. The conditional value-at-risk
(CVaR) metric captures the risk associated with the virtual power plant profit variability.
The bilevel problem is reformulated using the KKT conditions and strong duality of the
lower-level problem and solved as a MILP. The solution methodology we develop in Sec-
tion 4.5 follows a similar approach. We reformulate the bilevel problem into a MILP using
the KKT conditions and the lower-level problem’s convexity. Although this is a commonly
effective approach, it often does not scale well with the number of scenarios.
A bilevel model for micro-grid planning under uncertainty is explored by Gazijahani
and Salehi (2017). The paper explores risk-based strategies for the operation of micro-grids,
where the upper-level problem is associated with the optimal planning of distributed energy
resources. The lower level represents the problem of partitioning the traditional distribution
system into multiple micro-grids. The authors develop a cuckoo optimization algorithm
to optimize the upper-level problem and an imperialist competitive algorithm to solve the
lower-level problem. Although the overall problem structure is similar to what we are looking
at in this chapter, most solution methodologies presented in the space of stochastic bilevel
programming problems often make use of the inherent structure of the problem and have
problem-specific assumptions that do not generalize well to other problems.
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In this chapter, we consider a risk-based multi-stage stochastic bilevel model with an
underlying spatial network structure for decision making in the presence of two players acting
under a non-cooperative setting. We develop a customized heuristic based algorithm to find
high quality feasible solution to instances of the stochastic bilevel model. The algorithm finds
feasible solutions to the stochastic bilevel problem by iteratively solving restricted versions
of the problem until feasibility is achieved. The model focuses on analyzing the optimal
strategies for different risk preferences of the LNG operator (leader), who makes high-cost
decisions.
4.3 Problem Description
In this section, the bilevel problem’s general framework is described, then the stochastic
framework is incorporated into the problem. The bilevel problem consists of two players act-
ing in a leader-follower setting. The players make investment and operational decisions to
set up an infrastructure network with markets to buy and sell goods. The leader or manufac-
turer starts the game and operates to maximize the profit, subject to a set of constraints that
can include capacity constraints and other constraints associated with the network capacity
restrictions. The leader makes decisions concerning facility location, capacity installation
at these facilities, how much raw materials to procure from the follower, and the sales and
pricing decisions for its finished goods. Since the manufacturing facilities’ locations affect the
prices at which they can purchase raw materials from the supplier or follower, which in turn
affects the costs of delivering goods to consumers, the leader’s decisions have to be made
with much anticipation of the response from the follower. In light of the leader’s decisions,
the follower then responds in a manner that maximizes his profit function subject to his
operational constraints. The follower’s decisions include capacity investments, production
decisions, and the sales and pricing decisions in the different consumer markets.
The choice of facility locations for the leader or manufacturer mainly depends on the
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dynamics of the leader’s market and the follower’s infrastructure decisions, production de-
cisions, and strategic market decisions involving the prices and sales. These factors often
have stochasticity associated with them, which is introduced into this setting by considering
the demand uncertainty faced by both players in their respective markets. Uncertainty in
demand is captured through a set of scenarios that correspond to different demand levels
in markets, which we consider to be uncorrelated to each other. Considering a leader who
makes more capital-heavy and long-term investment decisions naturally paves the way to a
risk-based stochastic model where the leader makes decisions while considering the high risk
associated with his investments.
This chapter develops a multi-stage stochastic bilevel model formulation that captures
the strategic interactions between an LNG operator or leader and an NG producer or fol-
lower under demand uncertainty. The underlying spatial network of the problem can be
represented as a graph G(V,A) as shown in Fig. 4.2. The nodes V ∈ {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5}
represent geographical regions where the NG producers are operational, with each of these
nodes also representing a local spot market. The subset of nodes V ′ ∈ {v2, v5} shown in red
in Fig. 4.2 represent potential locations for opening LNG facilities. The node v6 represents
the overseas LNG market. The arcs represent the pipeline network that connects different
production regions and is assumed to be owned and operated by the NG producer. The blue
arcs in Fig. 4.2 represent the LNG transportation that links possible LNG locations to the
LNG market.
The first-stage decisions comprise the capacity investment decisions for both the players,
which need to be made before the demand uncertainty in the markets is revealed and hence
are not scenario specific. The LNG terminal location decisions are represented using a set of
binary decision variables, each one corresponding available locations for opening the termi-
nal. The LNG operator also makes decisions pertaining to the capacity to be invested at each
opened location. The NG producer’s first-stage decisions are the production capacity invest-
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Fig. 4.2. Graphical representation of NG producers, possible LNG locations, LNG market, and
pipeline network.
ment decisions. The leader and follower’s operational decisions are wait-and-see decisions
and are made once the uncertainty in demand is revealed. The LNG operator’s operational
decisions are the gas procurement quantities, sales, and prices in the LNG market. The
NG producer’s second-stage decisions include production quantities, sales to the local spot
market, sales to the LNG operator’s gas procurement market, and prices in both markets.
The stochastic bilevel model proposed in this chapter is formulated by incorporating the
stochastic framework into the bilevel model described in Chapter 3, to study the strategic
interactions between an LNG operator and NG producer.
We model the demand uncertainties in the different markets using stochastic scenario-
based optimization. The scenarios reflect the state of demand in the spot market, the
gas procurement market for the LNG player, and the LNG market and follow a discrete
probability distribution. The chance of every scenario occurring has a non-zero probability,
which exacerbates the risk associated with high-cost decisions. This study will consider
two decision-making approaches, risk-neutral and risk-averse, to conduct risk analysis and
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examine the impact of considering risk when making decisions.
4.4 Stochastic bilevel model
In this section, we provide the formulation for the stochastic bilevel model. The sets,
parameters, and decision variables of the leader and follower are given in Section 4.4.1.
Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 presents the model formulations for the risk-neutral and risk-averse
decision making approaches respectively.
4.4.1 Notation
Sets
N Set of production nodes; N = {1, 2, . . . , N}
M Set of LNG market nodes; M = {1, 2, . . . ,M}
Ω Set of scenarios; Ω = {High,Medium,Low}
Parameters
Kj Maximum production capacity at node j ∈ N
KLNGj Maximum capacity of LNG facility that can be built at node j ∈ N
Kpipeij Pipeline capacity available on link (i, j) ∈ N ×N
Cunitj Unit cost of installing production capacity at node j ∈ N
Cprodj (·) Production cost at node j ∈ N (C
prod







Cshipij Variable cost of shipping gas through pipeline link (i, j) ∈ N ×N
C liqj Cost of liquefaction at node j ∈ N
CLNGfixedj Fixed cost of investment in LNG facility at node j ∈ N
CLNGunitj Unit cost of installing capacity in LNG facility at node j ∈ N
CLNGshipij Variable cost of LNG shipment between node j ∈ N and market i ∈M
ηj Loss during liquefaction process at node j ∈ N
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aspotjω Intercept of spot market demand curve at node j ∈ N for scenario ω
bspotjω Slope of spot market demand curve at node j ∈ N for scenario ω
aLNGjω Intercept of LNG market demand curve at node j ∈M for scenario ω
bLNGjω Slope of LNG market demand curve at node j ∈M for scenario ω
aνjω Intercept of LNG facility gas procurement demand curve at node j ∈ N
for scenario ω
bνjω Slope of LNG facility gas procurement demand curve at node j ∈ N for
scenario ω
Leader’s Decision Variables
νjω LNG procured at node j ∈ N for scenario ω (by LNG operator)
lijω LNG shipped from node i ∈ N to market j ∈M for scenario ω
zj Binary variable taking value 1 if LNG facility is opened at node j ∈ N ,
0 otherwise
µj Capacity installed in LNG facility at node j ∈ N
dLNGjω Demand for LNG in market j ∈M for scenario ω
pLNGjω Price of LNG in market j ∈M for scenario ω
Follower’s Decision Variables
fijω Flow in pipeline (i, j) ∈ N ×N for scenario ω (from node i to j)
Qj Production capacity installed at node j ∈ N
qjω Production at node j ∈ N for scenario ω
dspotjω Demand for natural gas in spot market j ∈ N for scenario ω
pspotjω Spot price of natural gas at node j ∈ N for scenario ω
pνjω LNG facility gas procurement price in node j ∈ N for scenario ω
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4.4.2 Risk neutral strategy
In this section, we develop the model formulation for a risk-neutral decision maker who
optimizes the expected profit across all scenarios and does not explicitly consider any partic-
ular scenario when making decisions. In other words, a risk-neutral decision-maker considers































ljiω ≤ (1− ηj) νjω ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.1b)
νjω ≤ µj ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.1c)




jω ∀ j ∈M, ω ∈ Ω (4.1e)
dLNGjω = a
LNG
jω − bLNGjω pLNGjω ∀ j ∈M, ω ∈ Ω (4.1f)
zj ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j ∈ N (4.1g)
pLNGjω , νjω, µj, d
LNG
jω ∈ R+ ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.1h)
lijω ∈ R+ ∀ i ∈ N , j ∈M, ω ∈ Ω (4.1i)
116
Equation (4.1a) represents the expected total profit earned by the LNG operator (leader),
where the term pLNGjω d
LNG
jω is the revenue earned from LNG exports to overseas market j under
scenario ω. The term pνjωνjω is the cost of procuring gas from the NG producer (follower)
at node j under scenario ω. CLNGfixedj zj is the fixed cost of opening an LNG facility at node
j and CLNGunitj µj is the cost of adding capacity to the LNG facility opened there. The cost
of liquefaction of the gas at node j is given by C liqj νjω and cost of shipping LNG from the
export facility at node i to the LNG market at node j is represented by the term CLNGshipij lij.
Constraint (4.1b) ensures that the total LNG shipments from any node j to all LNG
markets are bounded by the total gas procured at that node, accounting for losses during the
liquefaction process. Constraints (4.1c) – (4.1d) ensure that the gas procured by the LNG
facility at node j does not exceed the capacity available at the facility. Constraints (4.1e)
– (4.1f) compute the total sales in each LNG market and specify the demand curves faced
by the LNG operator. Constraint (4.1g) represents the binary variable zj, which denotes









































jω + νjω ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (λjω) (4.2b)
qjω ≤ Qj ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (θjω) (4.2c)
Qj ≤ Kj ∀ j ∈ N (δj) (4.2d)
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jω ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (κjω) (4.2f)
νjω = a
ν







jω ∈ R+ ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.2h)
fijω ∈ R+ ∀ i, j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.2i)
Equation (4.2a) represents the expected total profit earned by the NG producer (fol-
lower), where the term pspotjω d
spot
jω is the revenue from spot market sales at node j and p
ν
jωνjω
is the revenue earned from sales to the LNG operator. Cunitj Qj denotes the cost of adding
production capacity at node j and the term Cprodj (qjω) represents the production cost at
node j. Cshipij fij represents the costs of shipping gas from node i to node j.
Constraint (4.2b) ensures flow balance among production, shipments, and sales at any
node j for all scenarios. Constraints (4.2c) – (4.2d) ensure that the total production at node
j under any scenario does not exceed the production capacity available there. Constraints
(4.2f) – (4.2g) specify the demand curves for the spot market and LNG facility gas procure-
ment at node j. The variables λjω ∈ R, θjω ∈ R+, δj ∈ R+, βijω ∈ R+, κjω ∈ R, and τjω ∈ R
are the dual variables associated with constraints (4.2b) – (4.2g), respectively.
4.4.3 Risk averse strategy
The LNG operator makes high fixed cost investment decisions that are influenced by
factors including natural gas availability, natural gas prices, and the LNG market demand.
Due to their high cost nature, the LNG operator’s decisions have a high risk. Hence, it
becomes necessary to consider how these decisions would change in the face of uncertainty if
we consider different risk behaviors for the LNG operator. Unlike the risk-neutral decision-
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maker, a risk-averse decision-maker makes decisions while keeping in mind the worst possible
scenarios and attempting to avoid high-risk decisions associated with extreme losses.
The value-at-risk (VaR) at a confidence-level α represents the αth quantile of the distri-
bution over the expected loss. The CVaR represents the conditional expected loss over the
VaR, and it penalizes larger losses more, unlike the VaR, which penalizes all losses bigger
than VaR equally. In this chapter, we use the conditional value at risk (CVaR) to account for
the risk associated with decisions for the LNG operator (leader) under a risk-averse decision
making approach. We assume that the NG producer is a risk-neutral decision-maker who
attempts to maximize the expected profit. The α − CVaR of loss function F is defined as
(Krokhmal et al., 2002):
CVaRα(F ) = y + (1− α)−1E[F (.)− y]+
where, E[F (.)− y]+ = max{0,E[F (.)− y]}
(4.3)
The CVaR is a coherent risk measure and is convex if the function F is convex (Krokhmal
et al., 2002). We attain a convex objective function for the LNG operator shown in Eq.




as shown in preposition 5 in chapter 3. Hence, using the CVaR risk measure on this function
does not affect the risk-averse LNG operator’s objective function’s convexity. Hence, the
resulting CVaR problem described in Eq. (4.4a) – Eq. (4.4d) retains the mathematical
properties of the risk-neutral decision-makers problem and both problems can be solved
using a similar approach.































CLNGshipij lijω ≥ 0 (4.4b)




We can solve the bilevel model described in section 4.4 by reducing it to a single-level
problem. The lower-level problem described in Eq. (4.2a) – (4.2i) is convex, and therefore,
we can replace the lower–level problem by the equivalent KKT conditions to achieve a
mathematical model with complementarity constraints (MPCC). The resulting MPCC shown
in Eq. (4.5a) – (4.5z) has non–linear complementarity constraints Eq. (4.5i) – (4.5q) which
can be converted to a set of linear constraints using binary variables and big-M terms as
shown in Eq. (3.10) in chapter 3. The resulting problem is a convex quadratic mixed-integer
program (QMIP) with a quadratic objective function and a set of linear constraints. The
QMIP is solvable for reasonably sized problems but becomes intractable as the number of










































jω ∀ s ∈ S, j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω
(4.5b)
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jω −M(1− ξsj) ∀ s ∈ S, j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω
(4.5c)∑
s∈S
ξsj = 1 ∀ j ∈ N (4.5d)∑
i∈M
ljiω ≤ (1− ηj) νjω ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5e)
νjω ≤ µj ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5f)




jω − bLNGjω pLNGjω ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5h)




jω κjω ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5i)
0 ≤ pνjω ⊥ −ψωνjω − bνjωτjω ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5j)
0 ≤ dspotjω ⊥ −ψωp
spot
jω + λjω + κjω ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5k)
0 ≤ Qj ⊥ ψωCunitj −
∑
ω∈Ω
θjω + δj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (4.5l)
0 ≤ qjω ⊥ 2 ψωCaprodj qjω + ψωCb
prod
j + θjω − λjω ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5m)
0 ≤ fijω ⊥ ψωCshipij + λiω − λjω + βijω ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5n)
0 ≤ θjω ⊥ Qj − qjω ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5o)
0 ≤ δj ⊥ Kj −Qj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (4.5p)
0 ≤ βijω ⊥ Kpipeij − fijω ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5q)∑
i∈N












jω ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5s)
νjω = a
ν
jω − bνjωpνjω ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5t)
zj ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j ∈ N (4.5u)
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ξsj ∈ {0, 1} ∀ s ∈ S, j ∈ N (4.5v)
lijω, fijω, βijω ∈ R+ ∀ i, j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5w)









jω , θjω ∈ R+ ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5y)
λjω, τjω, κjω, ujω ∈ R ∀ j ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω (4.5z)
4.5.2 Algorithm
Bilevel programs are strongly NP hard, even for the simplest case where both the upper
and lower-level problems are linear programs Ben-Ayed and Blair (1990). Since the stochastic
bilevel problem presented in this chapter involves an integer program in the upper-level and
a convex program in the lower level, it is NP-hard. This makes it rather hard to find optimal
solutions to large instances of the problem. Hence, we turn our attention to developing
a heuristic-based approach to identify “good” feasible solutions to the stochastic bilevel
problem, which can be attained in a reasonable amount of time. In this section, we develop a
heuristic-based algorithm to find feasible solutions to the stochastic bilevel problem described
in Section 4.5.1. We further explore the tractability of the algorithm and the goodness of
the feasible solutions attained in section 4.6
The MILP described in Eq. (4.5a)–Eq. (4.5z) is not tractable and cannot be solved
to optimality even for small networks when the number of scenarios increases. Thus, in
this section, we will exploit the underlying structure of the problem to develop an iterative
algorithm that would help attain feasible solutions in a reasonable amount of time. The
lower-level problem’s size increases exponentially with the size of the network and the number
of scenarios, leading to the increased size of the stochastic bilevel problem (SBLP). There
are a total of N×N×Ω flow variables in the lower-level problem that capture the flow of gas
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Fig. 4.3. Flowchart of the proposed heuristic algorithm to solve the SBLP
between regions based on the pipeline capacity. A large subset of these flow variables retains
the value of zero in all the best-case deterministic solutions. Hence, we create a restricted
bilevel problem (RBLP) by fixing a subset of the flow variables in the original SBLP to zeros.
Under this setting, we can iteratively update the subset of flow variables set to zero until we
attain a feasible solution to the original SBLP.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for finding feasible solutions for the SBLP
Initialization:
Deterministic solution set, S = ∅ ;
Flow subset, F = ∅ ;
for ω = 1 : Ω do
solve deterministic BLP → sω ;




update S ← S ∪ {sω} ;
end
end
for j ∈ (N ×N × Ω) do
for s = 1 : S do
if fj = 0 then






Solve RBLP → solRBLP;
Fix leader’s decisions and solve lower–level problem → solLL ;
if solRBLP = solLL then
Feasible solution found ;
break;
else
for j ∈ (N ×N × Ω) do
if (fj ∈ solRBLP) ! = (fj ∈ solLL) then
if (fj ∈ solLL) = 0 then
update F ← F ∪ {fj} ;
else








In the proposed algorithm, a feasible solution to the SBLP is found using a series of
steps. First, we find the best-case deterministic solutions for each scenario by solving the
deterministic version of the SBLP for every scenario. The solutions to all the scenario-wise
deterministic problems are added to a set S. We then use all the solutions in the set S
to identify a subset F of the flow variables that remain at value zero across all solutions
in S. Fixing the flow variables in F to zero, we now solve the RBLP. We now check if
the solution attained from the RBLP is feasible to the original SBLP by fixing the leader’s
variables and solving the lower–level problem. If the solution is not feasible, we update the
set F by removing the non-zero flow variables in the lower–level problem and adding the
zero flow variables not in F to F . We repeat the process until we attain a feasible solution
to the SBLP. The proposed algorithm’s flowchart is shown in Fig. 4.3 and the pseudocode
is presented in Algorithm 1.
4.6 Computational experiments
In this section, we conduct numerical experiments to study the computational tractabil-
ity of the proposed algorithm. We generate random instances of the stochastic bilevel prob-
lem for different network sizes, demands, and numerous scenarios. We generate random
instances of the stochastic bilevel problem in the following order: (1) generate an N × N
network, (2) randomly select potential locations for LNG facilities within the network, (3)
generate investment costs, capacity costs, production costs, and production capacity limits
for the LNG operator and NG producer for each node in the network, (4) generate a node-
node incidence matrix for the network along with pipeline and shipping costs, (5) define
LNG markets,M where open LNG facilities can sell LNG, (6) define scenarios ω ∈ Ω which
represent the demand conditions in the markets, (7) define demand curves for the local spot
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market and LNG market for each scenario. The computational study employs a single 2.6
GHz Intel Core i7 processor with 16 GB memory, using Gurobi 8.1.1.































We study the solution times and the computational tractability of the algorithm proposed
in Section 4.5.2 for randomly generated instances of the stochastic bilevel model. The average
runtime in seconds of 10 trials for each instance is summarized in Table 4.1. The instances
for which the exact solution time is not reported are the cases for which we could not find an
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optimal solution after 15 hours of computational time. The runtime analysis shows that the
proposed algorithm can find feasible solutions to several instances of the stochastic bilevel
problem in a very reasonable amount of time. In contrast, even small-sized problems are
not solvable using the exact solution methodology. The case study presented in Section 4.7
consists of a 9 node 9 scenario problem but this is because of the ease of visual representation
rather than computational limitation. For illustration purposes, we have solved the 27
scenario case and the results are summarized in C.1. We also see that the runtime increases
with the size of the network and its density, which is expected since the time to solve the
restricted bilevel problem increases with the network’s size.
The algorithm proposed in this chapter attempts to find a “good” feasible solution to
the stochastic bilevel problem. It becomes necessary to analyze the quality of the solution
with respect to the optimal solution. To study the quality of solutions, we compare the
solution attained by employing the proposed algorithm described in Section 4.5.2 to the
solution attained by exactly solving the QMIP described in Section 4.5.1. Table 4.2 presents
the percentage gap between the profits achieved by the leader and the follower attained from
the exact solution and the solution attained by the proposed algorithm for random instances
for which we can solve the stochastic bilevel problem exactly. We use this analysis to study
the quality of the feasible solution attained using the proposed algorithm. It is worth noting
that for most instances, the solution attained by the algorithm is within 9% of the optimal
solution. For smaller size problems, with three nodes, we achieve a solution within 4% of the
optimal solution, even for a larger number of scenarios. For some instances of the problem,
we achieve the optimal solution by applying the proposed algorithm. We repeated the same
experiments with changes in different model parameters like the investment costs, demand
curve parameters, and operational costs. We find that the results obtained are robust to a
wide range of parameter values.
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Table 4.2. Percentage gap between solution found from the exact solution approach and the

















3 4.376 4.376 0.00% 15.580 15.580 0.00%
9 7.975 7.975 0.00% 14.672 14.672 0.00%
27 6.453 6.268 2.87% 15.398 15.857 -2.98%
64 6.589 6.379 3.18% 15.160 15.387 -1.49%
4
3 4.873 4.873 0.00% 19.595 19.595 0.00%
9 5.454 4.991 8.50% 19.375 19.580 -1.06%
9 3 4.679 4.295 8.22% 38.743 39.870 -2.91%
4.7 Case study
In this section, the stochastic bilevel model developed in this chapter is applied to a
real-world problem to study the interactions between an LNG operator and an NG producer
under demand uncertainty. We will employ the model to study the Gulf-Southwest region
of the U.S., using similar regional definitions and data discussed in Section 3.6 of Chapter 3.
The nine regions included in the study are New Mexico (NM), Oklahoma (OK), Arkansas
(AR), Louisiana (LA), and Texas. Texas is further subdivided into North Texas (NT), East
Texas (ET), West Texas (WT), and South Texas (ST) based on the oil and gas division
district boundaries established by the Railroad Commission of Texas (2020).
The potential locations to open LNG terminals are limited to LA, ET, and ST. Similar to
the problem described in Chapter 3, each region has a local spot market with an associated
demand curve. We also consider two distinct LNG markets, each representing exports to
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Atlantic (e.g., Europe) and Pacific (e.g., Asia) destinations.
4.7.1 Scenario generation
In this chapter, we propose a model that models uncertainties in demand by considering
scenarios representing the state of demand in each market. We define high demand (H),
medium demand (M), and low demand (L) levels that each market could face with a given
probability (ψmarketdemand). Each scenario (ω) is the realization of demand levels in the spot market
and the LNG market. We construct the scenarios such that the LNG market’s demand
uncertainties are not correlated with the demand uncertainties in the NG spot market and
vice versa. These set of demand uncertainties considered for both the LNG market and
the NG spot market leads to a total of nine scenarios. We define a discrete probability
distribution across all scenarios as described below:





L = 1 (4.6a)
ωspot = {(H, ψspotH ), (M, ψ
spot







L = 1 (4.6b)
Ω = ωLNG × ωspot∑
ω∈Ω
ψLNGω × ψspotω = 1 (4.6c)
In Eq. (4.6), H, M, and L represents the possible states of demand in the LNG market
and the spot market, whereas ψLNG and ψspot represent the respective probabilities of these
demand scenarios in each market. ωLNG and ωspot represent the set of possible states the
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LNG market and spot market can be in, respectively. Ω represents the set of all possible
scenario combinations that we can achieve.
We create the scenarios by considering the actual data obtained from sources listed
in table 3.2 in Chapter 3. We define the high demand (H) scenario as having twice the
demand, medium scenario as having 1.5 times the demand, and the low demand scenario
as having the base demand. In the spot market, we similarly define the low scenario as
having the base demand, high demand (H) scenario as having twice the base demand, and
the medium demand scenario as having 1.5 times the base demand. We accommodate this
by parameterizing the demand curve parameters, intercept a, and the slope b, which change
based on each market scenario.
4.7.2 Results
In this section, we compare the risk-neutral decision-maker’s investment and operational
decisions to the risk-averse decision-maker. LNG operator’s high-cost decisions are prone to
high-risk, and hence the results presented in this section analyze the difference in optimal
strategies between the two decision-making approaches from the perspective of the LNG op-
erator. We consider the NG producer to be a risk-neutral player who maximizes his expected
profit in both approaches. The decision-maker’s risk behavior has significant implications
on the investment decisions, including the number of LNG facilities open, the location of
these facilities, and the total capacities invested in each location. We explore the results in
detail for both the LNG operator and the NG producer, including the investment decisions,
profits, pricing, and sales decisions.
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Fig. 4.4. Comparison of LNG operator’s and NG producer’s capacity investments when the LNG
operator is considered to be (a) risk-neutral decision-maker (b) and risk-averse decision-maker.
4.7.2.1 Investment decisions
Figures 4.4a and 4.4b show the capacity investment decisions by region of the LNG
operator and the NG producer under the risk-neutral and risk-averse strategy. Table 4.3
shows the total capacity investments under both risk strategies. In an attempt to minimize
the chances of huge losses at a 95% confidence level under the risk-averse strategy, the LNG
operator chooses to invest in only one LNG facility, which is quite in contrast with the three
facilities that are open under a risk-neutral strategy. The lower investments, in turn, leads
to a lower LNG capacity being available in the risk-averse strategy. Since the available LNG
capacity is lower in the CVaR solution, the amount of gas demand that the LNG operator
contributes is also lower, leading to lower capacity investments by the NG producer. The
NG production capacity investments in the risk-neutral strategy are 5% higher than those
of the risk-averse strategy.
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Table 4.3. Investment decisions when the LNG operator is considered to be a risk-neutral vs.
risk-averse decision-maker.




Number of LNG facilities open 3 1
Total LNG capacity open 2105.4 Bcf 1000.0 Bcf
Total production capacity 7267.161 Bcf 6894.977 Bcf
4.7.2.2 Profits
Figures 4.5a and 4.5b show the profits earned by the LNG operator and the NG producer
for each scenario under the risk-neutral and risk-averse strategies, respectively. The LNG
operator earns an expected profit of 7.9569 Billion$ under the risk-neutral strategy and
4.3953 Billion$ under the risk-averse strategy. The NG producer earns an expected profit of
50.0506 Billion$ under the risk-neutral strategy and 46.9584 Billion$ under the risk-averse
strategy. Although the profits earned by both players are higher under the risk-neutral
strategy, we can see from Fig. 4.5a that this strategy leads to a negative profit for the LNG
operator in the (’L’, ’H’) scenario where the LNG market is at low demand and the spot
market is at high demand. Under this scenario, the NG producer charges higher gas prices
The scenario definitions are represented using tuples (L1, L2) that show demand levels for the different
markets. The first element of the tuple (L1) represents the demand level of the overseas LNG market and
the second element (L2) represents the demand level for the local spot markets. For instance, the scenario
(’H’,’L’) represents the case where the LNG market demand levels are high and the local spot market demand
levels are low.
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to the LNG operator. Since the LNG operator already makes the investment decisions, he
ends up operating at a loss, which is the precise scenario a risk-averse decision-maker aims
to avoid. Hence, the risk-averse decision-maker chooses to invest more conservatively at the
expense of a lower profit to minimize the chances of incurring losses.
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Fig. 4.5. Comparison of LNG operator’s and NG producer’s profit when the LNG operator is
considered to be (a) risk-neutral decision-maker (b) and risk-averse decision-maker by scenario.
Each scenario represents (LNG market demand level, spot market demand level).
It is also worth noting that in the CVaR solution, the conservative investment decisions
also prevent the leader’s profit from increasing significantly even when the spot market is at
lower demand like in the (’H’,’L’) and (’M’,’L’) scenarios. Under these scenarios, the LNG
operator makes almost double the profit under the risk-neutral strategy compared to the
risk-averse strategy due to the NG producer’s higher gas prices.
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Fig. 4.6. Annual natural gas production and consumption when the LNG operator is considered
to be (a) Risk-neutral decision-maker (b) and Risk-averse decision-maker.
4.7.2.3 Natural gas production and consumption
Figures 4.6a and 4.6b show the total gas produced and consumed by both the spot mar-
ket and the LNG operator for each scenario under the risk-neutral and risk-averse strategies,
respectively. Although the overall trends are similar under both strategies, it is worth not-
ing the behavior of the NG producer under both strategies when faced with the scenarios
(’H’,’L’), (’M’,’L’) and (’L’,’L’), where the spot market demand is low. In the risk-averse
strategy, the producer chooses to restrict production and increase the LNG operator’s gas
prices in contrast with the risk-neutral solution where the producer produces much more
gas. This behavior of the NG producer is due to the LNG operator’s decision to open only
one LNG facility. Since the NG operator anticipated higher gas demand from one specific
location, he can increase the prices and reduce production. In the risk-neutral case, since
there are multiple facilities open, the LNG operator can now choose where to buy gas from,
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and hence the NG producer loses the control he has over the prices. Therefore, the NG
producer increases his profits by increasing the production instead of increasing the prices.












































































































Fig. 4.7. Natural gas procured by the LNG operator when the LNG operator is considered to be
(a) Risk-neutral decision-maker (b) and Risk-averse decision-maker.
Figures 4.7a and 4.7b show the amount of gas procured at each open LNG terminal by
scenario under the risk-neutral and risk-averse strategies, respectively. In the risk-neutral
case, with multiple facilities open, the facilities at locations ST and LA are almost always
utilized to capacity. The sharp contrast in model behavior under the different risk strategies
is evident under scenarios where the spot market demand is low. The CVaR solution restricts
the amount of gas purchased even when the LNG market demand is high. Alternatively,
the risk-neutral solution prefers buying more gas and increasing the LNG sales. In the risk-
neutral solution, it is worth noting that the choice to open an LNG facility at ET is mainly to
hedge against extreme gas prices charged by the producer, especially when the spot market
demand is high.
135
4.7.2.4 Natural gas prices
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Fig. 4.8. Average natural gas price in the spot market and LNG operator’s gas procurement market
when the LNG operator is considered to be (a) Risk-neutral decision-maker (b) and Risk-averse
decision-maker.
Figures 4.8a and 4.8b show the average gas prices faced by the LNG operator and the
local spot market by scenario under the risk-neutral and risk-averse strategies, respectively.
Although the NG producer’s risk behavior does not change under both strategies, we still see
slight changes in the spot market prices. Having a lower gas demand from the LNG player
in the risk-averse case leads to lower spot prices in that case compared to the risk-neutral
case. A high spot market and LNG operator’s gas demand leads to higher average gas prices,
especially to the LNG operator. This hike in prices is even more apparent in the risk-neutral
case, where the overall gas demand is much higher than the risk-averse case. When the
spot market demand is low, the LNG operator can procure gas from the NG player at lower
prices in the risk-neutral case. The gas prices are higher in the risk-averse case when the
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LNG market demand is high, as the NG producer charges higher prices as the LNG operator
only has one open location from where to buy the gas.


















































































































Fig. 4.9. Natural gas price faced by the LNG operator by region when the LNG operator is
considered to be (a) Risk-neutral decision-maker (b) and Risk-averse decision-maker.
Figures 4.9a and 4.9b show the gas prices faced by the LNG operator at open LNG
locations by scenario under the risk-neutral and risk-averse strategies, respectively. The
LG operator attains the lowest gas prices when the spot market is in low demand. The
low gas prices are because of the excess production capacity available and lower demand
in the spot market, causing the NG producer to lower the prices he charges. Under the
risk-neutral strategy, the decision to open multiple locations helps attain much lower prices
at both locations when the spot market demand is low. When the LNG operator has only
one location open under the risk-averse strategy, the NG producer would prefer to restrict
production and increase gas prices. Thus, in this case, even with potentially high demand in
the LNG market, the low prices achieved under the risk-neutral strategy are not achieved.
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4.7.2.5 LNG market dynamics
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Fig. 4.10. LNG market dynamics when the LNG operator is considered to be Risk-neutral decision-
maker vs. Risk-averse decision-maker including (a) LNG sales (b) and LNG market prices.
Figure 4.10a shows the total sales in the LNG market and the corresponding average
market prices by scenario under the risk-neutral and risk-averse strategies. We can see that
the total LNG sales are lower under the risk-averse strategy due to lower LNG capacity
investments. Under the risk-neutral strategy, when the spot market demand is lower, the
LNG operator can purchase a more considerable amount of gas from the NG producer at
lower prices, which leads to higher sales in the LNG market in those scenarios.
The average LNG market prices across both the Atlantic and Pacific LNG markets is
shown in Fig. 4.10b. Since the overall LNG sales are lower under the risk-averse strategy,
the market faces higher prices. Due to the higher natural gas and subsequent LNG supply
in the risk-neutral solution, the market prices are lower. The highest prices occur when the
spot market is at a lower demand under the risk-averse strategy, when the gas procured by
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the LNG operator is lower, leading to lower supply in the LNG market. The LNG market
prices under this case reflect the reduction in the supply of natural gas.
4.8 Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter, we have developed a stochastic bilevel model to study the strategic
interactions between an LNG operator and an NG producer in a leader-follower setting
under demand uncertainty. The model presented in the chapter aid the LNG operator and
NG producer in making capacity investment and operational decisions. It helps determine
optimal locations for the LNG facilities and their capacities, the amount of gas to procure
from the NG producer, sales, and market prices for the LNG operator. On the other hand,
the NG producer uses the model to determine production, sales, and pricing decisions. We
developed models for aid in decision-making under different risk strategies and illustrated
the impact of considering risk on the decision maker’s choices. To analyze the impact of risk
management on the decision-maker, we employ the CVaR to study the risk-averse strategy.
At the same time, we use an expected value maximization approach for the risk-neutral
strategy. We propose an algorithm to find high quality feasible solutions to the stochastic
bilevel problem relatively fast. We study the algorithm’s computational efficiency and the
quality of solutions obtained using the algorithm using randomly generated instances of the
stochastic bilevel problem. We see that the algorithm is able to find quality solutions for
even relatively larger instances of the problem within reasonable times. The quality of the
solutions found are consistently good and within 7-9% of the optimal solution for all tested
instances. The proposed algorithm utilizes the composition of the problem and the intuition
that most of the network flow variables remain at zero in our specific problem instance. It is
worth noting that this generalization may not hold in instances of the problem where most
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flow variables are non-zero. For such cases, a variation of this algorithm can be developed,
which could fix flow variables that may be non-zero yet unchanged in all the deterministic
scenarios, along with the flow variables that remain at zero.
We apply the models to a real-world example of the Gulf-Southwest region of the U.S.,
comprising nine regions with local spot markets, three potential LNG locations, and 2 LNG
markets. The results clearly show that when the LNG operator is a risk-averse decision-
maker, he makes more conservative investment decisions to hedge against possible high
losses. On the other hand, when the LNG operator is a risk-neutral decision-maker, his
decisions are less conservative and are made so as to maximize the expected profit, without
considering any chances of extreme losses explicitly. We see that both risk strategies have
their advantages and disadvantages and which one to choose should be based on the decision
maker’s priorities. Suppose the decision-maker is mainly interested in avoiding huge losses.
In that case, using the risk-averse (CVaR) strategy is better since it avoids a loss in all
scenarios shown in the case study. But if the decision-maker is risk-neutral, we can see that
the decision to open multiple facilities helps the LNG operator exert some control over the
prices the NG producer would charge. Hence, the expected profits earned under this strategy
are higher.
The model’s primary aim is to analyze how the growth in the LNG sector can affect the
local spot market and the NG producers’ behavior under demand uncertainty. To identify
insights specific to two autonomous players, namely the LNG operator and the NG producer,
and how they interact with each other, we make several simplifying assumptions regarding
the players and the markets. As with every model, our model also has some limitations due
to these simplifying assumptions. Our model only assumes single players in each level which
translates to a monopolistic assumption in both markets. In reality, both these markets
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are not monopolistic and have competition. Several moving parts and components in the
natural gas market are not explicitly modeled in our framework, including the pipeline
operator, storage operators, etc. The model presented in this chapter can be extended to
address some of these limitations. The monopolistic behavior of the LNG operator and NG
producer can be tackled by introducing multiple players in the upper and lower-level which
would introduce the aspect of competition in the model, leading to more realistic results.
Although we consider demand uncertainty using a discrete set of scenarios, we can extend
this analysis to continuous demand distributions. This can be accommodated into the model
with ease based on the availability of sufficient data to render a good approximation of the
demand distribution. The computational tractability of the problem can be preserved by




5.1 Summary of research contributions
In Chapter 2, we developed a least-cost optimization model of the U.S. electricity gener-
ation and transmission system. This model is used to study the evolution of the generation
and capacity mix from 2016 until 2050. The model represents the continental U.S. using
13 regions, each created based on similarity of demand profiles, generation resources, and
other factors. The temporal component in the demand profile is captured using 24-hour
representative profiles for each season. The model incorporates long-distance transmission
using the underlying network structure such that demand and supply are balanced across
the regions. The results produced by the model include the investment decisions over five
years and operational decisions, including the 24-hour dispatch for each season.
We compare the model results across four scenarios: No Policy, No New Transmission,
Pessimistic Costs, and Carbon Tax. The main policy-relevant insights derived from the
scenario analysis are summarized below.
1. U.S. electricity can be substantially decarbonized at modest cost, but complete decar-
bonization is very costly.
2. Significant expansion of solar PV and wind to combine for at least 40% of the generation
mix by 2050 is fairly certain, although solar PV and battery storage are more affected
by economic and policy assumptions than wind.
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3. Investments in long-distance transmission are very limited, while investments in battery
storage are much greater, under a wide range of assumptions.
4. Optimal solutions include large investments in natural gas capacity, but gas capacity
utilization rates decline steadily and significantly.
5. Cost structures shift away from operating expenditures and toward capital expendi-
tures, especially under climate policy.
Chapter 3 proposed a bilevel programming framework to investigate the strategic inter-
actions between an LNG operator and an NG producer under a leader-follower setting. The
model assumes the LNG operator to be the leader and the NG producer to be the follower
and helps both players make optimal investment and operational decisions under a non-
cooperative environment. The bilevel problem is solved by replacing the lower-level problem
with its equivalent KKT conditions, followed by reformulating the complementarity con-
straints into linear constraints using a disjunctive formulation employing binary variables.
Finally, the non-convex terms in the objective function are approximated using piecewise
linear functions, which leads to a convex QMIP. The methodology is applied to a real-world
problem by considering the Gulf-Southwest region of the U.S. as a case study. We define five
scenarios representing different decision-making structures and varying underlying assump-
tions to compare and contrast the results of those obtained by solving the bilevel problem.
The results show that an LNG player’s presence can put upward pressure on the local natu-
ral gas prices. The higher demand brought about by the LNG player raises the demand for
natural gas locally and hence the prices. However, this effect is controlled to an extent by
the NG producer’s higher production in response to the higher demand. Another significant
result that emphasizes the requirement for a bilevel framework under a non-cooperative set-
ting is that if the LNG operator does not account for the higher-than-expected prices the
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NG producer can charge after the facility location decisions are finalized, the LNG operator’s
profits can suffer substantially.
In Chapter 4, we developed a stochastic risk-based bilevel modeling framework to study
the strategic interactions between two players in a leader-follower setting under demand un-
certainty. We explore how the leader’s risk behavior can impact the optimal decisions of
both players and how the decisions change under different risk strategies. We employ the
conditional-value-at-risk (CVaR) to quantify the risk associated with the leader’s decisions
under the risk-averse setting. An expected value maximization problem is solved for the
risk-neutral setting. The follower is assumed to be risk-neutral in both cases. The resulting
stochastic bilevel problem in both cases is not tractable with a large number of scenarios, lim-
iting our ability to perform detailed analysis. Since stochastic bilevel problems are generally
hard to solve, we focus on finding high-quality feasible solutions to the problems relatively
fast. We proposed an algorithm that uses the problem’s underlying network structure to find
feasible solutions using an iterative approach. The computational experiments on randomly
generated instances of different sizes show the algorithm’s high computational efficiency. The
analysis clearly shows that we attain high-quality solutions using the algorithm, with the
feasible solutions found being very close to the optimal solutions.
The stochastic bilevel model is then used to study the strategic interaction between
two players, an LNG operator and an NG producer, in the natural gas market. The LNG
operator is considered to be the leader since his decisions are high-cost, high-impact, and
have long-term effects. Hence, we also explore how both players’ optimal strategies change
depending on the LNG operator’s risk behavior. The case study explores the Gulf-Southwest
region of the U.S. with demand uncertainty in the LNG market, spot market, and the LNG
operator’s gas procurement market. We see that a risk-averse decision-maker ends up making
more conservative decisions, resulting in a lower expected profit but does not incur a loss
in any scenario. In contrast, following the risk-neutral solution results in a higher expected
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profit but can result in an overall loss if faced with a specific, unfavorable scenario. When
following a risk-neutral strategy, the decision to have multiple LNG facilities open provides
the LNG operator with some control over the prices the NG producer charges for the gas.
Meanwhile, employing the more conservative approach under the risk-averse strategy results
in the LNG operator losing the ability to exert any control over the gas price, essentially
acting as a price taker. Hence, we see that each risk-based strategy has several pros and
cons, and the decisions can change drastically when the risk behavior of the decision-maker
changes.
5.2 Limitations
As with any mathematical model, the modeling frameworks proposed in this dissertation
also have their limitations. The multi-decadal timeframe and national scope of the problem
considered in Chapter 2 required us to make several simplifying assumptions in order to
address the questions we set out to explore. The model described in Chapter 2 considers
temporal and spatial aggregation to a level that may fail to shed light on the detailed dispatch
with high resolution in space or time. Since we use the model to identify possible long-term
transition pathways of the U.S. electricity system under different policy settings as opposed
to its exact path of evolution, the assumptions made do not significantly impact the results
gleaned from the analysis. We assume five-year time steps to reduce the computational
burden associated with solving the large-scale model. While using a more refined time
step could help accommodate factors like incorporating precise construction lead times for
different technologies, this would not affect the results significantly given the long analysis
time frame.
Similarly, modeling the U.S. electricity system as being controlled by single optimizing
agent that manages all investment and operational decisions to minimize cost is an abstrac-
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tion of the much more complex decision-making structure in reality. In reality, the U.S.
electricity system is managed by many different decision-makers, who may not always have
a common goal in mind when making decisions. The assumption of perfect foresight in
parameters does not hold as the parameters become more uncertain as time progresses. Al-
though we attempt to explore the variations of the model outcomes across several important
parameterizations using scenario and sensitivity analysis, several other parameter assump-
tions may not be precise representations of how they would evolve in reality. Some of the
model parameters like upper bounds on technology growth rates are relatively subjective
values adopted from the literature or approximated based on historical experience. As is
the case in essentially any energy modeling study that develops long-term scenarios, the
modeling framework is unable to predict the emergence of fundamentally new technologies
that could be introduced before 2050.
In Chapter 3, the primary objective of the modeling and analysis is to understand the
strategic interactions between an LNG operator and an NG producer operating under a non-
cooperative setting. The main idea was to develop a tractable bilevel model capable of aiding
in both players’ decision-making while accounting for the effects of the LNG export industry’s
growth on the domestic gas markets. The model’s computational tractability is preserved by
considering both players in isolation and observing their interaction dynamics. However, this
computational tractability comes with some limitations. One of the main limitations of this
modeling approach is that we consider only one LNG operator in the upper-level who owns
and operates the LNG infrastructure network and one NG producer in the lower-level who
owns and operates all the production facilities and the pipeline network. This assumption
effectively enforces each player’s monopoly in their respective supply chain segments, which
contrasts with reality. Natural gas markets are often quite competitive, with multiple LNG
operators and NG producers operating concurrently in a given region. Besides, the natural
gas supply chain consists of multiple moving parts or players operating in tandem, including
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the other players like the pipeline operator, traders, and storage operators. However, we do
not explicitly model these other players in our framework. Moreover, we assume that the
pipeline network is owned and operated by the NG producer, although it is generally owned
and operated by a separate entity in real-world markets.
The stochastic bilevel model we consider in Chapter 4 is designed to get an overarching
idea of how uncertainty in the future demand and the decision-maker’s risk preferences can
impact the optimal strategies of both the players. Most of the limitations of the model
described in Chapter 3 apply to this model as well since we create this model by extending
the model in Chapter 3 to incorporate demand uncertainty in the markets. We capture
the market uncertainty by considering different demand levels in the markets and using
them to specify different demand scenarios. We consider that different markets can face
different demand levels and the demand level in different markets are uncorrelated. We
define discrete probability distributions across all possible combinations of scenarios we can
achieve. The scenarios are constructed so that they represent the uncertainties in the market
to study the interactions between the LNG operator and the NG producer. Although we
can glean actionable insights from the discrete set of scenarios defined in the case study,
we lose the ability to conduct a detailed analysis by not considering continuous probability
distributions across the scenarios. Limiting the consideration to a discrete distribution and
a limited number of scenarios also helps manage the model’s computational burden that can
significantly increase with the number of scenarios.
Furthermore, for comparing the risk-averse and risk-neutral decision-making approaches,
we only consider the LNG operator to be risk-averse while assuming the NG producer to
be risk-neutral in both cases. Due to the less capital-intensive decisions of the NG producer
compared to the much lumpier and large-scale investment decisions of the LNG operator,
the NG producer’s risk behavior is not explicitly explored in the model described in Chapter
4. Although considering the LNG operator as a risk-averse decision-maker is more crucial
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given his high-cost and capital-intensive long-term investments, it may also be possible that
the NG producer chooses to be risk-averse as well. This specific instance of NG producer
as a risk-averse decision-maker alongside the LNG operator is not covered in our modeling
framework.
5.3 Future research directions
The electricity infrastructure modeling framework presented in Chapter 2 can be ex-
tended to address some of the limitations described in Section 5.2. The model provided can
be modified to address a variety of problems. It can be employed as a short-term decision-
making tool by reducing the time horizon considered for the analysis. Reducing the time
horizon allows the user to add more spatial and temporal resolution to the model without
significantly increasing its computational complexity. For instance, the 13 regions considered
in the study can be further disaggregated to represent states or counties as required to at-
tain more spatial resolution in the model. As mentioned in Section 5.2, the analysis assumes
perfect foresight and does not explicitly model the uncertainties associated with some of the
parameters. The model results indicate a shift to renewable generation as the time frame
progresses, which are guided in part by different parameters like the demand forecasts, costs
of renewables and how they would evolve in the future, their capacity factors, and other fuel
prices. Although we conduct a series of sensitivity analyses to address the result’s robustness
to some of these parameters, a stochastic programming model can be employed to attain a
more realistic representation of the system and its uncertainties. This stochastic framework
can be especially critical if the model is employed as a short-term decision-making tool for
investment and operational decisions at the utility level.
Another possible extension to the model with higher spatial resolution would be to
consider the technology investment decisions to be integer variables to construct an MILP
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in place of the LP, which can help provide more accurate and detailed investment decisions.
Similarly, including binary variables to capture the addition of generation capacities only
in pre-specified quantities can realistically capture the behavior for certain technologies for
which capacities generally get added in set bulk values. Similarly, the analysis presented
in Chapter 2 can also be further extended to include the transportation sector into the
model, which can help study different policy implications related to the electrification of
the transportation sector in the U.S. and the integration between electricity generation and
electric vehicle loads.
In the current model, resource adequacy is modeled using a constraint that ensures
that the net contribution to generation from each technology type balances the forecasted
peak load along with a reserve margin buffer. This representation of different generation
technologies’ contribution using pre-specified capacity credits becomes an unrealistic rep-
resentation, especially as the renewable fraction in generation increases. Since the results
clearly show a transition to a generation fleet with over 40% renewable generation, as the
capacity investments in renewable technologies increase, we are not accurately representing
the contributions of these technologies towards satisfying peak demand. Hence, it will be a
valuable contribution to the model if we can find a more realistic way to model the capacity
credits for renewable generation technologies like wind and solar PV without adding to the
model’s computational complexity.
There could be many extensions to the bilevel model that is presented in Chapter 3.
One of the main limitations of the model as discussed in Section 5.2 is the assumption of a
single LNG operator and NG producer, which effectively grants each player a monopoly in its
respective level of the market. Considering multiple players in the lower-level problem while
retaining a single player in the upper level leads to a single-leader-multiple-follower bilevel
structure, which has been implemented in the literature (Pozo et al., 2017). This model can
effectively capture the natural gas market’s competitive nature with multiple players, hence
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avoiding the monopolistic behavior in the natural gas markets while still considering that
LNG terminals are owned and operated by a single player.
Furthermore, both the players’ monopolistic behavior can be further moderated by con-
sidering multiple decision-makers in the upper and lower-level problems. The resulting model
considers multiple LNG operators and multiple NG producers operating in tandem in their
respective markets, effectively competing against each other. The ensuing multiple-leader-
multiple-follower structure ultimately leads to a more comprehensive formulation that can
provide more realistic results regarding the prices and actual natural gas consumption in the
markets. The general computational intractability of bilevel problems and the difficulties
associated with solving them presents a serious computational challenge. Besides, the liter-
ature on multiple-leader-multiple-follower bilevel problems is minimal, providing for a novel
and challenging problem.
The model presented in Chapter 3 considers the LNG operator and the NG producer
and their interactions in isolation. We also assume that the pipeline network is owned and
operated by the NG producer, which in reality is done by a separate pipeline operator.
A natural extension of the model would be to consider a pipeline operator as a follower
alongside the NG producer, resulting in a single-leader-multiple-follower bilevel model. The
LNG operator would be the leader, and the NG producer and the pipeline operator will be
followers, each of the players acting with the objective of maximizing their individual profits
while anticipating the actions of the other players. Alternatively, this interaction can also
be modeled using a tri-level model representing the actions of the LNG operator, the NG
producer, and the pipeline operator.
The stochastic bilevel model considered in Chapter 4 extends the model presented in
Chapter 3 to incorporate demand uncertainty in the markets. Hence, most of the proposed
extensions for the bilevel model can be applied to the stochastic bilevel model as well,
like considering multiple leaders and multiple followers in the upper-level and lower-level
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problems. This model can lead to a much richer formulation that can more realistically
represent the natural gas market. Another avenue worth exploring would be to study how
the NG producer and LNG operator’s decisions change when the LNG operator and the NG
producer are both risk-averse decision-makers.
The model analyzed for the case study in Chapter 4 follows a discrete demand distribu-
tion, constructed based on deviation from the base demand curve estimated from the data.
The model and solution methodology can be effectively extended to accommodate continu-
ous demand distributions in conjunction with relevant scenario reduction techniques. The
estimation of demand distribution can be challenging and would require access to detailed
historical demand data. Suppose the underlying probability distribution remains unknown,
or we are unable to estimate the distribution accurately due to lack of data. In that case,
we can consider using a distributionally robust optimization (DRO) approach that considers
that the actual distribution lies in an ambiguity set of probability distributions. Significant
research has been done in the theory, modeling, and solution methodology development in
the area of distributionally robust optimization in the past years. There are examples of
models that present DRO in the context of risk-averse optimization as well in the literature.
Hence, the extension of the risk-based stochastic bilevel model considered in Chapter 4 using





U.S. electricity infrastructure of the future:
Generation and transmission pathways through 2050
A.1 Sensitivity analysis results
Table A.1. Variation in non-renewable, renewable, and transmission capacity additions with the







Year δ = 3% δ = 5% δ = 7% δ = 3% δ = 5% δ = 7% δ = 3% δ = 5% δ = 7%
2020 1224.1 1223.3 1222.7 275.4 275.4 275.4 1298.9 1298.9 1298.9
2025 1309.3 1308.6 1308.1 322.7 322.6 322.6 3403.4 3403.4 3403.4
2030 1422.7 1421.9 1421.0 408.4 408.3 408.2 5362.1 5362.1 5362.1
2035 1563.9 1563.0 1562.3 539.8 539.3 538.3 7371.5 7371.5 7371.5
2040 1791.1 1790.7 1786.7 723.8 723.8 723.4 7371.5 7371.5 7371.5
2045 2071.2 2070.8 2068.7 1032.0 1031.4 1031.1 7371.5 7371.5 7371.5
2050 2179.4 2178.4 2177.3 1111.8 1110.5 1109.4 7371.5 7371.5 7371.5
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Table A.2. Variation in non-renewable, renewable, and transmission capacity additions with the
value of ξ, the parameter that controls the fractional contribution of import transmission capacity







Year ξ = 0.1 ξ = 0.5 ξ = 0.9 ξ = 0.1 ξ = 0.5 ξ = 0.9 ξ = 0.1 ξ = 0.5 ξ = 0.9
2020 1227.2 1223.3 1219.4 275.8 275.4 275.3 1298.9 1298.9 1298.9
2025 1313.2 1308.6 1304.1 323.0 322.6 322.4 3403.4 3403.4 3403.4
2030 1426.5 1421.9 1417.4 408.9 408.3 408.0 5362.1 5362.1 5362.1
2035 1567.6 1563.0 1558.3 539.7 539.3 538.6 7371.5 7371.5 7371.5
2040 1795.3 1790.7 1788.4 726.3 723.8 720.2 7371.5 7371.5 7371.5
2045 2075.4 2070.8 2068.5 1032.9 1031.4 1027.8 7371.5 7371.5 7371.5
2050 2183.0 2178.4 2176.1 1112.8 1110.5 1106.9 7371.5 7371.5 7371.5
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Table A.3. Variation in annual CO2 emissions and minimized objective value with the emissions
reduction target mandated for 2050. The increase in cost is relative to the No Policy scenario with
no emissions reduction target in place.









2016 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
50 5051.6 0.0 1720.1 1388.2 1177.8 1072.7 894.3 890.5 722.5 814.8
60 5150.6 1.9 1720.1 1388.6 1177.6 1072.3 892.8 885.3 718.7 688.0
70 5328.9 5.5 1720.1 1388.6 1176.5 1070.2 887.4 870.2 693.1 516.0
80 5498.4 8.8 1720.1 1387.0 1174.1 1066.1 862.9 748.7 546.4 344.0
90 5763.6 14.1 1720.1 1377.4 1163.0 1051.1 827.3 627.3 399.7 172.0
92.5 5973.3 18.2 1720.1 1376.7 1163.4 1046.1 821.7 597.0 363.0 129.0
95 6278.0 24.3 1720.1 1373.6 1159.9 1036.0 806.9 566.6 326.3 86.0
97.5 6726.2 33.1 1720.1 1367.0 1153.7 1023.8 782.9 536.3 289.6 43.0
100 8554.3 69.3 1720.1 1369.0 1136.0 1000.1 758.9 505.9 252.9 0
A.2 Full model formulation
Sets
YEAR Set of years; y ∈ Y
REGION Set of regions; r ∈ R
TECHNOLOGY Set of technologies; t ∈ T
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TIMESLICE Set of timeslices; l ∈ L
FUEL Set of fuels; f ∈ F
EMISSION Set of emissions; e ∈ E
MODEOFOPERATION Mode of operations for technologies; m ∈M
SEASON Set of seasons; se ∈ SE
STORAGE Set of storage technologies; s ∈ S
Subsets
NONRENEWABLE Set of non-renewable technologies (subset of tech-
nologies); t ∈ NRT
RENEWABLE Set of renewable technologies(subset of technolo-
gies); t ∈ RT
Parameters
Global
YearSplitl,y Fraction of year y in timeslice l
TimeSliceInSeasonl,s Timeslice l in season s
DiscountRater,t Discount rate for technology t in year y
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StepSize Time step considered for the model (5 years)
BaseYear Start year of the study (2016)
EndYear Final year included in the study (2050)
Demand
SpecifiedAnnualDemandr,f,y Demand for fuel f in region r in year y
SpecifiedDemandProfiler,l,t,y Fraction of annual demand for fuel f in timeslice
l in region r in year y
AccumulatedAnnualDemandr,f,y Total exogenous demand of each fuel f in region
r in year y
Performance
CapacityToActivityUnitr,t Potential quantity of electricity that could be pro-
duced by each available GW capacity of technol-
ogy t in region r
TechWithCapacityToMeetPeakTSr,t Technology t that can contribute to meet the peak
demand in region r
CapacityFactorr,t,l,y Fraction of the capacity of technology t available
for generation in timeslice l in region r in year y
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AvailabilityFactorr,t Fraction of the time technology t is available an-
nually for generation in region r
OperationalLifer,t Operational lifetime of technology t in region r
ResidualCapacityr,t,y Existing capacity of technology t in region r at
the beginning of year y
InputActivityRatior,t,f,m,y Rate of use of fuel f as a ratio to the rate of ac-
tivity of the technology t when in m mode of op-
eration in region r in year y
OutputActivityRatior,t,f,m,y Rate of production of fuel f as a ratio to the rate
of activity of the technology t in operation mode
m in region r in year y
Technology costs
CapitalCostr,t,y Capital cost of each technology t in a region r for
year y
VariableCostr,t,m,y Variable cost of operating technology t in mode m
in region r in year y
FixedCostr,t,y Fixed cost for maintaining technology t in region
r in year y
Storage parameters
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TechnologyToStorager,t,s,m Indicates which technologies t can contribute
(mode of operation m = 1, charging) to storage s
in mode of operation m (= 1) in region r
TechnologyFromStorager,t,s,m Indicates which technologies t can use (mode of
operation m = 2, discharging) stored energy from
storage technology s in region r
MinStorageCharger,s,y Minimum storage charge in storage s in region r
in year y
ConversionLosss Conversion loss in storage s when charging and
discharging
Cbattery Conversion coefficient for battery capacity to
charging limits
Capacity parameters
TotalAnnualMaxCapacityr,t,y Maximum allowable capacity for technology t in
region r in year y
TotalAnnualMinCapacityr,t,y Minimum allowable capacity for technology t in
region r in year y
Technology growth parameters
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MaxCapacityGrowthRater,t Maximum growth rate for technology t in region
r in each time step of the model
StartUpValuet Capacity available to start investments in new
technology t
Investment parameters
AnnualMaxCapInvestmentr,t,y Maximum capacity investment possible in tech-
nology t in year y in region r
AnnualMinCapInvestmentr,t,y Minimum capacity investment possible in technol-
ogy t in year y in region r
Activity parameters
AnnualActivityUpperLimitr,t,y Maximum production from technology t in year y
in region r
AnnualActivityLowerLimitr,t,y Minimum production from technology t in year y
in region r
ModelPeriodActivityUpperLimitr,t Maximum production from from technology t in
region r for the whole model time frame
ModelPeriodActivityLowerLimitr,t Minimum production from technology t in region
r for the whole model time frame
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Reserve margin parameters
ReserveMarginTagTechnologyr,t,y Indicates if technology t can contribute towards
reserve margin in region r in year y
ReserveMarginTagFuelr,f,y Indicates in a reserve margin should be main-
tained for fuel f in region r in year y
ReserveMarginr,y The reserve margin to be maintained in region r
in year y
Emissions & emission penalties
EmissionActivityRatior,t,e,m,y The the rate of pollutant e emitted as a ratio to
the rate of a mode of activity m for a technology
t in region r in year y
EmissionsPenaltyr,e,y Cost per unit of pollutant e emitted in region r in
year y
AnnualExogenousEmissionr,e,y Exogenous emissions for pollutant e in region r in
year y




CostMatrixr1,r2,f,y The variable cost of transmission for fuel f from
region r1 to r2 in year y
DistanceMatrixr1,r2 Geographical distance between region r1 and r2
(centroidal distance)
ResidualTransmissionCapacityr1,r2,f,y Existing transmission capacity between region r1
to r2 for fuel f in year y
TransmissionCapitalCostr1,r2,f,y Capital cost of installing a transmission capacity
between region r1 to r2 for fuel f in year y
CapacityPerTransmissionLaney Capacity of each transmission line installed in year
y. Energy in GW per 345 kV line
MaxTransmissionGrowthRater1,r2,f Maximum rate at which transmission capacity for
fuel f can grow between regions r1 and r2
OperationalLifeTransmissionr Operational lifetime of transmission in region r





NewCapacity(r,t,y) New investment in capacity for
technology t in year y in region r
AccumulatedNewCapacity(r,t,y) Total new capacity investments in
technology t till year y in region r
TotalCapacityAnnual(r,t,y) Total capacity (residual + new)
available for technology t in year y
in region r
Activity variables
Activity(r,l,t,m,y) This variable indicates if a technol-
ogy t is operating under any mode
m (producing or using a fuel) in a
given timeslice l in year y in region
r
RateOfActivity(r,l,t,m,y) The rate of activity for technology
t operating under mode m in times-
lice l in year y in region r
RateOfTotalActivity(r,l,t,y) Total rate of activity for technology
t in timeslice l in year y in region r
TotalTechnologyAnnualActivity(r,t,y) Total activity for technology t in
year y in region r
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TotalAnnualTechnologyActivityByMode(r,t,m,y) Total activity for technology t in
mode m for year y in region r
RateOfProductionByTechnologyByMode(r,l,t,m,f,y) Total production of fuel f from
technology t when in operation
mode m in timeslice l in year y in
region r
RateOfProductionByTechnology(r,l,t,f,y) Rate of production of fuel f from
technology t in timeslice l in year y
in region r
ProductionByTechnology(r,l,t,f,y) Production of fuel f from technol-
ogy t in timeslice l in year y in re-
gion r
ProductionByTechnologyAnnual(r,f,t,y) Total production of fuel f from
technology t in year y in region r
RateOfProduction(r,l,f,y) Total rate of production of fuel f
from all technologies in timeslice l
in year y in region r
Production(r,l,f,y) Total production of fuel f from all
technologies in timeslice l in year y
in region r
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RateOfUseByTechnologyByMode(r,l,t,m,f,y) Rate of use of fuel f by technology t
when in operation modem in times-
lice l in year y in region r
RateOfUseByTechnology(r,l,t,f,y) Rate of use of fuel f by technology
t in timeslice l in year y in region r
UseByTechnology(r,l,t,f,y) Use of fuel f by technology t in
timeslice l in year y in region r
UseByTechnologyAnnual(r,t,f,y) Total use of fuel f by technology t
in year y in region r
RateOfUse(r,l,f,y) Rate of use of fuel f by technology
t in year y in region r
Use(r,l,f,y) Total use of fuel f by all technolo-
gies in timeslice l in year y in region
r
Demand variables
RateOfDemand(r,l,f,y) Rate of demand for fuel f in times-
lice l in year y in region r
Demand(r,l,f,y) Demand for fuel f in timeslice l in
year y in region r
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ProductionAnnual(r,f,y) Total production of fuel f in year y
in region r
UseAnnual(r,f,y) Total use of fuel f in year y in re-
gion r
Cost variables
CapitalInvestment(r,t,y) Capital investment costs for tech-
nology t in year y in region r
DiscountedCapitalInvestment(r,t,y) Discounted capital investment costs
for technology t in year y in region
r
SalvageValue(r,t,y) Salvage value for technology t in
year y in region r
DiscountedSalvageValue(r,t,y) Discounted salvage value for tech-
nology t in year y in region r
OperatingCost(r,t,y) Operational costs for technology t
in year y in region r
OperatingCostBaseYear(r,t,y) Operational costs discounted to the
beginning of the 5 year period
(StepSize)
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DiscountedOperatingCost(r,t,y) Discounted operational costs for
technology t in year y in region r
AnnualVariableOperatingCost(r,t,y) Variable costs associated with tech-
nology t in year y in region r
AnnualFixedOperatingCost(r,t,y) Fixed costs associated with technol-
ogy t in year y in region r
VariableOperatingCost(r,t,l,y) Operational costs for technology t
in timeslice l in year y in region r
TotalDiscountedCost(r,t,y) Total discounted costs for technol-
ogy t in year y in region r
ModelPeriodCostByRegionr Total cost for full model timeframe
for region r
Storage variables
NetStorageCharge(s,r,l,y) Net storage charge in storage s in
timeslice l in year y in region r
StorageLevel(s,r,l,y) Storage level in storage s in times-
lice l in year y in region r
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StorageCharge(s,r,l,y) Net storage charge going into stor-
age s in timeslice l in year y in re-
gion r
StorageDischarge(s,r,l,y) Net discharge from storage s in
timeslice l in year y in region r
StorageUpperLimit(s,r,y) Maximum charge storage s can hold
in year y in region r
StorageLowerLimit(s,r,y) Minimum charge storage s can hold
in year y in region r
Reserve margin variables
TotalCapacityInReserveMargin(r,y) Total reserve margin capacity re-
quired in region r in year y
DemandNeedingReserveMargin(r,l,y) Demand needing reserve margin in
timeslice l in region r in year y
NetRenewableFraction(r,y) The fraction of reserve margin met
by renewable technologies in region
r in year y
Emission variables
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AnnualTechnologyEmissionByMode(r,t,e,m,y) Emissions of pollutant s from tech-
nology t operating in mode m in
year y in region r
AnnualTechnologyEmission(r,t,e,y) Emissions of pollutant s from tech-
nology t in year y in region r
AnnualTechEmissionPenaltyByEmission(r,t,e,y) Emissions penalty for pollutant s
emitted by technology t in year y
in region r
AnnualTechnologyEmissionsPenalty(r,t,y) Total emissions penalty in year y in
region r
DiscountedTechnologyEmissionsPenalty(r,t,y) Discounted total emissions penalty
in year y in region r
Transmission variables
RateofImports(r1,r2,f,l,y) Rate of imports for fuel f from re-
gion r1 and r2 for timeslice l in year
y
Imports(r1,r2,f,l,y) Imports for fuel f from region r1
and r2 for timeslice l in year y
AnnualImportCost(r,y) Cost of imports to a region r in year
y
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DiscountedAnnualImportCost(r,y) Discounted cost of imports to a re-
gion r in year y
DiscountedAnnualTransmissionCost(r,y) Discounted cost of transmission in
a region r in year y
TransmissionCapitalInvestment(r1,r2,f,y) Capital cost of investing in trans-
mission between region r1 and r2 in
year y
DiscTransmissionCapitalInvestment(r1,r2,f,y) Discounted capital cost of investing
in transmission between region r1
and r2 in year y
SalvageValueTransmission(r1,r2,f,y) Salvage value of transmission in-
vestments between region r1 and r2
in year y
DiscSalvageValueTransmission(r1,r2,f,y) Discounted salvage value of trans-
mission investments between region
r1 and r2 in year y
NewTransmissionCapacity(r1,r2,f,y) New transmission investment ca-
pacity between region r1 and r2 in
year y
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AccumulatedNewTransmissionCapacity(r1,r2,f,y) Net new transmission investment
capacity between region r1 and r2
until year y
TotalTransmissionCapacityAnnual(r1,r2,f,y) Total transmission investment ca-

















RateOfDemand(r,l,f,y) ∗ YearSplit(l,y) = SpecifiedAnnualDemand(r,f,y) ∗





RateOfActivity(r,l,t,m,y) ∗ YearSplit(l,y) ∗
(TechnologyToStorage(r,t,s,m)−TechnologyFromStorage(r,t,s,m)) ∀ r ∈ R, s ∈ S, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y
NetStorageCharge(s,r,l,y) = StorageLevel(s,r,l,y)−
StorageLevel(s,r,l−1,y) ∀ r ∈ R, s ∈ S, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y
StorageLevel(s,r,l,y) ≥ StorageLowerLimit(s,r,y) ∗DaysInSeasonl ∀ r ∈ R, s ∈ S, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y
StorageLevel(s,r,l,y) ≤ StorageUpperLimit(s,r,y) ∗DaysInSeasonl ∀ r ∈ R, s ∈ S, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y
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StorageLowerLimit(s,r,y) = MinStorageCharge(s,r,y) ∗
StorageUpperLimit(s,r,y) ∀ r ∈ R, s ∈ S, y ∈ Y






NewCapacity(r,f,y) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ Y
TotalCapacityAnnual(r,t,y) = AccumulatedNewCapacity(r,t,y)+




RateOfActivity(r,l,t,m,y) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y
RateOfTotalActivity(r,l,t,y) ≤ TotalCapacityAnnual(r,t,y) ∗ CapacityFactor(r,t,l,y) ∗
CapacityToActivityUnit(r,t) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y∑
l∈L




CapacityFactor(r,t,l,y) ∗AvailabilityFactor(r,t,y) ∗CapacityToActivityUnit(r,t) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ Y
Energy Balance
RateOfProductionByTechnologyByMode(r,l,t,m,f,y) = RateOfActivity(r,l,t,m,y)
∗OutputActivityRatio(r,t,f,m,y) ∀ r ∈ R, l ∈ L, t ∈ T, f ∈ F,m ∈M, y ∈ Y∑
m∈M
RateOfProductionByTechnologyByMode(r,l,t,m,f,y) =




RateOfProduction(r,l,f,y) ∀ r ∈ R, f ∈ F, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y
Production(r,l,f,y) = RateOfProduction(r,l,f,y) ∗ YearSplit(l,y) ∀ r ∈ R, f ∈ F, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y
RateOfUseByTechnologyByMode(r,l,t,m,f,y) = RateOfActivity(r,l,t,m,y)
∗ InputActivityRatio(r,t,f,m,y) ∀ r ∈ R, l ∈ L, t ∈ T, f ∈ F,m ∈M, y ∈ Y∑
m∈M
RateOfUseByTechnologyByMode(r,l,t,m,f,y) =
RateOfUseByTechnology(r,l,t,f,y) ∀ r ∈ R, l ∈ L, t ∈ T, f ∈ F, y ∈ Y∑
t∈T
RateOfUseByTechnology(r,l,t,f,y) = RateOfUse(r,l,f,y) ∀ r ∈ R, f ∈ F, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y
Use(r,l,f,y) = RateOfUse(r,l,f,y) ∗ YearSplit(l,y) ∀ r ∈ R, f ∈ F, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y
Demand(r,l,f,y) = RateOfDemand(r,l,f,y) ∗ YearSplit(l,y) ∀ r ∈ R, f ∈ F, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y
Production(r,l,f,y) ≥ Demand(r,l,f,y) + Use(r,l,f,y) ∀ r ∈ R, f ∈ F, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y
Capital Cost




∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ Y
Operational Cost∑
m∈M
TotalAnnualTechnologyActivityByMode(r,t,m,y) ∗ VariableCost(r,t,m,y) =
AnnualVariableOperatingCost(r,t,y) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ Y
AnnualFixedOperatingCost(r,t,y) = FixedCost(r,t,y) ∗












∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ Y
DiscountedOperatingCost(r,t,y) =
OperatingCostBaseYear(r,t,y)
(1 + DiscountRate(r,t))(y−BaseYear +0.5)
∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ Y
Salvage Value
SalvageValue(r,t,y) = 0 ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ {y : y + OperationalLife(r,t) < EndYear}
SalvageValue(r,t,y) =












DiscountedSalvageValue(r,t,y) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ Y
Capacity Growth Rate
NewCapacity(r,t,y) ≤ TotalCapacityAnnual(r,t−StepSize,y)∗
MaxCapacityGrowthRate(r,t) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ Y
Capacity Constraints
NewCapacity(r,t,y) ≤ AnnualMaxCapInvestment(r,t,y) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ Y
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NewCapacity(r,t,y) ≥ AnnualMinCapInvestment(r,t,y) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ Y
AccumulatedNewCapacity(r,t,y) ≤ TotalAnnualMaxCapacity(r,t,y) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, y ∈ Y





RateOfActivity(r,l,t,m,y) ∗ YearSplit(l,y) ≤




RateOfActivity(r,l,t,m,y) ∗ YearSplit(l,y) ≥






RateOfActivity(r,l,t,m,y) ∗ YearSplit(l,y) ≤
ModelPeriodActivityUpperLimit(r,t) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T∑
m,l,y
RateOfActivity(r,l,t,m,y) ∗ YearSplit(l,y) ≥
ModelPeriodActivityLowerLimit(r,t) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T
Reserve Margins Constraints∑
t∈NRT










TotalCapacityAnnual(r,t,y) ∗ CapacityFactor(r,t,l,y) ∗
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ReserveMarginTagFuel(r,f,y) ∀ r ∈ R, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y
TotalCapacityInReserveMargin(r,y) = DemandNeedingReserveMargin(r,l,y)∗





EmissionActivityRatio(r,t,e,m,y) ∗ YearSplit(l,y) =
AnnualTechnologyEmission(r,t,e,y) ∀ r ∈ R, t ∈ T, e ∈ E, y ∈ Y
Flow Balance




Import(i,r,l,f,y) ≥ Demand(r,l,f,y) + Use(r,l,f,y)+∑
i∈R


















NewTransmissionCapacity(i,r,f,yy) ∀ i ∈ R, r ∈ R, f ∈ F, y ∈ Y,
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yy ∈ {yy : y − yy ≥ 0, y − yy < OperationalLifeTransmissionr}
TotalTransmissionCapacityAnnual(i,r,f,y) = AccumulatedNewTransmissionCapacity(i,r,f,y)+
ResidualTransmissionCapacity(i,r,f,y) ∀ i ∈ R, r ∈ R, f ∈ F, y ∈ Y
RateofImports(i,r,f,l,y) ≤ TotalTransmissionCapacityAnnual(i,r,f,y)∗
CapacityToActivityRatioTransmission(r,f) ∀ i ∈ R, r ∈ R, f ∈ F, l ∈ L, y ∈ Y∑
l∈L
Imports(i,r,f,l,y) ≤ ConversionCoeff∗











∀ r ∈ R, y ∈ Y
DiscountedAnnualImportCost(r,y) =
AnnualImportCostBaseYear(r,y)
(1 + DiscountRater)(y−BaseYear +0.5)
∀ r ∈ R, y ∈ Y
Salvage Value Transmission
SalvageValueTransmission(i,r,f,y) = 0
∀ i ∈ R, r ∈ R, f ∈ F, y ∈ {y : y + OperationalLifeTransmissionr < EndYear}
SalvageValueTransmission(i,r,t,y) = TransmissionCapitalInvestment(i,r,f,y)∗
1− (1 + DiscountRateTransmission(r,f))EndYear−y+1 − 1
(1 + DiscountRateTransmission(r,f))OperationalLifeTransmissionr −1














DiscSalvageValueTransmission(i,r,f,y) ∀r ∈ R, y ∈ Y
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Appendix B
Strategic interactions between liquefied natural gas
and domestic gas markets: A bilevel model
B.1 Sensitivity analysis: pipeline investment cost
The following table presents the sensitivity of pipeline capacity investments to the unit
capacity cost of pipeline investments. Although the current costs assumed in the model do
not result in any pipeline capacity investments, lowering the costs associated with building
the pipelines in effect increases the pipeline capacity investments. The sensitivity analysis
is conducted by varying the pipeline investment costs to fractions of the currently assumed
pipeline investment costs Cpipe. The results of the sensitivity analysis are summarized in
Table. B.1.
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Table B.1. Sensitivity of pipeline investments to costs.
Pipeline costs (as
fraction of Cpipe)










Risk-averse stochastic bilevel programming: An
application to natural gas markets
C.1 27 scenario solution
In this section, we present the results for the problem discussed in the case study with
nine nodes for 27 scenarios. We generate the scenarios employing a similar strategy described
in Section 4.7.1., where each market could face demand scenarios of high (H), medium (M),
and low (L) demand with a given probability (ψmarketdemand). We assume that the uncertainties
in each market are uncorrelated with the other markets. Thus, the demand uncertainties in
the LNG market, gas procurement market for the LNG operator, and the spot market are
independent of each other. This set of demand uncertainties considered for all three of the
markets, namely the LNG market, LNG operator’s gas procurement market, and the NG
spot market, leads to a total of 27 scenarios.
The investment results for the risk-averse LNG operator and risk-neutral NG producer
are summarized in Table C.1. The results, including production, gas procured by the LNG
operator, spot sales, and average gas prices for both the spot market and LNG operator’s
gas procurement market for the 27 scenario problem, are provided in Table C.2. The LNG
market results, including sales and LNG market prices, are reported in Table C.3. We see
similar overall results as those under the 9 scenario case regarding the overall investment
capacities and locations. The scenario-specific results are different as the 27 scenario case
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Table C.1. Investment decisions for risk averse decision maker for 9 scenario and 27 scenario.
Variable 9 scenario 27 scenario
Number of LNG facilities open 1 1
Total LNG capacity open 1000.0 1000.0
Total production capacity 6894.977 6872.518
LNG operator’s (Leader) expected profit 4.3953 4.3561
NG producer’s (Follower) expected profit 46.9584 46.5082
can account for more demand setting the markets would face and how each interacts with
the other’s dynamics. The LNG operator’s lowest gas price achieved is lower in this case
compared to the 9 scenario case. The regional spot prices are similar in both the 27 scenarios
and the 9 scenario case. We see similar trends in the LNG market dynamics as well, with
the total LNG sales and the average LNG market prices.
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1 (H, H, H) 6872.518 1000.000 5872.518 10.046625 10.763
2 (H, H, M) 6163.233 1000.000 5163.234 8.747375 10.763
3 (H, H, L) 4442.278 1000.000 3442.279 8.747125 10.763
4 (H, M, H) 6872.518 1000.000 5872.518 10.046625 7.565
5 (H, M, M) 6163.232 1000.000 5163.233 8.747375 7.565
6 (H, M, L) 4442.278 1000.000 3442.279 8.747125 7.565
7 (H, L, H) 6872.518 1000.000 5872.518 10.046625 1.170
8 (H, L, M) 6163.232 1000.000 5163.233 8.747375 1.170
9 (H, L, L) 4442.279 1000.000 3442.279 8.747125 1.170
10 (M, H, H) 6872.518 1000.000 5872.518 10.046625 10.763
11 (M, H, M) 6163.232 1000.000 5163.233 8.747375 10.763
12 (M, H, L) 4442.278 1000.000 3442.279 8.747125 10.763
13 (M, M, H) 6872.518 1000.000 5872.518 10.046625 7.565
14 (M, M, M) 6163.233 1000.000 5163.234 8.747375 7.565
15 (M, M, L) 4442.278 1000.000 3442.279 8.747125 7.565
16 (M, L, H) 6872.518 931.051 5941.469 9.976375 2.493
17 (M, L, M) 6163.232 1000.000 5163.233 8.747375 1.170
18 (M, L, L) 4149.595 707.300 3442.295 8.747125 6.786
19 (L, H, H) 6872.518 1000.000 5872.518 10.046625 10.763
20 (L, H, M) 6163.232 1000.000 5163.233 8.747375 10.763
21 (L, H, L) 4442.278 1000.000 3442.279 8.747125 10.763
22 (L, M, H) 6872.518 931.051 5941.469 9.976375 8.447
23 (L, M, M) 6163.232 1000.000 5163.233 8.747375 7.565
24 (L, M, L) 4442.278 1000.000 3442.279 8.747125 7.565
25 (L, L, H) 6872.518 935.697 5936.822 9.981000 2.404
26 (L, L, M) 5949.504 786.236 5163.268 8.747375 5.271
27 (L, L, L) 4442.279 1000.000 3442.279 8.747125 1.170
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1 (H, H, H) 900.000 18.2000
2 (H, H, M) 900.000 18.2000
3 (H, H, L) 900.000 18.2000
4 (H, M, H) 900.000 18.2000
5 (H, M, M) 900.000 16.4995
6 (H, M, L) 900.000 18.2000
7 (H, L, H) 900.000 16.0335
8 (H, L, M) 900.000 16.4995
9 (H, L, L) 706.362 16.9635
10 (M, H, H) 900.000 17.4810
11 (M, H, M) 900.000 17.4810
12 (M, H, L) 900.000 17.4810
13 (M, M, H) 900.000 15.7805
14 (M, M, M) 900.000 15.7805
15 (M, M, L) 900.000 17.4810
16 (M, L, H) 837.946 17.6795
17 (M, L, M) 900.000 17.4810
18 (M, L, L) 636.570 18.3225
19 (L, H, H) 900.000 15.1170
20 (L, H, M) 900.000 15.1160
21 (L, H, L) 900.000 14.3430
22 (L, M, H) 722.999 16.8170
23 (L, M, M) 900.000 13.4920
24 (L, M, L) 900.000 15.9695
25 (L, L, H) 842.127 15.6725
26 (L, L, M) 707.612 16.9650
27 (L, L, L) 805.295 12.6190
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Youssef Almulla, Eunice Ramos, Thorsten Burandt, Gabriela Peña Balderrama, Gus-
tavo Nikolaus Pinto de Moura, Eduardo Zepeda, and Thomas Alfstad. From the de-
velopment of an open-source energy modelling tool to its application and the creation
of communities of practice: The example of OSeMOSYS. Energy Strategy Reviews, 20:
209–228, 2018.
Farhad Samadi Gazijahani and Javad Salehi. Optimal bilevel model for stochastic risk-based
planning of microgrids under uncertainty. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics,
14(7):3054–3064, 2017.
Vikas Goel, M Slusky, W-J van Hoeve, Kevin C Furman, and Yufen Shao. Constraint
programming for LNG ship scheduling and inventory management. European Journal of
Operational Research, 241(3):662–673, 2015.
191
Government of Canada. Natural Gas Facts, 2018. URL https://www.nrcan.
gc.ca/science-data/data-analysis/energy-data-analysis/energy-facts/
natural-gas-facts/20067#L6%20(canada%20provincial%20percentages).
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